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Since 2009, the Nigerian military has been fighting the insurgent and terror group Boko 
Haram in the Northeast region of Nigeria. In 2016, the Islamic State of West Africa 
Province (ISWAP) formed as an offshoot of Boko Haram and aligned with the remnants 
of ISIS. The Nigerian army has failed to defeat the insurgent groups and has, according to 
the research, committed abuses and atrocities, including extrajudicial killings, against the 
civilian population. The norms of military effectiveness, the normative theory of military 
performance and, the neorealist combat balance theory formed the theoretical basis for 
this study. The research questions addressed whether a nation’s military reflected its 
society and if the dysfunction in that society affected military performance. This 
qualitative study utilized a grounded constructivist approach in gathering data from seven 
active duty and retired military senior leadership and academics. Data analysis revealed 
that a nation’s military does mirror/reflect the society from which it emanated. The 
dysfunction found in society transfers to the military and is causally linked to battlefield 
failure and societal abuse. Specifically, this study identified the rabid dysfunction and 
corruption found within Nigerian society and linked societal dysfunction to army 
dysfunction. In addition, in a nation where tribalism dominates every aspect of life, this 
study found the army to be a tribe unto itself, further propagating the violent narrative 
against civilians. Positive social change may be possible if civilian and military 
leadership understands the dysfunctional social dynamic and its effects on State 
institutions, including the military, in a post-colonial African nation. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction to the Study
Since 2009, Nigeria has dealt with the radicalized Islamic sect Boko Haram, 
borne from Mallam Lawal’s organization, Shabab Muslim Youth Organization, founded 
in 1995. Though the Nigerian military has been fighting Boko Haram since the group 
acquired a violent mandate in 2009, it has experienced limited success with offensives 
and operations using conventional warfare tactics. As such, Boko Haram continues to be 
a potent force. Further, while carrying out conventional warfare doctrine, the military has 
committed abuses against the Nigerian population and, along with the terror groups, is 
responsible for citizens fleeing to relief and relocation camps. (Amnesty International, 
2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2016a).
The Nigerian army has the mandate from the political leadership to defeat Boko 
Haram and ISWAP and remove the groups from Nigeria. However, the military has 
failed to deny Boko Haram/ISWAP safe haven in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon and has 
failed to stop economic and material support from reaching the groups.  The Nigerian 
military must be viewed positively by the population, not feared as much as the terror 
groups. In abusing the people, the government risks moving civilians to support the 
insurgency. Boko Haram has capitalized on this reality by claiming that it is fighting 
government corruption and population abuse carried out by the military (Human Rights 
Watch, 2011). 
This disunity within the social and political structure represents the complexity 
that is Nigeria. The state governments contradict the federal state and are not unified with 
the federal government on many topics (Abdulhamid & Chima, 2016). 
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There are also geographical and religious divides. The south (majority Christian) 
population lacks concern for those in the North struggling with Boko Haram. For the 
most part, the population is unconcerned with a nationalistic-patriotic paradigm. Nigeria 
lacks a collective nationalism or a national identity as a nation-state. There is the Muslim 
North, the Christian South, and the tribal system that holds sectarian loyalty. 
Nationalism in Nigeria is found within local and regional ethnic, religious, and 
civic structures, denying a national identity and an avenue to Nigerian patriotism 
(Negedu & Atabor, 2015). For instance, the Northern States Elders Forum has accused 
Christian President Goodluck Johnathon of allowing Boko Haram to slaughter “good 
Muslims” in Northeast Nigeria (Doukhan, 2015). Though Muslims have opened their 
doors to the displaced and victimized despite the array of issues in Nigeria, this appears 
to be a localized phenomenon in northeastern Nigeria (Cohn, 2016). 
The basis for this study lay in determining whether the dysfunction within the 
Nigerian population contributes to the issues found in the Nigerian Army that affect 
efforts to defeat terror groups. Identifying the issues to success and defining how a 
nation-state can fight an in-house insurgency would not only assist Nigeria but any state 
dealing with a homegrown insurgent or terrorist organization. In addition, social change 
occurs when the military successfully engages the insurgency and protects the civilian 
population while doing so. 
This chapter includes a background on Nigeria and its social constructs, the 
threats that Boko Haram presents, the damage to the Nigerian population, and offerings 
from various scholars on how to end the Boko Haram insurgency from a sociological 
standpoint. The problem statement specifies the issue of dysfunctional societal influence 
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on military performance. Research questions are identified, and the conceptual 
framework addresses the complexity of Nigerian society. Additionally, operational terms 
and the nature of the study are identified. Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations are 
discussed. The significance of this study relates to the destruction of Boko Haram and the 
protection of the Nigerian people. 
Background
Boko Haram is not the first militancy group Nigeria faced since gaining its 
freedom from Great Britain in 1960 (Awortu, 2015). Other groups have included the 
Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist sect in northeast Nigeria; the Yoruba ethnic Odua 
People’s Congress in southwest Nigeria; the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the 
Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra, an Igbo ethnic group in southeast Nigeria; and 
the Niger Delta militants, which affects offshore commerce (E.A.D.W., 2016). 
According to the U.S. Department of State (2017), approximately 40 Middle 
Eastern and African terror organizations exist. Boko Haram’s strength has been estimated 
to be between 5,000 and 10,000 members, though numbers fluctuate (Warner & Hulme, 
2018). Boko Haram had diminished in capacity and effectiveness, but this may be 
nothing more than the natural flow in the life cycle of an insurgency (Leach, 2016).
Boko Haram operates as a criminal organization under the veil of Islam. Boko 
Haram has used tactics to incite fear, gain power, and notoriety, including kidnapping 
schoolgirls and women to be used as slaves, wives for members, and offering many to the 
sex trade. Since 2009, the group has been responsible for killing more than 31,000 people 
in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The insurgency has led to 2.3 million people 
displaced, with 250,000 Nigerians fleeing to neighboring countries (Nichols, 2015). In 
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2011, before the national elections, Boko Haram, along with other radical Nigerian 
groups, promised to make Nigeria ungovernable by turning the Islamic people against 
democracy and proving the government corrupt and inept. This effort, if successful, 
would have allowed Boko Haram to establish a Caliphate (Mbah, Nwangwu, & Edeh, 
2017). In 2016, Boko Haram affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
However, with the reported death of Abubakar Shekau, a new leader emerged in Abu 
Musab al-Barnawi with the blessing of ISIS. Shekau did not die, and the group splintered 
into two: the Shekau Boko Haram faction and the Islamic State of West Africa Province 
(ISWAP) led by al-Barnawi. 
Research has addressed the rise of Boko Haram and the military response; 
however, the literature is limited on how a country’s population can influence the 
nation’s military. However, though the research is limited, it has offered potential 
solutions to the conflicts related to Boko Haram. Barna (2014) proposed a sociological-
based solution that included ending the social conditions that allowed Boko Haram to 
grow and thrive. In Nigeria, these solutions involve ending cultural impunity and human 
rights abuses, reforming the judicial system and improving the capacities of law 
enforcement, improving intelligence collection and analysis both internally and 
externally, addressing the governance deficit, ending corruption, increasing transparency 
of political decisions, increasing dialogue across all Nigerian ethnic and religious entities, 
and increasing federal and state cooperation (Barna, 2014). 
Liolio (2013) also offered a guide in reforming government functions to an ideal 
level. If the insurgency is defeated, the underlying causes for its existence are still in 
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place, allowing for other groups to take its place. Thus, Liolio provided steps needed to 
vanquish corruption in Nigeria and found in figure 1. 
Figure 1
Liolio’s Corruption reform proposal. 
Note. Redefining the Nigerian Polity Through Reforms. (Liolio, 2013)
Additionally, Transparency International (2016) offered five steps to address 
corruption: ending impunity, reforming public administration and finance management, 
promoting transparency and access to information, empowering citizens, and closing 
international loopholes in access to money laundering. Boko Haram exists due to social 
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conditions that include Nigeria’s socioeconomic issues, religious belief system, external 
non-state actor influence, constitutional issues, the benefits content of the insurgency, and 
ideology (Idahosa, 2015, p. 26).
Unmar (2013) noted that providing employment opportunities and improving 
school enrollment and the justice system can address these conditions. A dialogue among 
involved parties could also lead to a national reconciliation (pp. 58-60; see also Liolio, 
2013, p. 99). However, it would be difficult if not impossible to offer Boko Haram 
“soldiers” amnesty for murder, rape, kidnapping, slavery, and torture committed against 
an innocent population. The ability to affect diplomacy to resolve political issues is 
always favored, but abandoning the rule of law to effect change would set a dangerous 
precedent in fighting terrorism. Nigeria is not the only country dealing with Boko Haram, 
and it may be difficult for the populations of those countries to allow Boko Haram to 
escape justice. 
In addition to the precedent that a diplomatic approach could set, reconciliation 
between the government and Boko Haram had been tried and failed. In 2012, various 
government and non-government organizations sought peace with Boko Haram through 
diplomacy, insisting that dialogue was the best way to address insurgency (Ahokegh, 
2012, p. 53). However, Boko Haram has a sustained political life, bolstered by its close 
affiliation with ISIS and other African terror groups. Research has suggested that 
dialogue is not enough to address the terrorist groups and will only create more security 
concerns (Ahokegh, 2012, p. 53). 
The problem with diplomacy is the religious authority that drives the insurgency. 
Conversion to the Salafist belief system is the only goal Boko Haram and ISIS are 
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interested in (Mitchell, 2016). Religious leaders target the young for radicalization, 
giving them an avenue to attack a system they believe harmed them (Onuoha, 2014). 
Youths join Boko Haram because they have limited education, little or no employment 
prospects, extreme economic deprivation, and they may come from broken homes; thus, 
the outlaw group provides a home, empowerment, camaraderie and belonging, and a 
purpose to their life (Lohman, 2010, para. 5). 
Youth in Nigeria also join out of ignorance of religious teaching in that violence 
is the way of Allah (Agbiboa, n.d.). In political Islam, a way to redeem oneself in the 
eyes of Allah is through martyrdom, giving their soul to paradise. Thus, changing the 
conditions that allowed Boko Haram to flourish must be addressed by the Nigerian 
leaders and people if the insurgency is to be defeated. This study was needed to help 
explain the failure in dealing with a terror and insurgent from the standpoint of a nation’s 
military fighting an inhouse insurgency. 
Problem Statement
In the first half of 2017, Boko Haram carried out 43 attacks and killed more than 
200 civilians (Mintel, 2017; Kazeem, 2017). In 2018, 1,200 civilians were killed and 
200,000 displaced due to Boko Haram. In June 2018, Boko Haram murdered 84 people in 
a double suicide bomb attack at a mosque in Mubi, Adamawa State. Numerous reports 
are documented, indicating little abatement in insurgent activity (Searcy, 2019). Attacks 
have continued unabated, with ISWAP attacking Nigerian Army installations with 
impunity (Searcy, 2019). 
The Nigerian Army has not defeated Boko Haram and has abused and killed 
innocent civilians (Amnesty International, 2016). The military practices conventional 
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warfare tactics, including indiscriminate scorched earth tactics, sweep and detain 
operations (including innocents), and the population is both purposely and 
indiscriminately harmed or killed (Nossier, 2013, para. 12). 
Further, in 2017, the New York Times reported mass rapes of women by Nigerian 
soldiers (Searcy, 2017). Existing literature has sought to address through quantitative 
means the effects of society and its culture on military performance (Fowler, 2016). 
However, though literature concerning the social dysfunction of Nigerian society on 
Boko Haram is prevalent, the literature and study of how societal culture can affect 
military performance is lacking.
Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is not a conflict over geography but a conflict for the hearts 
and minds of the indigenous people. Public support for the Nigerian government and its 
counterinsurgency efforts provides for its democratic legitimacy and security. However, 
the Nigerian Army does not engage the population for its support; the military confronts 
the population and abuses, commits atrocities and deaths, including extra-judicial killings 
(Amnesty International, 2016a). 
Extensive research has occurred in studying counterinsurgency operations of 
outside contravening nation-states and their actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Malaya, and 
Algeria (Galula, 1964; Gentile, 2009; Kilcullen, 2010; McMaster, 2009; Paul et al., 2010; 
Ricks, 2006, 2010). U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering 
Insurgencies was built on historical examples and academic studies. 
As a result, population-centric warfare has been installed on the battlefield by the 
United States, Britain, Germany, France, and a host of North Atlantic Treaty 
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Organization (NATO) countries. However, research focusing on a nation-state dealing 
with an insurgency within its borders and the lack of support to the government by the 
indigenous population is lacking. 
Additionally, the importance of societal structures, cultures, behaviors, and beliefs 
and their endemic dysfunction has been minimally addressed. Few studies explore a 
nation-state fighting an in-country insurgency. Instead, the bulk of scholarship has 
focused on an intervening country carrying out a counterinsurgency operation in a host 
country. It is here where societal structures, cultures, behaviors, and beliefs have been 
studied but only related to an intervening foreign army. 
Nigeria 
Though a sense of nationalism and patriotism would automatically enjoin populist 
support, Nigerians do not enjoy a nationalist identity or patriotism (Bello, 2013). In 
applying counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, the population in which the 
insurgency exists is considered the “prize” of war, but the support of the people is crucial 
(Gentile, 2009a). It is also essential that counterinsurgents identify the human and 
material resources necessary to succeed (Myklebust & Ordeman, 2013, para. 42). If 
support for Boko Haram came solely from the Nigerian population, then accepted 
population-centric rubrics could be employed. 
The Nigerian government and military would not have to win the people over 
from supporting the insurgency but would need to educate the people on the importance 
of support for government actions and military operations. The military must consider the 
population as an asset and the prize in an insurgent war. However, education is not the 
only issue as cultural immersion. Due to tribalism, the Nigerian army would have to 
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enjoin the population for support. Therefore, this study focused on the Nigerian military 
and the effects of society and culture on military performance. 
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural 
dysfunction might affect military performance. In addition, I hoped to identify the factors 
that prevent support for the Nigerian national government from the Nigerian population 
in the fight against Boko Haram. Initial research identified that no one group, sect, 
government agency, or religious group had worked together to better Nigerian society; 
therefore, a distinct and solidified national identity does not exist. Much of the Nigerian 
population, specifically the Muslim population, provides little tangible support to Boko 
Haram (Poushter, 2015). Any support by Muslims for Boko Haram emanates from the 
understanding that the group represents pure Islam and are believed “to be devout 
Muslims who uphold true Islam” (Khalil, 2017, para. 3 & 4). Therefore, in a successful 
counterinsurgency, the military should enjoin the population in the fight against terror. 
This study helped identify a path forward for the Nigerian military to embrace the 
population while fighting Boko Haram. 
Research Questions
Research Question 1: How, and to what extent, does a nation’s military reflect or 
mirror the society from which the military was derived? 
Research Question 2: How, and to what extent, can marked societal dysfunction 
affect or inhibit military performance in Nigeria? 
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Theoretical Framework
This study used several military function theories to explain the performance of 
the Nigerian army. Social constructs, such as conflict theory, can explain the rise of Boko 
Haram from a nonviolent youth group to a terror group based on political Islam. Muslim 
youth strive for balance and homeostasis in a system that cannot provide a pathway to 
achieve either. Islam provides a simple, successful life, and those who join experience a 
simple set of rules and a simple way of living, giving Allah what is due Allah. 
Additionally, this study lay within the rubrics of sociology in that all actions and 
counteractions are motivated by individuals’ desire to affect their surroundings. 
Individuals act according to their interpretation of the meaning of their world (Segre, 
2014); therefore, individuals assign meaning to what is relevant and essential.
As stated, this study is set in the framework of military function theories and 
whether a society can affect military culture and performance. Excessive accumulation of 
power by one state or coalition elicits the opposition of others, and it is in this context, 
the neorealist combat balance theory exists (Waltz, 1988). Neorealism states that if an 
army has a large force sufficiently equipped with the latest cutting-edge weaponry and 
adequate material to support the army during a conflict, then that force will win the 
battle. 
Therefore, countries pursue an arms race to achieve superior, technologically 
advanced equipment and resources. An example of neorealism occurred during the Cold 
War when the United States and the USSR reached a stalemate in force. However, this 
theory is most appropriately utilized when opposing militaries participate in conventional 
warfare and has little application in asymmetric (insurgent) warfare. 
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In addition to the neorealist theory, the normative theory of military performance 
dictates that cultural norms influence its tactical behavior, determining military 
performance (Fitzsimmons, 2013). An army that is highly trained, educated, and led by a 
professional officer corps, trained in mission-based objectives over order-based behavior 
will achieve success on the battlefield. These attributes are present in the combat units, 
intelligence, logistics, support units, and command. 
The norms of military behavior are understood in terms of how members behave 
and perceive behavior (National Research Council, 2014). The injunctive norm reflects 
group assessment of approved and disapproved conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990). In this 
regard, norms signify values or the shared belief system of a group (National Research 
Council, 2014). The descriptive norms of military behavior represent the oughtness or 
rightness of how a military responds to a situation. Contrary to the injunctive norm, the 
descriptive norm does not relegate morals or ethics to how a group acts. The descriptive 
norm indicates how a group member conforms to a group, usually through training, 
discipline, and leadership, and group dynamics drive this norm. (National Research 
Council, 2014). 
If an injunctive norm is violated, group members may sanction the individual or 
individuals to correct the infraction. However, if a majority in a group violates an 
injunctive norm, the minority may simply ignore the offense. The desire to belong is a 
strong norm in and of itself. Group membership is valued, and people generally comply 
with group norms because compliance implies acceptance of an individual’s group 
membership and consequent self-image. Therefore, societal dynamics and group 
functions sanctioned by society carry into society’s institutions. 
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Nature of the Study
This study is qualitative with anthropological insights used to explain how the 
military has not successfully engaged Boko Haram and how the government and 
population have not adequately addressed social attitudes resulting in insurgency 
successes. Qualitative methodology with a grounded theory approach offered guidance in 
producing an end theory, therefore addressing remedies to the causes. The qualitative 
approach seeks to consider information collected and assign meaning to it using personal 
views, past experiences, and cultural backgrounds to construct and interpret the data 
gathered (University College Dublin, n.d.). Thus, qualitative research was utilized to 
explore and understand the meaning of individuals or groups and their relationship to a 
sociologically based problem (Creswell, 2013). Inductive reasoning offered the best 
avenue to address the two-pronged problem of societal dysfunction linked to military 
dysfunction.
I incorporated grounded methodology to build a narrative of societal and military 
dysfunction. Grounded theory is a qualitative method used to derive a theory about a 
phenomenon (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Walsh 
et al., 2015), which is more than just a qualitative method (Walsh et al., 2015). Grounded 
theory is justified by providing a rich, detailed, and carefully crafted account of the 
subject through research (Martin & Turner, 1986). 
Theoretical sampling maximizes the ability to discover variations in concepts and 
fill categories in terms of properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The 
grounded approach includes the constant comparison of new data with emerging 
categories and themes and looking to different groups to develop theoretical sampling to 
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identify information differences (Creswell, 2009). Grounded theory adopts a constant 
comparative method in coding for conformity and coherence to ideas and evidence 
(Glaser & Strauss 1999). 
Throughout the researcher’s coding process, the researcher iterates between the 
data and the emerging theory (Charmaz, 2006). It is essential to use each phase of inquiry 
to raise the analytic level of the work within the study (Charmaz, 2008). It is not plausible 
to postulate a theory as to why the Nigerian military abuses the Nigerian population in 
the war against Boko Haram; however, identifying a thesis from a multitude of 
possibilities could assist future research in helping the military to defeat Boko Haram and 
apply warfighting techniques that protect the population. The grounded approach also 
helped discover obstacles in the Nigerian nation-state to identify paths to success in 
protecting the population and defeating Boko Haram.
Further, it is essential to study a subjects’ social environment and condition 
(Sutton & Austin, 2015). The qualitative grounded approach with a constructivist view 
presented the best avenue to discover the disparities of social context relevant to the 
Nigerian Army to address the research problem. Constructivism is a theoretical concept 
that enables one to comprehend and gain knowledge (Fosnot, 2006). 
Constructivism does not require a specific or definitive answer—merely the 
ability to obtain unbiased and factual information. The constructivist approach allows the 
researcher to understand human experience in an environment and understand that 
constructural reality comes from social experiences (Cohen & Manion, 1994; Mertens, 
2014). Using a constructivist method in research allows humans to construct knowledge 
and meaning from experiential occurrences (Charmaz, 2008). 
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Data sampling in grounded theory is far less than any quantitative study. In 
general, grounded theory requires a range of 20–50 respondents to reach theoretical 
saturation. As will be explained in Chapter 3, this study addressed a relatively small 
population studied, the Nigerian Army. To address my interview sample group, I used a 
small hyper-homogeneous group of interviewees. Not only did I seek data and theoretical 
saturation, but I also sought to reach saturation of knowledge (see Bertaux, 1981). 
In this study, a smaller qualitative interview population was acceptable, primarily 
because the researcher focused on a strict homogeneous group. I chose interviewees 
based on stringent parameters, including senior military leadership and military 
academics representing a small population with a small theoretical focus. Therefore, the 
interview group was small based on the ratio of the study group versus the interview 
group. The point of diminishing returns can occur quickly, which means that as the study 
proceeds, increasing data accumulation does not lead to additional information (Ritchie et 
al., 2013). Finding one occurrence of a data piece, or code, is enough to become part of 
the analysis framework (Mason, 2010). 
If this were to be a quantitative study, a large cross-section of U.S. senior 
leadership could be surveyed on their military views, field operations, interaction with the 
public, and counterinsurgency operations. However, a quantitative study could not offer 
detailed insights into a path to identify if society and its culture affect military 
performance. 
Additionally, trying to reach Muslim Nigerians affected by the military for a 
quantitative survey would be difficult as the northeast region does not have power, 
telecommunications, and the internet. Therefore, a qualitative study offered an 
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opportunity to understand the nuances in denial of support (the population) by seeking a 
small sample of highly educated, socially involved scholars and military experts who live 
and study the issues. 
Data collection addressed social and cultural functioning in military behavior 
through interviews with senior military officers and academics. The senior military 
commanders and scholars interviewed understand the foundations of civilian influence on 
military behavior. The U.S. military and the Nigerian military are disparate; however, 
strategy, military performance, training, social performance, conduct, battlefield 
expectations, and behavior are universally accepted through military best practices, and 
proper conduct is the prerogative of various international organizations such as the UN, 
the Red Cross, and The Hague. I will further discuss the nature of the study in Chapter 2. 
Operational Definitions
Ahlul Sunnawa Jama Ahhijra: Founded by Abubakar Lawan in 1995 and is 
believed to be the early precursor to Boko Haram. This group was non-violent and began 
as a youth group for disenchanted and disenfranchised youth (Ori, 2013). 
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb: Located in Algeria, and has committed to 
attacking European and American targets. Originated from the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat that affiliated with al-Qa’ida in 2006 (Steinberg & Werenfels, 
2007).
Apostate: About the Islamic term as used by ISIS. A Muslim who does not follow 
the strict form of Islam as practiced by ISIS and al-Qa’ida, or a Westernized Muslim. 
Initially, part of Catholic doctrine recognizing a cleric who had left a religious order or a 
Catholic who abandoned the religion for a reformed theology (Mallet & Toussaint, 2012). 
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Asymmetric warfare: Describes warfare between two fighters who differ in 
military capability, funding, tactics, and strategy. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, 
insurgency, and irregular warfare are descriptions of asymmetric warfare rubrics used by 
small states and non-state actors (Tomes, 2004).
Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of 
Biafra: Two separate organizations with the same goal. The Bakassi Boys advocated 
anti-crime vigilantism in the Biafra state. They roamed the streets carrying out anti-crime 
attacks using machetes. They were so successful and popular that cities within Biafra 
invited them to police their towns. However, accused of extra-judicial killings, 
intimidation on behalf of the state, and extortion leading to the crimes they sought to end, 
they were disbanded only to reemerge in 2021. (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012; (Njoku, & 
Nzeagwu, 2021). 
Boko Haram (“Jama” atu Ahlissunnah lidda’ awati Wal Jihad’): Known as the 
Muhajir Yousuf ayah sect, Nigerian Taliban, and The Group of Al-Sunna for preaching 
and Jihad. The group represents an ultra-radical sect based in Nigeria and was considered 
too violent for ISIS (Siollun, 2016). 
Counterinsurgency: Incorporates the strategy, techniques, military, psychological, 
financial, social tactics, politics, and intelligence practices that governments utilize to 
combat an insurgency. Like the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must continually adapt 
to the changing social and battlefield requirements and threats. (U.S. Army, 2014). 
Crimes against humanity: Defined as crimes inflicted on victims based on their 
group membership rather than individual characteristics—crimes committed against 
fellow nationals and foreigners. These are international crimes that override state 
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sovereignty and are committed by politically organized groups acting under policy. These 
crimes include only the most brutal and abominable acts of violence and persecution 
(Luban, 2004).
Ex parte Quirin: A case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942 and during World 
War II that upheld the jurisdiction of a U.S. military tribunal within the trial of eight 
German saboteurs in the United States. Quirin set a precedent for trial by military 
commission of any unlawful combatant against the United States on or off the battlefield 
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S., 1942). 
Fedayeen Saddam: A paramilitary group loyal to Saddam Hussein estimated to be 
30,000 to 40,000 strong. The Fedayeen Saddam took up the fight after Iraq fell using 
unconventional tactics and guerilla warfare (Otterman, 2005).
Foreign internal defense: A term utilized to describe the approach in which an 
interdicting military provides offensive and defensive operations in a host country to 
defeat an aggressor such as an insurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).
Globalization: Globalization refers to the free movement, interaction, and 
integration of information, goods, and people between international boundaries. It is the 
procedure or action of global integration of a country’s social world view relating to 
ideas, products, and cultural exchange (Al-Rodhan, 2006). In terrorism, globalization 
refers to the movement of ideas, strategies, and people between terror groups, the 
exportation, and importation of terrorist activities to all corners of the globe. In the 
modern context, it is the global dissemination and assimilation of radical Muslim 
terrorists into a common cause (Lutz & Lutz, 2015).
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Guerrilla warfare: Irregular warfare using unconventional tactics by small groups 
of fighters who fight against a far larger force, usually government military forces (Van 
Creveld, 2000, p. 357). 
Hausa-Fulani: Refers to the Hausa and Fulani tribes of western Africa. These two 
groups are referred to as Hausa-Fulani after the 1804 Fulani war. These two ethnic 
groups make up 29% of Nigeria’s population and are associated with cattle as their main 
economic commodity. The Igbo and Yoruba tribes represent the majority within the 
Nigerian tribal system (“Hausa and Fulani people,” n.d.).
Hors de combat: According to the International Red Cross, hors de combat 
prohibits “attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat. hors de combat is: 
(a) anyone who is in the power of an adverse party; (b) anyone who is defenseless 
because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds, or sickness; or (c) anyone who clearly 
expresses an intention to surrender; provided they abstain from any hostile act and does 
not attempt to escape” (ICRC, n.d.-g; IHL Database. (n.d.)
Infidel: One who rejects the truth of Islam, Allah as their God, and Mohammed as 
his prophet. ISIS uses Kafir to describe those who do not conform to the Salafist belief 
system (Fanani et al., 2020). 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): The Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Identified as Dawlat al-Islamiyah 
f’al-Iraq wa al-Sham or the moniker Da’ish (Daesh). The Islamic State is a Sunni Salafist 
insurgency and terror organization founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Petranick, 2016). 
Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da’wati wal-Jihād: “People committed to the 
propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad,” which is Boko Haram’s Islamic name. 
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Mohammed Yusuf chose this name to replace Ahul Suwanna Jama Ahhijra, the name 
chosen by Abubakar Luwan. Boko Haram is the name given to the group by Nigerians 
(UN, 2016).
Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān: Founded in 2012 and known as 
Ansaru; a militant Islamist splinter group of Boko Haram. Their leader is Abu Usmatul 
al-Ansari, who split the group away because of ideological differences in the 
interpretation of Islamic law. They also disapproved of Shekau’s targeting of the Islamic 
population. Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru targets Western interests in Nigeria who directly 
or indirectly support the government or military forces (Zenn, 2013).
Jus ad bellum: Applies to the conditions under which states may resort to war or 
the use of armed force in general. The prohibition against the use of force amongst States 
and the exceptions to it (the UN authorization for the use of force or self-defense) appears 
in the UN Charter of 1945 and represent the core ingredients of jus ad bellum 
(International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2015). 
Jus in bello: A UN mandate that regulates the conduct of nation-states engaged in 
an armed conflict. International Humanitarian Law is applied with jus in bello; it seeks to 
minimize suffering in armed conflicts, mainly civilians, by protecting innocents from 
armed conflict to the greatest extent possible. It is the responsibility of the nation-state to 
ensure jus in bello (ICRC, 2015). 
Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist Sect: Founded by cleric Mohammed 
“Maitatsine” Mara in 1945 Nigeria. Banished by the British, he returned in 1960 after 
independence. He was a Koranic scholar but rejected Mohammed and claimed himself to 
be the annạbi, or prophet. The group Yan Tatsine consisted of Maitatsine’s followers who 
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participated in the Yan Tasting riots over five years from 1980, in which 10,000 people 
died. One of the first radical groups in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011). 
Modernization: Modernization is how society progresses through transition, 
improving itself and people’s lives. Advanced societies modernize and progress as 
technology and society dictate. In third world and developing countries, modernization 
occurs through outside forces seeking influence in the state (Przeworski & Limongi, 
1997).
Movement for the actualization of the sovereign State of Biafra: Associated with 
Igbo nationalism and is a secessionist movement in Nigeria’s Biafra state. They seek to 
make Biafra an independent country separate from Nigeria. They are considered an 
extremist group by the Nigerian government (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012). 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad: Founded in 2011 by Hamad al-Khairy and 
Ahmed el-Tilemsi as a splinter group of al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. 
Responsible for much of the violence in Mali. In 2013, the group merged with the 
Masked Men Brigade to form Al-Murabitoun (“The Sentinels”). In 2015, the group 
realigned with al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb but in 2016 pledged 
allegiance to ISIS (START, 2015). 
Occam’s razor: Nature is simple, human action, and interaction is considered 
simple in underlying motivations and intentions. Human motivation can be attributed to 
seven theories, including self-actualization, self-determination, and the incentive theory 
(Whitbourne, 2011). Therefore, in sociology, simple motives generally explain results. 
The drive reduction theory states that humans reduce complexity to the simple to solve 
issues to balance homeostasis (Whitbourne, 2011). Complex interactions become simple 
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interactions as humans distill the complex to the simple to discover a workable solution 
that can best explain a functional and dysfunctional society, as society evolves from the 
human condition; therefore, the simplest solution or explanation is generally the most 
advantageous (Bishop & Shech, n.d.). 
Odua People’s Congress (Oodua Liberation Movement): Founded in 1997 as a 
militant sociocultural-economic organization to protect the Yoruba people. It clashed 
with the Nigerian government repeatedly over separatist demands. The Yoruba are some 
25 million strong in Nigeria and conflict with the Hausa tribe (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012). 
Population-centric asymmetric warfare: Conventional warfare or total war 
involved the destruction of the enemy and their surroundings.  World War II was the last 
real conventional war. Asymmetric warfare is counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, 
and population-centric refers to the people involved within the conflict zone. No longer is 
geography the primary motivator for war, but it is the hearts and minds of the people or 
population control and support. The object is to win allegiance and loyalty to the host 
government and intervening troops and deny the insurgents support (Gentile, 2009a). 
Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization: Founded in 1995 by Mallam Leval. 
Thought to represent the foundation from which Boko Haram emanated. Lawal founded 
this group to indoctrinate Nigerian youth into radical Islam and revolt against Western 
influence using peaceful means (Onuoha, 2014).
Transnational: Transnational refers to the spreading of or dissemination across 
international borders. In terrorism, ISIS and al-Qa’ida have taken to this model to recruit 
via social media, assimilate existing terror groups, expand their sphere of influence, 
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increase funding and arms purchases. In this way, the terror groups have acted as 
multinational conglomerates (Brown, 2017). 
Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah: Wilayat is translated to mean “province.” Therefore, 
Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah is the West African Province of ISIS. For example, Wilyat al 
Yemen is the Islamic State’s Province in Yemen (Rahmani & Tanco, 2016).
Assumptions 
I assumed that the specified individuals would participate in the interview 
process. Additionally, I believed the participants would provide insight into social and 
cultural effects on military performance. I also assumed that those interviewed would 
answer with complete honesty and integrity. This requirement goes to the honor and 
integrity of military officers. Therefore, the study depended on the honesty and integrity 
of the interviewees. Furthermore, I assumed that this research could provide a pathway 
for the Nigerian Army to recognize the negative issues associated with its military 
performance and move to correct deficiencies. In identifying the dysfunction within the 
Nigerian military, I hoped this study might provide a pathway to elicit ideas allowing the 
military to enhance performance and defeat the insurgency. 
Scope of Delimitations
The scope of the study focused on Nigeria’s social constructs and their effect on 
the military. I interviewed senior military officers and military scholars who have a deep 
knowledge of leadership and societal influences on military performance. Participants 
were invited to participate in an interview for approximately 45 minutes to an hour, 
intimating their professional understanding of how military culture is affected by society 
and its civilian culture. 
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The interview questions were structured to identify and explore civilian 
influence’s social and cultural influences in army culture. The limited boundaries 
included military performance and societal contributions to the dysfunction and 
divergence within the Nigerian culture. This study could also contribute to addressing 
military functioning across nations in general. The most relevant countries are in sub-
Saharan Africa—colonial nations that have exhibited a tumultuous history of governance. 
Limitations
Certain limitations affected this study. I limited the data collection to a specific 
and focused group of military and civilian individuals who had particular knowledge on 
how a population, its societal structures, and sociological realities and culture might 
affect military performance. Therefore, interviewees were chosen from within a specific 
parameter. Senior military officers participated from both the active duty and retired 
ranks. In addition, scholars with a Ph.D. and military service record participated in the 
interviews. These individuals carried advanced degrees in political science and history. 
Scholars with a Ph.D. in History study military doctrine, function, theory, application, 
and outcomes within the military educational complex, and have taught at Fort 
Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the War College at 
Carlisle Barracks, and the U.S. military academies. 
Significance of the Study
Despite examples of counterinsurgency operations carried out by NATO countries 
and the United States, in light of new military doctrine and the advancements in counter-
insurgent philosophy and applications, the Nigerian military has not defeated the terrorist 
and insurgent movement. The significance of this study lay in identifying the reasons 
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why the Nigerian army cannot end an insurgency. Additionally, the army has, according 
to various humanitarian organizations, including the Red Cross, been accused of human 
rights violations against the Nigerian civilian population. In identifying the root causes 
for abuses, I hoped that actions could take place within the military to advocate for 
change resulting in the army protecting and advocating for the population. 
I hoped that this research would help guide the Nigerian military to make 
substantive changes to its internal belief system and doctrine, understanding that society 
affects the army in military performance, recruitment, training, and leadership. This study 
could assist in changing the paradigm of an ineffective fighting force that abuses civilians 
to a successful battlefield force that protects civilians. This reality would result in 
organizational credibility and strategic effectiveness, thereby affecting social change. 
This change, if effected, would provide for positive social change in varying degrees 
across Nigeria and its institutions. 
National support for counterinsurgency operations flows from the people. Social, 
economic, political, and religious impediments affect the government’s efforts to 
successfully confront and defeat Boko Haram. Though prior research had addressed these 
topics, they have not been discussed in an inclusive qualitative manner focused on the 
machinations of counterinsurgency. Despite dysfunction, Nigeria as a state is one of the 
more successful post-colonialization experiments in Africa. Suppose Boko Haram (and 
ISWAP) are successful in destabilizing Nigeria. In that case, additional African countries 
could be in peril, if not from Boko Haram, then from associated radical political or 
religious groups. In addition, the fight against the ISWAP may present a future existential 
threat to the United States. Should Nigeria fail, should the insurgents establish a 
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Caliphate in Nigeria, it would provide safe harbor and a training base for terrorists 
providing a global reach. 
Summary
In Chapter 1, I explained the theories used to address the issues in Nigeria. In 
addition, it was essential to understand the military norms of operation, as military norms 
are connected to societal functioning. Therefore, the focus in this study included the 
realities of social dysfunction and the affected culture of the Nigerian military. This focus 
included leadership, doctrine, training, the moral and ethical belief system, and applying 
military culture and doctrine against Boko Haram and the Nigerian people, both of which 
could present as aberrations of social (military) cultural behavior. 
Chapter 2 discusses the history and structure of Nigeria and its society, Boko 
Haram, and the Nigerian military. Understanding the contributory social, political, and 
military factors are essential to recognize endemic issues within the population. Chapter 2 
also includes the explanations of the law of war, just war theory, humanitarian law, and 
the international rules of warfare, including conduct and expectation for a military force 
within a civilian population. The literature review studies Nigerian societal dysfunction 
and the continued military dysfunction in fighting Boko Haram. It is here where the 
research problem is exemplified. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
 I examined the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and how the army has not 
defeated the insurgency. To understand Nigeria’s problems, the country’s diverse and 
complicated societal structures that stem from colonial imperialism. This includes 
tribalism that prevents a nationalist identity, unity, and patriotism (Okogu, & Umudjere, 
2016). The literature review provides the nuances in revealing societal truths in a 
landscape of dysfunction. 
The literature on military affairs and counterinsurgency tends to focus on the rise 
of Boko Haram. Chapter 2  examines the history of Boko Haram and its link to radical 
Islam. These sections include a deep and thorough description of the present-day 
Nigerian conflict, the Nigerian population and social structure, and a description of the 
Nigerian military as an organization. 
The existing literature is limited on how nation-states address an “in-house” 
insurgency, and other available scholarly sources fill in these gaps. It is essential to 
understand the foundations, guiding principles, and parameters of counterinsurgency 
warfare to understand how wars are conducted in a moral and ethical structure. Because 
there is a lack of research around the Nigerian insurgency, other frameworks, including 
those from the United States, are necessary to understand this issue. Looking at 
insurgency experiences can give context to Boko Haram. This chapter also touches on the 
lessons learned by the United States during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as they 
advanced the frameworks for understanding insurgencies.  
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The literature review also discusses military power, ability, and capability in a 
social and cultural context. A military can exhibit all the signs of a neorealist force with 
access to funding, the latest weaponry and doctrine, and material support. Still, if the 
soldier is the weak link in the chain, then military power becomes a false narrative. The 
chapter also discusses a variety of ethical issues that are faced when an insurgency 
occurs. Just war theory sets parameters in which a nation-state can legally enter warfare.
Yet despite the best efforts of commanders in enforcing rules of engagement, 
discipline, and providing a moral compass, soldiers can stray from the correct moral and 
ethical path. Nigerian military leadership has struggled meeting Boko Haram on the 
battlefield and has repeatedly refuted reports of population abuse (Adeakin, 2016). 
Chapter 2 Structure
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. First is a discussion of the literature search 
strategy and the theoretical framework used for this study. I identify the keywords used 
within this research study. Related to the theoretical framework, I explore the social and 
cultural influences on military performance, military norms, and the dual-process theory 
as applied to battlefield control. I discuss Nigeria’s social components, including 
tribalism and the Nigerian military and its actions in the field. It is this discussion that 
provides a cataloging of societal and cultural dysfunction. 
I explain the beginnings of Boko Haram and its founding from a peaceful youth 
organization to the terrorist group linked to the Salafist Islamic religion. I also go in-
depth on international law and conflict, the rules of war, responsibility to protect, and the 
just war theory that pertains to the Nigerian conflict, along with humanitarian law. This 
information allows the reader to understand how Nigeria relates to the international 
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community on military force. Finally, I address the social change advocated by this 
research study. 
Literature Strategy
I began the literature review process by outlining significant study points within 
the scholarship, including social structures and war. This effort built a foundation for 
building a pyramid, increasingly narrowing and defining the focus until the subjects had 
been exhausted in information. This action mirrored the strategies offered by Bui (2014), 
who suggested that an initial wide-ranging approach would culminate in a narrowing of 
themes and phrases to obtain specific references. Additionally, Booth et al. (2016) helped 
to identify the relevancy and reliability of the research by identifying relevant research 
information, reliable sources, performing analysis, and the process of reporting and 
writing results. 
I utilized digital databases including Google Scholar, JSTOR, Research Gate, 
Project MUSE, EBSCO, ERIC (ProQuest), Sage Publications, and WorldCat. I used the 
Walden University Library, the library at the University of Nebraska-Omaha, and 
Creighton University to acquire microfiche files and periodicals and acquire the 
necessary books to complete the study. Government sources included the Department of 
Defense, U.S. Army, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the UN, and the Nigerian 
Constitution database. Accessing Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, and 
Human Rights Watch provided information on ground conditions and realities in Nigeria, 
supported by reports from the U.S. Department of State, who utilized both Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch as vetted institutions to provide information 
included in U.S. Department of Defense and State Department reports on Nigeria. The 
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U.S. military, Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines provide its doctrinal 
manuals online and published through Amazon.com and national booksellers. 
Keywords were essential to the literature review, and I used the following 
keywords. African genocide, African insurgencies, African terrorism, African tribalism, 
Ahlul Sunnawa Jama Ahhijra, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, apostate, asymmetric 
warfare, Auftragstaktik, Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra, Berliner Methodentreffen Qualitative Forschung
Boko Haram, counterinsurgency, crimes against humanity, ethics in war, 
Executive Outcomes, Fedayeen Saddam, foreign internal defense, foreign external defense, 
Geneva Conventions, Geneva Protocols, guerrilla warfare, Hausa-Fulani, infidel, 
International Humanitarian Law, Islam, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), 
Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da’wati wal-Jihād, Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis 
Sūdān, Law of War, modernization theory, Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist Sect, Mao 
Zedong, morals in war, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad, NeoRealist Combat Balance Theory, Nigerian Army 
abuses, Nigerian corruption, Nigerian graft, Nigerian military, Normative Theory of 
Military Performance, Occam’s Razor as a social concept, Odua People’s Congress, 
population-centric warfare, radical Islam, Salafist, Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization, 
Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International, transnationalism, 
US Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, and Wilayat 
Gharb Ifrīqīyyah. 
The search for these keywords provided additional secondary keywords, which 
narrowed the search for information. Keywords identified books and journal articles, 
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which led to a string of different literature sources, building and expounding each other. 
Once I realized that each topic was thoroughly addressed by not accumulating new 
information and that topics, codes, themes, and subjects had become redundant, I 
considered the topic saturated (see Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Theoretical Framework
The issues surrounding Nigeria’s insurgency are vast and complicated. No one 
theory could address dysfunction in Nigeria because the country suffers from sociologic 
disunity (Gbinije, 2015). Viewing a problem through more than one theoretical lens is 
essential to understand the full scope of the problem (Holton, 2009). Social function 
theories are applied to view society from differing points of a theoretical lens. Still, it 
would be conducive to design an alternative approach to explain the dysfunction in 
Nigeria and other post-colonial entities, but that is beyond this project’s scope. 
The theoretical lens for this study rests with the norms of military behavior, the 
normative theory of military performance, and the neorealist combat balance theory. It is 
essential to understand the dysfunction Nigerian society represents to understand how the 
military might perform. The focus of this study was whether society could influence or 
affect military performance. Therefore, in this section, I explain various military theories 
regarding military performance. A link may be made (in conjunction with interview 
answers and their application to the research questions) between society and military 
function.
Social Control 
Social control helps understand the dysfunction found in Nigeria. There are three 
modes of social control: personal, parochial, and public. Personal social control depends 
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on the person to conform to societal norms as the neighborhood lacks control (Bursik & 
Grasmick, 1993). In northeast Nigeria, low income and high unemployment imbue 
mistrust and lack of communication among the community, leading young people to join 
radical Islam groups. 
Parochial social control states that the neighborhood engages with certain aspects 
of social control but may not include youth engagement (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). 
Public social control offers total community engagement as the community and 
neighborhoods work as a group or found an organization to improve on and protect the 
community (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). This represents the village philosophy and idea 
of community involvement, engagement, and success. Community members are involved 
in schools, youth programs, community centers, additional community social structures 
and work to ensure youth success. 
Social control exists in Nigeria, but only to the extent the tribe is involved. 
Historically, religion has a moral influence on the community, contributing to a locus of 
control-oriented toward a socially accepted morality. In context, this reality empowered 
individuals to have a degree of control over themselves within their society (Kirby, et al., 
2000).
Further, society operates on shared values and a shared moral authority—a society 
that emphasizes order, stability, consensus, and equilibrium, or the homeostasis of the 
organism, will view societal problems as either deviance or a problem of social 
disorganization (University of Minnesota, 2019, chap. 7.1, 7.2). Institutions to which the 
individual belongs dictate “normal” sociologic function or deviancy. Thus, if society does 
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not match what is expected, there is pressure to conform and reintegrate with society 
(Obaro, 2014). 
For instance, in a democratic nation, the military is subject to the will of civilian 
control. A democratic nation’s founding documents, social and cultural norms, the rule of 
law, and international law guide the military to perform in an acceptable moral manner. 
The army is also guided by the political-civilian culture established in society. It is the 
lawmakers and the people of the nation who hold the military accountable. The military 
is subject to accountability and is expected to represent the nation’s values and belief 
system.
Societal Traits and the Military
There is little scholarship on how a society can affect military performance. 
However, research has noted that society creates or allows for material power, translating 
to military power (Rosen, 1995). For instance, military performance in a democratic state 
may not be associated with material acquisition and wealth but may be decided on 
through a complex mix of culture, education, the rule of law, religion, societal 
involvement, political structures, and a national identity; thus, military power is 
dependent on military performance (Biddle & Long, 2004). Additionally, a nation’s 
military has some freedom to isolate its members from society and install internal 
structures to govern their members (Rosen, 1995, p. 29). However, if the military is a 
mass, non-professional army with short terms of service, is large relative to society, fights 
wars with high casualty rates that force quick recruitment with no training time. If 
society’s social structures are divisive, this can decrease the military’s effectiveness 
(Rosen, 1995, p. 29). This paradigm is a direct reflection of the situation in Nigeria. 
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Research has indicated that society and culture matter to the military, although 
Western democratic culture is not conducive or optimal in battle (Fowler, 2016). For 
example, Afghanistan and Iraq provided the U.S. military the opportunity to embrace 
counterinsurgent warfare. But the establishment of strict rules of engagement protected 
civilians to the detriment of American and allied troops (French, 2015). The Taliban took 
advantage of this dynamic and showed that it is impossible to simultaneously protect 
civilians, achieve force protection, and achieve the physical elimination of insurgents 
(Zambernardi, 2010). 
Further, though scholars acknowledge culture’s influence in a social or economic 
environment, culture is absent in applying concepts of military power (Fowler, 2016). 
Leadership must account for culture in operational definitions of military power. Still, 
conceptual models are underspecified, exaggerating the effects of those factors 
commonly included—personnel quantity, equipment quality, economic development, and 
regime type. However, decision-makers cannot accurately assess an enemy states’ martial 
capabilities and capacity without accounting for culture (Fowler, 2016). Research has 
suggested that the culture found within a mercenary force allowed a small, under-gunned 
force to defeat the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (Fitzsimmons, 2013).
Regardless of societal influences, military power advances and implements state 
power in various ways both within and beyond the state’s borders (Paret, 1989). Military 
power also confers created political power and its permanency. The nation’s military 
organizations benefit from the national resources, which allows the political leaders to 
impose the nation’s will on either an existing or potential enemy (Tellis et al., 2000, p. 
134). It is the output level of military resources that transposes to military effectiveness. 
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However, the efficiency by which those resources are transformed guides military 
capability. 
Material transformation is not the only parameter to guide military effectiveness 
or capability. Military doctrine, leadership, effective organization, the quality of soldiers, 
discipline, training, and adjunct support affect military capability (Tellis et al., 2000). 
However, if natural resources provide for military resources and corruption diverts those 
resources (e.g., in Nigeria’s situation), then military effectiveness is negatively affected 
(World Bank Group, n.d.)  
The military can accrue the best equipment and construct a successful military 
doctrine. Still, it is the human factor that uses the weapons, carries out orders, adds 
meaning to tactical and strategic initiatives, and ultimately overcomes the opposing army. 
Thus, it is inevitable that a military would suffer the abnorms of civilian society. Soldiers 
will commit crimes on and off the battlefield; therefore, it is incumbent on military 
leadership to provide and prosecute further training, education, and discipline to mitigate 
future negative behavior. 
Counterinsurgency can only occur through Weberian state consolidation. The 
state and the military work to create a stable, orderly system supported by the population 
and then endorsed by legitimate violence (Weber, 1946). However, this is a well-formed 
[State] but complex task (Packwood, 2009). When a government is legitimate, the people 
understand and share in a level of confidence, accepting societal expectations and their 
government (Packwood, 2009). Trust in the government should transfer to trust in the 
military. However, the Nigerian people have neither confidence nor trust in the military 
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nor the government, as neither offers legitimacy (Ejimabo, 2013; Channels Television, 
2021). 
Military Norms
In addition to social theories, it is essential to discuss military norms. Norms are 
phenomena that influence behavior (Hechter & Opp, 2001), guiding how people should 
behave regardless of other values or ethics (National Research Council, 2014). Norms 
refer to the “oughtness” of behavior based on the moral belief about what should happen 
in a situation. In society, behavioral norms remain informal and are not codified into laws 
or statutes. However, norms give strict order to life and human interactions. (Anderson & 
Dunning, 2014, p. 1). Behavioral norms prevent life from becoming nasty, brutish, and 
dangerous on a wholesale level preventing chaos (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 1). 
Descriptive norms refer to people’s typical behavior or how they process reality 
(Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 2). Injunctive norms serve as standards or a social model 
to correct inappropriate behavior. 
For instance, the injunctive norm reflects approved and disapproved conduct 
identified by the group or what most people think one should do (National Research 
Council, 2014). The injunctive norm relies on social pressure in guiding performance, 
tied to a collective outcome (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 4). Descriptive norms are 
those norms that, regardless of morality, are defined by the group. This normative 
behavior allows group members to conform to the group. This normative behavior guides 
the expectations of how a group member will behave or act in specific situations and is 
tied to what the group is doing (National Research Council, 2014).
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Neither is isolated or set in stone by the rules of normative behavior. For example, 
if a group of soldiers decides to ransack and pillage a village, a soldier who refuses to 
participate has violated the descriptive norm and has demonstrated the injunctive norm as 
prescribed by a lawful well-functioning society.  Societal norms and moral values have 
superseded the needs and desires of the group (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 4,5).
According to the National Research Council (2014), three mechanisms enforce 
norms and effectively influence group behavior. A rational self-interested person will 
conform to a standard if the expected sanctions are sufficient. The second mechanism 
refers to the internalization of norms, such as self-discipline. This represents the internal 
makeup of a person, an individual with high expectations or values and a moral set that is 
ingrained and unshakeable. Finally, the mechanism concerns how “norms develop based 
on the expectations of how others will act” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 26). The 
implication here is conditional conformity is based on realizing that it becomes a self-
interest if all or most participants conform. This represents the individual’s expectation of 
what others will do to ensure homeostasis or equilibrium in a situation and within the 
group, or all for one, one for all. 
The theoretical framework of norms pertains to the neorealist combat balance 
theory and the normative theory of military performance used by Fitzsimmons (2013) to 
understand how a highly disciplined and trained, but small and under-gunned mercenary 
force could defeat a far larger insurgency. The military of any nation develops its own 
culture based on the culture and social structure from the society from which it is drawn. 
In addition, subsets of culture and norms within the military may exist down to 
the platoon level as soldiers create their own supportive and close environment within a 
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much larger force. Platoon level associations are symbiotic as each soldier depends on the 
other for support, camaraderie, and safety--security in a violent environment. 
Dual Process 
It is essential to discuss decision-making rubrics in the heat of battle or high-stress 
environments. Individuals have two information processing systems: fast and slow, 
which work together to formulate judgments and influence behavior. This condition 
involves the deliberative reasoning brain and the intuitive and emotional brain, which is 
often subconscious. 
This is, of course, a simplification of the thinking process, and there is conflict as 
to whether individuals have “two different parallel processing architectures, or simply 
two different cognitive modes” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 27). Fast thinking 
(system 1) influences decisions through the immediacy of a situation. This process arises 
from a partly instinctual, partly learned, and often emotional response to stimuli. The 
slow process (system 2) is the rational, deliberative thinking process” (National Research 
Council, 2014, p. 27). However, the best result may occur when both work in sync to 
solve an issue.
It is essential to understand dual process as it affects men and women and their 
decision-making in battle. In battle, enlisted soldiers fight and are driven by training and 
discipline. However, any number of cognitive impairments, including fear, anger, 
information overload, loss of situational awareness, and adrenaline, can play a part in 
how soldiers respond to stress stimuli (Kahneman, 2011). This represents the type 1 
response. 
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Officers provide type 2 control on the battlefield. This reality was understood as 
far back as the Napoleonic wars. It came to the forefront in the revolutionary war when 
British officers were sniped by the colonials to remove command and control. The British 
complained as officers kept the battlefield under control and prevented it from devolving 
into debauchery and depravity (Black, 1999). In Europe, the nobles from which the 
officer corps emanated agreed that officers were to be protected. 
Any number of cognitive impairments may hinder system 2, including fatigue, 
personal issues, lack of situational awareness, fear, anger, and information overload. 
When these interfere with system 2 thinking, irrational and hurried decisions may 
increase and cause chaos. For this reason, the US Army maintains strict rules of 
engagement but allows junior officers to make decisions and adjust orders to complete 
the mission. 
It is system 2, in conjunction with the military norms of behavior, which pulls the 
soldier back from harming civilians by shooting them for the loss of a Nigerian soldier in 
battle or running through villages setting homes afire and shooting anyone who flees the 
flames because they must be guilty (Nossiter, 2013). 
Military Culture
Fitzsimmons (2013) noted the neorealist combat balance theory. An army that 
fields a large force, sufficiently equipped with the latest quality weaponry, determines the 
material combat balance between the two combatants, determining their military 
performance. The normative theory of military performance dictates that a military's 
cultural norms influence its tactical behavior, determining military performance 
(Fitzsimmons, 2013).  Although Fitzsimmons studied a private small unit mercenary 
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army, the premise is testable when applied to a nation’s army. The cultural norms of the 
military, taken and influenced by its society, affect military performance. Not in material, 
but the human interaction and actions on the battlefield. 
The US Army is a prime example in which these two theories intermesh. The US 
army also maintains a culture of forward-thinking, highly trained, and motivated leaders 
and field troops. As demonstrated in Iraq after the surge and the implementation of 
counterinsurgency theory and tactics, army commanders and troops became agile, 
adaptable, competent, and wholly progressive in counterinsurgency tactics. 
The US army is culturally trained in the German military principle of 
Auftragstaktik, and operations are grounded in mission-based tactics rather than the 
obverse in detailed order-based tactics. Field commanders and young officers are allowed 
the ability to take the initiative and leeway to make decisions in the field based on a 
changing battlefield environment to advance their mission. According to Fitzsimmons 
(2013), a “military’s cultural norms influences its tactical behavior,” which in turn 
“influences its military performance” (p. 3). This reality may point to conditions within 
the Nigerian Army that deny even the most mediocre effort in strategy and operational 
performance. 
The Nigerian military’s culture and doctrine are grounded in order-based 
operations that can deny military performance's normative theory (Onuoha, Nwangwu, & 
Ugwueze, 2020). In other words, in being an order-based organization, the Nigerian 
military cannot operate in the spirit of Auftragstaktik as the organization does not teach or 
train to complete the mission but rather to complete the order. Leaders and their 
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subordinates follow the order and stop activity when the order has been completed, even 
if the mission, operational, or strategic objective has not been achieved.
It appears that the Nigerian military is structured to present two faces. One face of 
the military performs foreign internal defense missions for UN Peace Keeping Operations 
and the Economic Community of West African States. These units are the best Nigeria 
has to offer and have performed admirably, winning accolades and awards from the 
foreign press and nation-states (Nigerian Army, 2017a; Nigerian Army, 2017b). 
The second face the Nigerian army presents is that of internal dysfunction. This 
has involved forces who cannot stand in a fight with the insurgents, abuse the population, 
kill innocents, and demonstrate poor discipline while attempting a coup d’état discovered 
in May 2017 (Kumolo, 2017). In addition, Nigerian Army leadership has consistently 
focused allegations of wrongdoing and blamed incidents and atrocities on Boko Haram 
and the public when committed by Nigerian military personnel. 
The military norms of behavior within the Nigerian Army are so affected by 
Nigeria’s societal and cultural dysfunction that abnormalcy is the norm. The truth may be 
simple; the Nigerian Army is socially, culturally, materially, and professionally incapable 
of defeating a smaller under-gunned, and poorly led insurgent force. However, in the 
grand scheme, it may be that the insurgency is the force that is better led and fields 
superior firepower. 
Nigeria as a Democratic State
Prior to 1960, Nigeria was a colony of Great Britain that provided the country's 
economic and security foundation. Nationalism existed in Nigeria, but only as a front 
against the British. Still, once Nigerians gained independence in 1960, the people 
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abandoned nationalism in favor of tribal affiliation, and nationalism reverted to a local 
and regional phenomenon within the tribes (Emeh, Ubaku, & Anyikwa, 2015). 
Nigeria is a 21-year-old democracy, a federal republic, and is considered a fragile 
state (Fund for Peace, 2018). As with most African countries, colonial powers designated 
national borders without deference to cultural or ethnic realities, basing national 
boundaries on a rivers course, watershed, colonial convenience, straight lines through 
unpopulated areas, agreements between countries (Britain and France concerning 
Nigeria), the Congress of Berlin, and through the post-colonial Organization of African 
Unity (Herbst, 1989; Jones, 2015). 
A sheik of the Shammar tribe can best sum up the reality of colonialisms’ 
disregard for local cultural divisions; when asked why he smuggled sheep and benzine 
into Iraq from Syria, he responded by answering; “Why did you put the Syrian border in 
the middle of my sheep? We were here first” (Ricks, 2006, p. 61).
Figure 2 indicates the position of Nigeria relative to the African continent. Benin, 
Chad, Niger, and Cameroon border Nigeria. The colonial border system led to cultural, 
ethnic, and religious conflicts between a Muslim North and Christian South. In addition, 
conflicts exist between the Muslim Fulani, a cattle culture, and the agrarian Christian 
South. In addition, conflict exists with the Biafra delta people who desire political and 
economic independence (Biafra Free State, n.d.; Okeke, 2015).
Nigeria has over 250 diverse ethnic groups, encompasses 500 languages, and 185 
million people spread through 36 states and the Federal Capital State (CIA, 2017). 
Nigeria extends over 58,689 square miles. Nigeria has the largest population in Africa 
and is also the richest, based on oil and natural gas production, primarily located in 
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Benin's Bight in the Delta state region noted in Figure 3 (CIA, 2017). Figure 3 indicates 
the position of each Nigerian state and its association with the countries of Chad, 
Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. The Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, and Yobe states in the 
northeast are where the Boko Haram attacks are concentrated. Negedu and Atabor (2015) 
noted that before British colonial rule, the various ethnic tribes operated as separate and 
diverse political and religious systems. 
Figure 2
Nigeria, located on the Bight of Benin, on the African Continent. (Betts, n.d.)
44
The British incorporated separate systems to exploit capital, and to manifest this, 
the British employed a divide and rule mentality to maintain British hegemony, create 
disunity, create disputes, and encourage ethnic suspicions, thus enforcing tribalism and 
conflict. The British used this asymmetric warfare tactic to prevent nationalism and keep 
the various tribes and sects separate, seeking providence and hegemony for themselves.
Figure 3
Map of Nigeria with Location of the 36 States.
Note. Most of the Boko Haram activity is in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Kano, Gombe, and 
Jigawa states. (Administrative Map of Nigeria, open-source,  n.d.)
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War, in any form, has long been associated with the acquisition of land and 
resources. However, the British used a pseudo-population-centric asymmetric warfare 
tactic to defeat anti-colonial sentiment (Herbst, 1989). The British actively promoted 
internal conflict to control any nationalist intent as the population held grassroots power 
but could not unify to challenge colonial rule (Herbst, 1989). 
When the British vacated Nigeria, they did not leave a plan or template in place 
for the new Nigerian government to follow. The government was left to “devise structural 
changes to cope with questions of unity and stability” and to overcome obstacles tied to 
introducing an overly complicated version of democracy to a diverse and illiterate 
population (Herskovits, 1980, para. 11). The British were kicked out, so the vacating 
government did not leave managing civil servants behind to assist in the transition. The 
ethnic divides, encouraged by the British, eventually crippled the new federation. As a 
result, a civil war broke out in Western Nigeria (Kobo, 2020). This reality followed a 
pattern in which every colony in Africa was left to its own machinations. 
After the transition, the Nigerian central government was weak, ineffective, 
corrupt, and unable to adequately provide even the essential services to the people (Metz, 
1991). It did not help that between 1960 through 1999, Nigeria experienced ten coup 
d’états led by various military leaders who believed they could do better (Siollun, 2009; 
Pulseng, 2016). After Nigeria achieved democracy in 1999 through the fourth republic, 
no successful coup d’états have taken place. 
There have been four sitting civilian presidents of Nigeria, and the latest, 
Muhammadu Buhari, is a former army general and rival of Goodluck Jonathon, president 
from 2010 through 2015. Buhari has attempted to address the issues that plague Nigeria 
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and garner support for the war but has not succeeded. In 2015, he gave the military an 
order to destroy Boko Haram within three months, but this proved an impossible task 
(Chesa, 2015). After his re-election in 2019, he did not address the Boko Haram issue at 
all. 
Nigeria is heavily grounded in the tribal system and offers a complex ethnic and 
cultural diaspora. Internal conflicts between Muslim and Christian, north versus south, 
rich-poor, communal violence, tribal isolation, rampant corruption, and Boko Haram are 
tearing the country apart. Because of this dysfunction, Boko Haram found a 
complementary environment in which to grow.
Western influences which constructed Nigeria worked to create disharmony 
during colonial rule. Kant (1784) noted that human beings desire peace and contentment 
yet cannot avoid continuous disagreement with each other; this is Kant’s “unsociable 
sociability” (p. 4). Echoing Kant, Schneewind (1998) wrote, “We are self-preserving and 
quarrelsome beings, but we are also sociable. These two aspects of human nature make 
the problem of maintaining social order quite definite: how are quarrelsome but socially-
minded beings like ourselves to live together” (p. 72)? 
Nigerians live together through a precarious concoction of adversity, diversity, 
distrust, ancient ancestral ties, and tribal affiliations, and yet, as US Ambassador to 
Nigeria, William Stuart Symington, once noted; somehow, “whatever happens, Nigerians 
have a way of figuring out ways to live together” (Vanguard, n.d. para. 1).
Northern Nigeria is mired in poverty and the lack of opportunity with a 
poverty rate of 67%, the Northwest at 71.1%, and the Northeast, the focus region for 
Boko Haram, at 72.2% (Ahokegh, 2012). The rampant poverty and lack of opportunity 
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in the north allows Boko Haram to recruit Muslim men and children with the promise of 
political change, true Islamic enlightenment, and a life purpose.
In 2016, the Nigerian military declared Boko Haram 100% defeated and launched 
Operation Accord to address the violent Fulani. The Nigerian army had repeatedly 
claimed victory against Boko Haram only to continue insurgent operations (Mora, 2017). 
The Fulani remain active against Christians; however, consolidation between the Fulani 
and Boko Haram is unlikely as the terror and insurgent group are of Kanuri ethnicity. 
However, Boko Haram may influence the Fulani in radical Salafist Islam to cultivate a 
Sunni association (McGregor, 2017). 
This ethnic reality shifted in Mali as young Fulani, traditional supporters of the 
Bamako government in balancing Tuareg and Arab power in Northern Mali, have been 
recruited by radical Islamic groups (McGregor, 2017). The issue is complicated, but the 
result of this confrontation between the herdsman and the farmer has depleted the already 
undermanned Nigerian military to address both the Fulani and Boko Haram. 
The Fulani represent a danger aside from Boko Haram. The military’s attitude 
towards the Fulani is questionable and suspicious at best. President Buhari is Fulani, and 
allegations have been raised that the government condones the military's actions against 
Christians in the north (McGregor, 2017). Figure 4 maps the location of the Fulani 
through Africa and Nigeria, and it is within the “middle belt” region where the two 
religions coexist that violence exists, and tensions run high. Contradictions abound in this 
African state. While having no constitutional authority, the Emir of the Kano state 
currently influences many Muslims in social, moral, and spiritual matters. The Emir, 
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Sanusi Lamido Sanusi II, has carried on his grand uncle’s tradition of “chief government 
critic for life” (Perry, 2014, p. 13). 
Figure 4
Fulani Diaspora through Africa and Nigeria.
Note.  (Quiles, 2019). 
The Emir is decidedly anti-corruption and believes that while politicians are 
temporary, the traditional leaders of Nigeria are the true leaders, not only in politics but 
in societal and cultural affairs (Perry, 2014). The Emir noted that greed and ineptitude 
mark the Nigerian government, and when the leadership fails, the state fails (Perry, 2014; 
Okoronkwo, 2015). The current president, Buhari, had been ill and had not addressed the 
reforms he promised during the election, spending much of his first term in England 
undergoing medical treatment. 
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The elites and wealthy in Nigerian believe the nation-state is too big to fail, and 
this perpetuates their unwillingness to face up to the country’s issues and failures 
(Campbell, 2013). In an interview with Femi Kuli, a popular Nigerian musician and 
political activist, Femi lamented that “Nothing works, we have no education, no 
electricity [water], the roads are bad, and the airport is shit” (Perry, 2014, p. 31).
In every society, it is the political, economic, or social elites who guide society to 
prosperity (Smith, 2003a). The elites also attempt to maintain equilibrium in society for 
the good of all, but it is good for the wealthy and elites as they hold the power structure. 
However, in Nigeria, instead of the elites and affluent defining and molding society, 
instead of representing the core investment and producing a functional society, the elites 
wall themselves off from the Nigerian society and perpetuate their personal and isolated 
Nigeria with Porsche showrooms and Gucci Salons (Perry, 2014).
The state of the Nigerian democracy is tenuous at best. A thwarted coup d’état in 
May 2017 is the best evidence that Nigeria faces hurdles for a lasting and vibrant 
democracy. Add to the situation widespread corruption, tribalism, violence against 
women and children, including genital mutilation, and internal conflicts between tribes 
and ethnic groups mean that Nigeria may be hard-pressed to address a continuing 
transnational insurgency adequately. The politicians and the wealthy maintain the status 
quo to maintain their position and profitability (Dike, 2014). Society in Nigeria is 
dysfunctional, and the State as a whole is not at peace with itself. 
Tribalism in Nigeria
Nigerian is not a nation-state. It is, at best, a frail nation on the verge of 
implosion. The UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (n.d.) used the 
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definition offered by Davis (1997) that a Nation-state “is one where the great majority are 
conscious of a common identity and share the same culture.” Tribalism, among other 
dysfunctional issues, denies Nigeria nation-state status. According to Walby (2003), 
“nations are much more often projects that are in the process of becoming something 
more, than they are actually realized in stable political institutions and command over 
territory” (p. 531). 
Vail (1991) noted that nationalism was viewed as progressive and laudable in the 
modernization paradigm, while tribalism was viewed as retrogressive and divisive. 
However, tribalism persists, for ethnic particularism offers safety and security. According 
to Mehlika (2013), modernization is required for countries to influence and control their 
political, social, and economic development. Christian Southern Nigeria is far more 
modernized than the North, a reality not lost on the Nigerian people. Smith (2016) noted 
Pierce and explained that Boko Haram rose in the Borno state by taking advantage of 
tribalism's political, religious, and cultural separations (p, 565).
In addition, Smith (2016) described the “moral economy of corruption” in Nigeria 
as one in which the conduct of politicians and patrons is judged socially based mainly on 
how well power and (especially) money are employed for productive social and political 
purposes, rather than for purely selfish aggrandizement” (p. 565). Smith (2016) also 
noted that the population is nearly inoculated from corruption in that implicitly, “the 
moral economy associated with a politics rooted in patron-clientism mitigates class 
conflict and inhibits more widespread mobilization against corruption” (p. 565).
Nigeria is so corrupt that when Niyi Osundare gave a speech at a Save Nigeria 
Group conference, he stated, “we no longer blush at corruption. How did our nerves slide 
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into their present state of stupor? How did we plunge into this state of unconsciousness? 
Catastrophes that would shake normal societies to their very foundations hit and leave us 
unfazed. Tyrants in military uniform whipped us with scorpions; only a few of us 
protested (Osundare, 2012, para. 10). According to Osundare, “corruption is the grand 
commander of the federal republic” (heading).
A strong sense of nationalism in Nigeria is nonexistent and is tied to the inherent 
suitability of the localized tribal system. No single tribe has any stake in embracing and 
extending its nationalistic tendencies to accommodate other tribes. In this dynamic, 
complexity theory enters the equation as both a consolidator and disruptor of the nation-
state, the state (local) and the “concatenation of cultural movements” denies unity 
(Kaufmann, 2017, p. 22). 
Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) noted that the colonial system strengthened the tribal 
system across Africa and brainwashed Africans to believe they were less than full 
national and international community members. In addition, Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) 
wrote that “Africans are seen as murderers of fellow Africans, dehumanizing Africans, 
aiding and abetting against Africa, antagonizing African values and morals due to their 
self-acclaimed tribal supremacy” (p. 92). Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) offered that 
tribalism mandates the reality of a strong cultural or ethnic identity that separates and 
isolates one group from another through locational polity and economic inclusiveness; 
that identity drives the tribal-state to the exclusion of all else.
The imperial system from which colonialism sprang introduced inferiority to 
Africans, so the tribal system enabled tribal Africans to strive for superiority over other 
tribes. Therefore, African nation-building has been stymied by Africans' “mental slavery” 
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(Ogoku & Umudjere, 2016). It is true then that tribalism is isolationist and protectionist. 
Figure 5 graphs the location and population percentage of the various Nigerian tribes. 
The Hausa-Fulani are the largest tribe in Nigeria.
Figure 5
Map of Nigeria Identifying Tribal Dispersion
Note. This map indicates the major tribes in Nigeria. (Lamm, 2014).  
Nationalism is present within the tribal system, carrying tribalism into national 
politics affecting the Nigerian people and national unity (Bello, n.d.; Tilde, n.d.). 
However, the divides in Nigeria have not been addressed in the literature regarding the 
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effects of national unity and support for the government in fighting an insurgent and 
terrorist entity.
The Nigerian federal government also has issues with the Fulani; like the militants 
in Biafra who seek independence, the Fulani commit violence to ensure their motives are 
met in expanding their territory to graze cattle.
The Fulani drive their herds south in the post-harvest season to graze on the 
cultivated fields. However, for many reasons, including climate change, the Fulani have 
found it necessary to keep their stock south all year, destroying the fragile agricultural 
environment (McGregor, 2017). The Fulani and the Hausa-Fulani vigilante group Yan 
Sakai seek reprisals against whole villages and farmers with machetes and AK-47s. 
Violence against the agrarians mirrors the attacks by Boko Haram in both number and 
ferocity (McGregor, 2017).
The research demonstrated the Nigerian military, with government approval, 
enables the Fulani’s destruction of Christians in the north. This enabling may signal an 
institutional problem in that military conducts operations enforcing domestic policy, 
allowing sectarian violence and the plausibility of genocide (Murray, 2017; McGregor, 
2017). It is illegal in Nigeria for civilians to own guns; however, the Fulani are well 
armed with automatic AK-47s and other small arms. The Fulani have access to arms and 
ammunition. In contrast, the Nigerian Army in Northeast Nigeria had struggled to equip 
their troops with arms and ammunition to fight against Boko Haram (Ross, 2016). 
As an emerging but fragile state, Nigeria has not enjoyed the fruits of nationalism 
as a means of bringing its disparate peoples together to affirm Nigeria as an advanced 
prosperous nation-state. Nigeria is a fragile state, with internal forces of disunity sowing 
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the seeds of dissolution (Fund for Peace, 2018). When Nigeria constructed its democracy-
based constitution in 1999, politicians considered a parliamentary platform for the 
government. However, Nigeria adopted the American model of democracy, expecting a 
fully functional and operational society committed to democracy (Herskovits, 1980). 
Nigeria’s constitution mandates the separation of church and state. Unfortunately, 
the primary religious demographic, Christian and Muslim, believe it is their “turn” when 
presidential elections are held every four years, which leaves animosity simmering. And 
in fact, the presidency was rotated between Christian and Muslim through an informal 
system known as zoning. According to Muhumuza (2019), a Christian from the south is 
succeeded by a Muslim from the north. This has been widely recognized as the key to 
holding the country together. (para. 12). 
Occult and Superstitions 
Understanding the culture of Nigeria is essential to comprehend military 
performance. According to Chuter and Gaub (2016), “African militaries inevitably reflect 
the dominant cultural traditions and mores of their societies, as all armies do” (p. 33). The 
authors went on to explain that in sub-Saharan Africa, societies, along with their soldiers, 
are influenced by the belief in magic and superstitions, so much so that witchcraft and 
sorcery are believed to be authentic and prevalent in African societies, with Nigeria no 
exception (Waapela, 2016). The belief in the occult and its’ effect on both the population 
and military is just one cultural facet not considered in the West. 
Waapela (2016) wrote, “The intractable corruption in Nigeria and the docility of 
the Nigerian masses to rise and challenge the political elites’ exploitation of their natural 
resources is strongly believed to have a spiritual dimension, aside from the many other 
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physical and social factors that may be advanced” (p. 1). The Nigerian people are 
believed to be “spiritually manipulated by the political elites.” So much so that they are 
unable to ask their “political representatives (councilors, assemblypersons, senators, the 
president or governor) basic questions that border on governance” (Waapela, 2016, p. 7). 
Waapela (2016) continued asking questions of Nigeria; “Why is Nigeria so 
endowed with many natural resources, producing up to 2.6 million barrels of crude oil per 
day, and having about 82 million hectares of arable land still ranks amongst the poorest 
nations of the world? Why are meritocracy, accountability, transparency, competence, 
and integrity jettisoned in Nigeria, especially from 1999-date? Why is Nigeria among the 
few nations parading the highest number of church and mosque-goers in the world, still 
ranks as one of the most corrupt countries” (Waapela, 2016, p. 2)?  
Spirituality and belief systems play an important role in Nigeria and can account 
for the inability to hold the government and the military accountable. According to 
Waapela, “the Nigerian masses have become inexplicably docile when they should kick, 
they temporize, when they are to smite, they smile” (p. 7). Waapela (2016) explained that 
when political elites use occult practices on the Nigerian masses, they do not show anger 
with their deplorable, pauperized state, nor do they frown at the corruption of their 
political elites (p. 8). 
Western sensibilities have no place when studying Nigeria or any African nation. 
One must believe the occult to be very real because Nigerians think it is legitimate as it 
guides and controls their lives. Of particular note are the “witches” of Nigeria. Children 
known as skolombo or street children. The Christian south, epicenter of witchcraft and 
the occult, demonizes homeless children (Ellison, 2018). 
56
Finally, the lack of professionalism within the Nigerian Army may be a symptom 
perpetrated by the fear of a coup d’état. The Nigerian Army, before 1999, represented a 
weak organization due to the military ruler constantly stripping the army of funds and 
men fearing a new coup d’état. In May 2016, the army rifted as many as 70 Nigerian 
officers and senior officers from the service due to “corruption and partisan politics” or, 
as the fired officers alleged, “sectional and political considerations” (SaharaReporters, 
2016). 
In May 2017, the Nigerian Army investigated coup d’état reports as politicians 
attempted to influence officers to take control while Muhammadu Buhari was in England 
undergoing medical treatment. Army leadership moved quickly to quash any thought of a 
coup d’état. Chief of Army Staff, Tukur Buratai, stepped forward and issued a stern 
warning to his officers to stay out of politics, which raised the specter of a coup plot 
(Hassan, 2017). This belief in retributive or preclusive action, the rifting of officers from 
the ranks, which has over five decades weakened the army's core. 
In January 2019, 200 officers were compulsorily retired before the presidential 
election in February 2019. There were suggestions that this was done to ensure a smooth 
political transition and prevent trouble. The military railed against such suggestions and 
advised the media to verify information from the appropriate source before rushing to 
press to avoid fake news that is not credible and is misleading (Nigerian Voice, 2019). 
The Nigerian Military
The Nigerian Army can be traced to the 1863 Glover Hausas, founded by Sir John 
Hawley Glover of the Royal Navy (Nigerian Army, n.d.). Various regiments operated in 
the separate North and South protectorates. In 1900, the corps became the Royal West 
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Frontier Force. In 1914, the British abolished the protectorates, and the Nigerian 
regimental system was born. Queen Elizabeth visited Nigeria in 1956, and in her honor, 
the Nigerian regiment became the Queens Own Nigerian Regiments. By June 1958, the 
Nigerian military forces became independent from Britain, and the Nigerian government 
acquired military control and responsibility. (Wyss, 2016).
After independence, the Nigerian Army became subservient to the civil 
administration. However, 33-years of military dictatorships depleted the army of training, 
professionalism, accountability, and operational effectiveness, and the people’s trust 
(International Crisis Group, 2016). The Army was once the region’s most potent, and 
Africa counted on Nigeria’s army to be a regional stabilizing force.
Nigeria’s Modern Army 
The Nigerian Army appears to follow the praetorian model in civilian-military 
relations. Perlmutter (1969) explained that a modern praetorian state is “one in which the 
military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system” (p. 383). 
Perlmutter noted that the praetorian state may “develop when civilian institutions lack 
legitimacy or are in a position to be dominated by the military,” which is true in Nigeria 
(p. 383). The political system is weak, with weak and ineffective political parties that are 
considered low-level institutions. In Nigeria, tribalism is the political party and political 
system, and the National Assembly merely a symbol. 
Perlmutter (1969) offered that praetorianism often occurs in nations that are in the 
“early and middle stages of modernization and political mobilization” (p. 384). Between 
1960 and 1999, Nigeria was an underdeveloped state, so the army was “pushed into 
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political action when civilian groups and leaders failed to legitimize themselves 
(Perlmutter, 1969, p. 384).
Nigeria lacks a strong, cohesive, articulate, and vibrant middle class which lends 
society to ensure a praetorian government. Perlmutter (1969) also noted the conditions 
which are present lack the necessary universal symbols that generally bind a society 
together (i.e., “I am Igbo and live in a country called Nigeria”).
According to Perlmutter (1969), “the middle classes in most praetorian states are 
small, weak, ineffective, divided, and politically impotent” (p. 387). This condition is 
present in Nigeria, and its presence is “manifested in the class structure's polarization-the 
gap between the few rich and the many poor” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 387).
Praetorian existence is explained by “low social cohesion, personal desires, and 
group aims frequently diverge, and the formal structure of the state is not buttressed by an 
informal one; institutions do not develop readily or operate effectively; social control is 
ineffective; and channels for communication are few” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 385). It is 
here that Perlmutter mentions dissociation in a societal equation. In addition, “not only 
does the underdeveloped society as a whole lack unifying orientations, but its various 
sectors tend to be further fragmented and incapable of mounting unified action even for 
the narrower benefits of a particular sector” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 386).
Perlmutter (1969) noted that the “salient characteristic of modern military 
organization in developing policies is their professionalism. The professionalism and 
institutionalization of the military entail the establishment of military colleges, 
specialized training, the formation of a unified professional group, and a national army” 
(p. 383). One can argue that Nigeria is a praetorian state merely because the government 
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uses the military to enforce local, regional, and national policy, negating the army's social 
and cultural impact against civilians. The military eschews any regard for the Nigerian 
Constitution when it harms, abuses, or kills innocent civilians and acts poorly on the 
battlefield, dispossessing any thought of humanitarian law or the law of war.
Praetorianism
The Nigerian military moved from the ruler-type praetorian model to the 
arbitrator-type in 1999 with the establishment of the fourth republic. Perlmutter (1969) 
noted that in a state with a low cohesive social structure, the praetorian model is 
characterized by fragmented boundaries and relations between civil and military 
authority, both seeking political power and relevancy, but the state ultimately retains 
civilian control. Additionally, the military is oriented to external threats and internal 
challenges. The arbitrator-type military tends to preserve military expertise, is 
conservative, and maximizes civilian power (Perlmutter, 1969). 
According to Perlmutter (1969), there are distinguishing characteristics of the 
arbitrator-type army. The military accepts the existing social order, and once civilian 
disputes are settled, the army returns to its barracks or stands down. The army has no 
political organization and does not work to maximize army rule; if intervention is 
necessary, the army establishes a time limit for military intervention until an alternative 
and acceptable government is established. The military is concerned with their 
professionalism, sometimes overly concerned, and they operate from behind the scenes as 
a pressure group. Still, they have a low level of national consciousness, and they may fear 
civilian retribution. 
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In addition, professionalism is insisted upon and is codified in army doctrine and 
culture; promotions are determined by ability, expertise, and education (Perlmutter, 
1969). According to Perlmutter (1969), the praetorian model negates professionalization 
principles, and the attributes of a professional army are not “inoculated or observed” (p. 
391). Nigerian military officers are promoted many times based on tribal affiliation or the 
desire to enrich subordinates as their senior officers have been enriched. 
Perlmutter (1969) noted that the army does not have a professional tradition 
because of this reality or has deteriorated, conferring the military a low level of national 
consciousness and identification. Therefore, the model Nigeria uses to enforce domestic 
policy by an army trained to kill and inflict mass damage; first and foremost, lends itself 
to the praetorian model. Prior to 1999, the Nigerian army operated as a praetorian ruler-
type army with numerous coup d'état coup de etat taking place and the army’s command 
general taking control.  
The liberal model would have civilian authority in complete control of the 
military with clearly delineated lines of the civil and the military, continual civil-military 
competition accompanied by occasional but tenuous civilian control, and a military-
oriented to coping with external threats and internal challenges to both the state and its 
existence simultaneously. In Nigeria, the fear of a coup d’état and independent actions of 
military abuse and atrocities negates the liberal model (Tellis, et al., 2000). 
The Nigerian Army considers itself the jewel of Africa, and the leaders tout the 
training and professionalism brought to the Army after 1999. Although college students 
upon graduation are required to perform one year of civil service to the country (Simon, 
2011b), the military is all-volunteer. The army is predominantly Muslim, but efforts have 
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moved forward to recruit Christians (Godwin, 2016). Enrollment into the military is 
coveted as it provides many in Nigeria with a route out of poverty and 
disenfranchisement. The age mandate from 18 to 22 years (26 if a tradesman) seems a bit 
short-sighted in enlistment and limits recruitment to only the youngest Nigerian male 
(Nigerian Army Recruit Portal, 2019). However, the training regimen is quite strenuous 
due to Africa’s harsh conditions. 
The Nigerian system is comparable to the US Military (only) in that the training is 
divided into three phases; Red, White, and Blue and is completed in ten weeks (US 
Army, 2017). From basic training, Nigerian soldiers move on to Advanced Individual 
Training, training for Military Occupational Specialties or their career assignment 
(Timaya, 2017). As with Western armies, during boot camp, the Nigerian training 
command instructs in morals and ethics on the battlefield (Timaya, 2017). 
The Nigerian National Defence Academy in the Kaduna state trains the officer 
corps for the Nigerian Army and is considered the best military academy in Africa. The 
Academy is a descendent of the Royal Military Forces Training College, which existed 
before decolonization. Cadets enter the program and participate in a five year “Regular 
Combatant Course” (Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020) 
In addition to the bachelor’s program, the Academy also offers graduate and post-
graduate degrees (Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020). The contents of the 5-year program 
are not known; it is more likely than not that training mimics British training. This would 
indicate that morals and ethics in combat are included as officers are the primary arbiters 
and enforcers of discipline and ethical behavior (British Army, 2020; Nigerian Defence 
Academy, 2020). According to GlobalSecurity.org, while the Nigerian Army is the 
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largest in West Africa, the reality is far from perception. When President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a former military man, was elected in 1999, he feared the Army, so he 
proceeded to skeletonize the organization to prevent further coups (“Nigerian Army,” 
n.d.). 
In 2016, the Army had an estimated 130,000 active-duty soldiers and 32,000 
reservists (Sweeny, 2016). In 2019, the numbers reflected 120,000 active duty and 0 
reservists (Global Fire Power, 2020). The army is ranked 47th globally, but this is a neo-
realist number based on strength and material power, not ability or capability (Global Fire 
Power, 2020). Although a large and complex organization, the Army is understaffed for 
its obligations to the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, UN 
Peace Keeping Operations, and in addressing Boko Haram (“Nigerian Army,” n.d.).
Corruption has hampered the force in denying the acquisition of both basic and 
advanced weaponry. Transparency International stated that previous and fraudulent arms 
deals left the army without vital equipment, is insufficiently trained, and is low in morale 
and under-resourced (“Military Graft Undermines Nigeria's Fight,” 2017). Gone are the 
days when army officers were referred to as “dirties,” those who had enriched themselves 
during military rule, and the “cleans,” those who had not participated in using their office 
to enrich themselves (“Nigerian Army,” n.d..). Corruption plagues the army with those 
who still seek to enrich themselves. Because of these issues and their actions against 




The Nigerian Army consists of eight divisions, including one amphibious. The 
First Division is located at Kaduna, the command division known as the show division, to 
give visitors and heads of state a show of what Nigerian military power looks like (“7th 
Infantry Division,” 2019). This division does not represent the reality of army life in 
Nigeria. In 2013 headquarters established the 7th Infantry Division for the war against 
Boko Haram. So poor was the operational capability the General Officer Commanding 
was removed four times between 2013-2014 (“7th Infantry Division,” 2019). 
In 2014, two mutinous actions occurred by soldiers who refused to fight against 
the insurgency. So grievous was the leadership that “junior officers are willing to be 
court-martialed, rather than continue to be sabotaged, humiliated, and killed by the 
corruption and incompetence of the top military command and federal government” (“7th 
Infantry Division,” 2019). It is the 7th ID, which has borne the brunt of attacks by ISWAP 
and Boko Haram in the years following. These are the soldiers who flee when ISWAP or 
Boko Haram attacks. 
In 2017, Military.com ranked the Nigerian Army as the fifth worse military in the 
world (Stilwell, 2017). The Nigerian Army could not meet its obligation to protect 
civilians from insurgents and terrorists, so the government formed the Civilian Joint Task 
Force (CJTF). Metz (2007) noted that “militias arise from a combination of need and 
opportunity” (p.15). The militia exists as the “state cannot address the basic needs of a 
specific group, particularly security, economic opportunity, and a basis for political 
identity” (Metz, 2007, p. 15). 
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Ross (2015) wrote that in Northeast Nigeria, the army was underequipped, their 
“armored vehicles don’t actually move,” and soldiers are known to “flee from battle with 
civilians as they tear off their uniforms.” “Run for your lives,” they were screaming as 
they fled, he said. “Boko Haram is coming!” The soldiers tore off their uniforms, put on 
civilian clothes, parked their army vehicle under a tree, and fled in a car (Searcy, 2019, 
para. 18). 
In 2014, Nigeria commissioned the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command 
through the assistance and training provided by the US. However, SOF is designed for a 
focused and particular military mission skill set (“Nigerian Army Special Operations 
Command (NASOC),” 2014). It may be difficult to understand why a specialized unit 
was established when regular army units lack leadership, logistical support, competence, 
training, and lack food, weapons, and ammunition in the field. 
Nigerian Military Budget and Operations 
The Nigerian defense budget from years 2000 through 2008 was 3% of 
government expenditures. From 2009 through 2014, expenditures rose 7.2% but were still 
underfunded compared to the Gross National Product (International Crisis Group, 2016, p 
i). Corruption runs rampant through the civilian and military sectors. From 2007 through 
2014, Sambo Dasuki, a retired Nigerian Army Colonel and former National Security 
Adviser to the President of Nigeria, allegedly diverted 2 billion dollars meant for military 
arms, supplies, and ammunition (The ScoopNG, n.d.). This action caused field forces to 
run short on ammo, weapons, uniforms, supplies, training, and pay, leading to mutinies 
and Boko Haram’s control of the North (The ScoopNG, n.d.).
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President Buhari, disturbed by the reports, wrote: “The findings made so far are 
extremely worrying considering that within the same period our troops were in desperate 
need of ammo/equipment” (The ScoopNG, 2016, para. 13). The report indicated that the 
independent audit showed a “total extra budgetary intervention” for arms, excluding 
grants from state governments, amounted to over $5 billion. Of the 513 contracts, 53 
were “failed contracts” worth more than 2 billion dollars (The ScoopNG, 2016).
National legislators also divert money from the military budget through the 
appropriation process to serve tribal needs, private business dealings, and personal 
interests (International Crisis Group, 2016). The military is understaffed; operational 
planning is inadequate. Bloated padded payrolls serve ranking officers, and a weak 
auditing system contributes to the Nigerian military's morass (International Crisis Group, 
2016).
The Nigerian military participates in regional peacekeeping, stretching an already 
undermanned force and budget. In addition, the military is dealing with over two dozen 
internal security operations, the largest being Boko Haram (International Crisis Group, 
2016). Training is woefully inadequate, facilities are insufficient in number, staffing 
poor, and the Nigerian Army is mired in conventional warfare doctrine (International 
Crisis Group, 2016). 
In 2020, the Nigerian Army budget was noted to be 2.1 billion dollars U.S. The 
military fielded 129 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. The army accounted for 258 tanks, 
1750 armored personnel carriers, 363 self-propelled and towed artillery, and 38 rocket 
launchers. The navy had a ship complement of 75 small patrol vessels (Global Fire 
Power, 2020). 
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The Nigerian army, the “Jewel of Africa,” is not, as the military is “badly 
governed, under-resourced, and virtually adrift in policy and doctrine” (International 
Crisis Group, 2016, para. 2). If Nigeria’s armor does not run, if troops lack arms, 
ammunition, training, logistical support, food, where does 2.1 billion dollars U.S. go 
(International Crisis Group, 2016, para. 2)?
According to the International Crisis Group, “Dubious procurement practices, 
fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at 
the national security adviser’s office” further degrade the force as funds are diverted at 
the headquarters level to private or non-military purposes (International Crisis Group, 
2016, para. 4). Reports from the field indicate that soldiers went into battle against Boko 
Haram with inadequate weaponry and ammunition, while some soldiers carried no arms 
(Ross, 2015).
 In 2019, Nigeria ranked the 144th least corrupt country out of 176 countries 
assessed. From 1996 through 2018, Nigeria’s corruption rank averaged 121.48, with the 
highest rating in 2005 (Trade Economics, 2019). 2019’s mark is slightly better than the 
2005 level, indicating corruption mitigation had not worked. As a comparison, Russia 
and Ukraine, the most corrupt countries in Europe, carry a rating of 138 and 120 
comparatively (Trade Economics, 2019).
The Nigerian military has experienced failure on the battlefield and in attempting 
to manage a regional war. As 2020 is upon Nigeria, the army has been fighting Boko 
Haram for 11-years with little chance of resolution. The military remains corrupt, and 
leadership, logistical support, and appropriate doctrinal applications for soldiers in the 
field appear non-existent.
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As far as addressing Boko Haram as a conventional army, Tellis, et al. (2000) 
noted through the institutionalist approach; the military, like all organizations, is driven 
by institutional well-being. In Nigeria, this translates to officers and senior leaders' 
assuring personal and professional well-being; they seek to maintain the status quo by 
ensuring their positions in the army are solid and lucrative. Therefore, innovation does 
not exist and, if it did, may not be successful. In the end, the leadership would be more 
driven with the internal distribution of status and power than with organizational goals. In 
this paradigm, new ideas are perceived as threatening (Thompson, 1969). This approach 
describes the Nigerian military. 
In contrast is the professionalist approach, which views the military as an 
organization driven by protecting state security. The professionalist is optimistic and 
understands that the organization will innovate successfully and learn, initiating positive 
change (Tellis, et al., 2000). The US military, as well as NATO armies, are 
professionalist organizations. 
The Nigerian Constitution and the Military 
The Nigerian constitution offers primary direction to the civilian government on 
military use for internal and external issues. The constitution states: “The president shall 
be the head of state, the chief executive of the Federation, and commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces of the Federation” (Constitute, 2021, p. 59). “The powers of the president as 
the commissioner-in-chief of the armed forces of the Federation shall include the power 
to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the Federation” (Constitute, 2021, 
p. 94). Additionally, the 1999 Constitution in Article 214 (1) ended localized police 
forces and installed a national police force: “There shall be a police force for Nigeria, 
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which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and … no other police force shall be 
established for the Federation or any part thereof” (Ekeh, 2010; Constitute, 2021, p. 92). 
The Constitution states the Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National 
Assembly made on that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces adequately to 
effectively defend Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity 
and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air. The military should suppress 
insurrection and restore order and perform such other functions as may be prescribed by 
an Act of the National Assembly (Constitute, 2021, p. 93).
Section 3 gives the president the authority to assign the military to confront and 
eradicate Boko Haram on Nigerian soil. The Nigerian constitution also stipulates that: 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on democracy and social justice 
principles. Accordingly, it is declared that: Sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria 
from whom government through the constitution derives all its powers and authority. The 
security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. The 
participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution” (Constitute, 2021, p. 15). Expressly, the protection of the 
people from corruption and abuse is noted in section 15(5) in that “The State shall abolish 
all corrupt practices and abuse of power” (Constitute, 2021, p. 15). The Constitution also 
states, “Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and 
accordingly--No person shall be subject to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment” 
(Constitute, 2021, p. 23). In 2015, the Nigerian Assembly passed the Administration of 
Criminal Justice Act, which “prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
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of arrestees; however, it failed to prescribe penalties for violators” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2017, p. 5). 
Based on humanitarian agency claims, recorded video footage, eyewitness 
accounts, and reports, and documents provided by the government, the Nigerian Army 
and the CJTF have violated multiple tenets of the Nigerian constitution (Amnesty 
International, 2014, 2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2016a, 2016b). Within this context of 
human rights, the actions by the military become concerning regarding the treatment of 
citizens in Northern Nigeria.
Understanding the Nigerian Army
Chuter and Gaub (2016) attempted to explain African armies for the European 
Union, whose members have poured funds into Africa to project their expectations and 
concepts on the Africans. European Union conceptualizations and desires have little to do 
with the realities found in Africa, as independent states use the funds and assets as they 
see fit. Ghuter and Gaub (2016) noted that African armies are dissimilar from each other, 
let alone from Western armies, as each colonial power formed native armies for their 
particular colonial strategies. 
The colonial powers built substantial military or paramilitary native forces, led by 
white officers and used against the African populations. This may be part of the legacy 
and why the Nigerian Army harms and abuses the home population. It was a learned 
concept and wholly acceptable while serving under the British. 
In general, and according to Chuter and Gaub (2016), “African armies have 
evolved mainly by trial and error, and their missions include, in different places, public 
order, gendarmerie-style operations, border policing, and even development and 
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infrastructure tasks” (p. 12). Armies in Africa have become involved in 
counterinsurgency, counterterrorist operations, peacekeeping missions, and control 
intelligence gathering and analysis in many countries (Chuter & Gaub, 2016). These 
armies carry out these missions even though they are conventionally based and were 
established to address asymmetric warfare. The armies of Africa were decidedly built on 
the neo-realist theory of power projection using conventional warfare tactics and strategy.
The Nigerian Army operates under resource constraints; poorly maintained 
military equipment, inadequate infrastructure, and armament is degrading while soldiers 
live and work under challenging conditions. This is not a Nigerian problem but affects all 
African national armies (Chuter & Gaub, 2016). 
Figure 6 identifies the civilian trust factor for African nations concerning their 
armies. Nigeria is ranked near the bottom in trust from the civilian population. In synch 
with the civilian view of the military, Nigerians do not approve of military rule. The 
people want democracy but may have little understanding of what makes a democracy 
work for the benefit of the people. 
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Figure 6
 Level of Popular Trust Toward the Army and Attitudes to Military Rule. 
Note. (Chuter & Gaub, 2016, p. 32).  
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Boko Haram
Boko Haram was founded as a decidedly local phenomenon with transnational 
radical Islamist influences. Boko Haram’s early form sprang from the Maitatsine, an 
Islamic fundamentalist sect who, in the 1980s, recruited children and teens. The roots of 
Boko Haram can be traced to 1995 when Abubakar Lawan founded the non-violent 
movement Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra (Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization) in 
Maiduguri, the capital of the Borno state (Onuoha, 2012). 
In 2002, Lawan left Nigeria to study in Saudi Arabia. Mohammed Yusuf took 
control and renamed the group Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da’wati wal-Jihād (people 
committed to propagating the prophet’s teachings and Jihad) (Ekanem, Dada, & Ejue, 
2012). Yusuf provided education and jobs to the marginalized youth but increasingly 
radicalized the group through the early 2000s (Agbiboa, 2015).
An essential factor to their and other radicalized Islamic groups' growth and 
appeal is the spread of globalization. Gansler (2013) defined globalization as the “long-
term, largely irreversible phenomenon involving the political, cultural, and economic 
merging of geographically dispersed groups and shares the idea that transportation and 
communication technologies are pervasive and consequential” (p. 2). Globalization 
expanded recruiting economic viability and spreading the radical ideology. It increased 
the global national and economic hierarchies, leaving underdeveloped nations struggling 
to achieve the same level of financial independence as developed nations. 
Globalization within the radical Islamic diaspora became a reality as al-Qa’ida 
spread its message throughout the Middle East, Europe, Africa, the Far East, and 
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Muslims worldwide. ISIS took the mantle away from al-Qa’ida after the US military 
disseminated the group in the early to mid-2000s. Boko Haram affiliated with ISIS 
expanding the globalized network of like-minded Jihadi groups. With the affiliation with 
ISIS, goals have changed. 
ISIS demanded that Boko Haram stop its terror campaign against Muslims and 
adopt a focused campaign against Christians, the military, and the democratic 
government to establish the African caliphate. Therefore, Boko Haram has become a 
transnational terror enterprise and has increased its presence with the advent of 
globalization. Table 1 notes the differences between the localized historical insurgency 
model and globalization. 
In 2009, Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād, led by Yusuf, conducted 
a violent uprising against the Nigerian state. Yusuf was captured and summarily executed 
by the Nigerian government, and his followers were imprisoned. However, instead of 
dissipating the sect, the group enjoyed a resurgence and adopted a ruthlessly violent 
demeanor (Bunker & Dilegge, 2017).
Table 1 
Conventional Localized Insurgency Versus Globalization
Conventional insurgency Global insurgency
Insurgent goals: Specific overthrow of local 
government
Complex, thematic, overthrow of 
global order
Power source: Support from the local population Global support from like-minded 
individuals
Center of Gravity: Local population International influence on 
communications, funding, 
recruiting, travel, and leadership
Organizational 
structure:
Hierarchical, tribal, or group Networked, connected, 
interknitted, flatter organization 
leadership: many capable leaders
Insurgent primary 
tactic:
Guerilla warfare, terrorism Hybrid warfare, international 
terrorism and support
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Insurgent motivation: Deprivation, disenfranchisement A strong grievance, a change to 
world order
Note. Ellington, 2013, p. 85. 
In 2010, Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau attacked the state prison in 
Bauchi and freed 105 followers and 600 additional prisoners (“‘Boko Haram Attack’ 
Frees Hundreds of Prisoners,” 2010). Boko Haram refined its skills and training through 
a close association with al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. In March 2015, 
Shekau announced the groups' affiliation with ISIS/ISIL. 
Shekau changed the group’s name to Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (Islamic State of 
West Africa). Better known as Boko Haram, which means, depending on the translation, 
“Westernization is sacrilege, Western education is a sin,” or “Westernization is 
forbidden” (Murphy, 2014; Tilde, n.d.). In addition, Shekau reached out to al-Qa’ida in 
the Islamic Maghreb to enhance Salafist affiliation.
In late 2016, reports emerged that Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, was 
killed in an air attack. However, in 2017, the Nigerian government confirmed that Shekau 
was still alive and possibly hiding in Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest (Gaffey, 2017). Newly 
affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISIS dictated that Abu Musab al-
Barnawi, son of the late Mohammed Yusuf, assume control to realign the group with the 
ISIS ideology of fundamentalist Islam (Zenn, 2018). 
Abu Sa’ad, Abubakar Shekau’s second in command before his death in 2013, 
preached to followers, primarily teenagers, that victory lay in martyrdom, that killing the 
apostate and infidel was the only true way of redemption before Allah. Martyrdom was 
the goal, not a life on earth, and to serve Allah, is to become a martyr for his cause 
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(Perry, 2014). Perry (2014) interviewed a Nigerian general who stated that he had never 
seen anything like it, that Boko Haram fighters walked into the barrage of return gunfire, 
casual, committed, and unconcerned for their safety; they “simply walk into death” (p. 3). 
Boko Haram is an insurgency that focuses on terrorizing the population. They 
employ terrorist actions by carrying out suicide attacks, detonating car bombs, and 
terrorizing the people of four nations. Mass kidnappings are prevalent, entire villages 
have been eradicated, and the stated goal is to destabilize the Nigerian government 
(Suleiman & Karim, 2015). 
Boko Haram emerged because of poor governance, economic hardship, 
inequality, and corruption (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). A Nigerian Bishop stated that 
Boko Haram existed as a resistance movement about corrupt rule rather than an Islamist 
political movement (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). The literature indicates that while these 
beliefs are partly true, Boko Haram exists as a force for political Islam. Political Islam 
combines polity and religion to create a dynamic that captures the imagination and 
respect of the “true Muslim” and drives the people to support and become active in the 
insurgency. Yet, Boko Haram attracts its membership because of poverty, economic 
marginalization, social and regional inequality, and inadequate national governance 
(Briscoe & van Ginkel, 2013).
The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands (Jamāʿatu Anṣāril 
Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān), better known as Ansaru, or al-Qa’ida in the Lands Beyond 
the Sahel, operated as a splinter group from Boko Haram and operated in the Kano state, 
the homeland of the Hausa-Fulani people. Ansaru coordinated its operations with al-
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Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(Ronen, 2014). 
Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru did not target Muslim innocents but “fight” against 
mainstream Islam and representative Western values. Ansaru’s mandate included 
defending the interests of Islam and Muslims in Africa and is not confined to Nigeria 
(Ronen, 2014). Ansaru’s activities occurred in Northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and 
Cameroon. Although Ansaru has become somewhat dormant, members spread 
propaganda and may evolve into a third Boko Haram faction or join ISWAP. 
Boko Haram refers to the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, a doctrinal study provided by Allah to 
“rectify the mistaken beliefs, misunderstandings, and misconceptions Muslim have 
accumulated for over 200 years” (Richardson, 2014). The writings held within the Kitāb 
al-Tawḥīd present the “purity” of Islam and justifies their terrorism on both apostates and 
infidels.
Chibok
In 2014, the Chibok schoolgirl's abduction by Boko Haram awoke the world to 
the problem of the terrorist group. Boko Haram soldiers attacked the Chibok Girls 
School, killing 30 instructors and staff; the radical group abducted 276 girls ranging from 
16 to 18. Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader, stated that the girls were kidnapped 
to be wives for his men, sex slaves, and sold on the black market. (Dorell, 2014).
The world community came to the aid of Nigeria with the hashtag campaign 
#BringBackOurGirls. Michelle Obama stated that “In these girls, Barrack and I see our 
daughters” and joined the campaign (Perry, 2014, p. 14). The social media campaign did 
nothing to help the girls and appeared to be nothing more than a feel-good response, but 
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it did raise the global profile of Boko Haram, the effect they had long desired (Perry, 
2014). On Boko Haram and the Chibok girls, Femi, a Nigerian celebrity, asked, “Where 
is the military? They have the highest budget; where is the money” (Perry, 2014, p. 31)?
In the guise of Chibok, on February 19, 2018, Boko Haram attacked the girl’s 
school at Dapchi, in Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram’s fertile hunting ground. The group 
kidnapped as many as 100 girls, and there was evidence the Nigerian Army failed to 
prevent the attack. “The Nigerian authorities have failed in their duty to protect civilians, 
just as they did in Chibok four years ago. Despite being repeatedly told that Boko Haram 
fighters were heading to Dapchi, it appears that the police and military did nothing to 
avert the abduction” (Amnesty International, 2018, para. 8). Counterinsurgency tactics 
would have included the placing of soldiers in or around Dapchi to protect civilians. 
Isolate and protect the population is a first-tier requirement in counterinsurgency. 
In 2021, a spate of kidnappings occurred; 317 girls were kidnapped from the 
Government Girls Secondary School in the town of Jangebe, in the northern state of 
Zamfara (Maclean, 2021). The terror group kidnapped 40 boys and adult teachers from a 
boy’s school in the Niger State, with one child killed. In December 2020, the Katsina 
State saw 300 boys kidnapped. According to the New York Times, kidnap-for-ransom has 
become a cottage industry (Maclean, 2021). 
Figure 7 provides context in understanding the region in which Boko Haram 
operates and the relative locations of Chibok and Dapchi. Nigerians do not take to bad 
news, and owing to the culture, many in Nigeria refused to believe the girls’ schools had 
been attacked. Defeating the insurgency is crucial as Nigerians suffer at the hands of the 
terror organization. Two of the most horrific acts carried out by Boko Haram included the 
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2015 attack on Baga, Doron Baga, and 16 surrounding villages in the Borno state. This 
after the military attacked Baga in 2013, burning the village to root out Boko Haram 
sympathizers. It was estimated that 2,000 people were killed in the Baga region, primarily 
women and children (Amnesty International, 2015; Segun, 2015, Deblasio, 2015). 
Figure 6
Location of Chibok and Dapchi
Note. Abuja is the capital of Nigeria (BBC News, 2018c).
Figure 8 is a 2017 map of Northern Africa and the sub-Saharan showing the 
influence of multiple terror groups. The routes of human and contraband trafficking are 
noted, indicating that these groups are working with each other. This map does not show 
that Boko Haram is active in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Al-Shabab is active in 
Somalia, with al-Qa’ida active in Mali, Algeria, and Libya. However, since 2013, these 
groups have expanded, and ISIS has made incursions into these regions.
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Figure 7
Map of Africa’s Militant Islamist Groups.
Note. 2017 map of Africa that notes the various locations of terror groups and the routes 
for the drug trade which fuels terror. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2020)
Figure 9 maps the operational area of Boko Haram inside Nigeria. The majority of 
attacks have occurred around the Borno state capital of Maiduguri. Boko Haram operates 
in this area as it offers a quick escape to Cameroon, Chand, and Niger for a safe haven. 
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The region is vast and ungoverned, and conventional warfare tactics are moot in 
protecting civilians and defeating the insurgency.
Figure 8
Boko Haram Activity in Nigeria
Note. From The brutal toll of Boko Haram’s attacks on civilians (Ali, 2017). 
The documented events prior to 2016 represent Boko Haram as led by Abubakar 
Shekau. As noted previously, on August 19, 2016, Shekau and his senior leadership were 
identified as being killed in an airstrike by the Nigerian Air Force. As a result, ISIS 
elevated Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf’s son, to the leadership post. Shekau (reported 
alive) denied Barnawi’s appointment and Shekau refuted ISIS although he did not rescind 
his bayat (oath of allegiance to a leader) to al-Baghdadi (Kelly, 2019a). Shekau’s ruthless 
brutality, his definition of apostasy, the targeting of Muslims, and the enforcement of his 
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version of Takfir led to the change (Takfir is the controversial practice of one Muslim 
declaring another a non-believer, or Kafir) (Kelly, 2019a). 
Boko Haram then split into two factions. Shekau led his loyalists while Barnawi 
led the new faction Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, in early 
2019, and apparently due to internal strife, ISIS appointed Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-
Barnawi as governor of ISWAP. There is a marked operational difference between the 
two groups. ISWAP targets Nigerian government installations and the army. Shekau’s 
faction attack soft targets within the civilian population. It is ISWAP who is the larger 
and more active faction (Kelly, 2019a). 
On December 6, 2018, and January 14, 2019, respectively, attacks were carried 
out in Rann, 175 km (110 miles) northeast of the Borno state capital, Maiduguri. As the 
attacks began on the internal displaced persons camp, army forces in both instances fled. 
At the same time, the attackers set fire to shelters and a United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) clinic erected to assist and house people made homeless by the conflict (Kelly, 
2019a). Seventeen civilian casualties were documented, while 10,000 civilians fled 
(Kelly, 2019a). The attack was attributed to ISWAP; however, it turned out the Shekau 
faction was responsible. 
Both factions are referred to as Boko Haram, and the media has difficulty 
differentiating which actions taken by the insurgents are attributable to which group. 
However, ISWAP, using the preferred ISWA identifier, attacks only hard targets. ISWA 
represents an existential threat to the existence of Nigeria. Boko Haram is working to 
create its Caliphate in northeastern Nigeria. However, it is unlikely the two factions 
would merge as ideological differences differ significantly. 
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According to Omar Mahmood, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security 
Studies in Addis Ababa, “There are ideological divides with Shekau that remain 
unbridged, especially regarding the determination of who is and is not a civilian” (Kelly, 
2019b). 
Figure 9
Progression and Split of Boko Haram in 2016
Note. Based on Kelly (2019b). 
In 2019, the attacks on Rann and Baga demonstrated the differences between the 
two groups. Shekau destroyed Rann and ran civilians down, killing them, while ISWA 
allowed people to leave Baga unharmed (Kelly, 2019b). Boko Haram attacks soft targets, 
civilian targets, while ISWA focuses its efforts against the Nigerian Army, protected 
national government institutions and local government offices. 
ISWA shuns attacks against the population as they try and cultivate support, 
something Boko Haram was never concerned with achieving. ISWA’s attacks are 
ORIGINAL GROUP
Abubakar Shekau




Pledged Allegiance to ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi




Abu Mus’ab Al-     
Barnawi Faction





pinpointed to military and government installations and not within the disseminated 
population. Figure 11 represents attacks carried out by both the Shekau faction and 
ISWA. The Shekau faction has been most active from 2016 through 2019. However, 
ISWA’s attacks are pinpointed to military and government installations and not within 
the disseminated population. 
Figure 10
Attacks Carried Out by ISWA and Boko Haram Shekau Faction 2016–2019
Note. Attacks carried out by both ISWA (dark grey) and the Boko Haram Shekau 
faction (Orange) from 2016 through 2019. From (Acled, 2019). 
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Attacks have been increasing from the Northeast zone to the south and the west. 
The United Kingdom has warned against traveling to Nigeria as terrorism has hit “public 
places where crowds gather have been targeted, including places of worship, markets, 
shopping malls, hotels, bars, restaurants, football viewing centres, displacement camps, 
transport terminals, government buildings, security, and educational institutions” 
(GOV.UK, 2021). 
Radical Islam
Sunni and Shia are two main sects in Islam. Sunni makes up between 80% and 
85% of the Muslim diaspora. Both sects have radicalized members and organizations and 
Iman’s who preach violence against the West. The Shia make up 10% to 16% of the 
Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2009). 
Khalil (2017) estimated that 10% -15% of the Muslim population are extremists 
and Islamic conservatives (potential extremists) consist of about 30% of the Muslim 
population who live in Muslim-dominated countries. The remaining 50% of the Muslim 
population are spread among different cultures and civilizations and lie within the global 
community, rather than the Islamic community, which influences their beliefs (Khalil, 
2017). Khalil (2017) noted that extremism is not confined to a country dominated by the 
Muslim faith and can emerge from the global diaspora. 
In understanding an insurgency or radical movement is crucial to understand the 
culture, political belief system, and religious belief system that drives these groups. 
Terror groups that operated in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Baader-Meinhof (Red Army 
Faction), Peruvian Shining Path, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and 
the Italian Red Brigades, were leftist political groups bent on disrupting or vanquishing 
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the sitting capitalist government in the nation-state they operated. Today, much of 
terrorism is based on radical Political Islam.
The world has labeled al-Qa’ida and ISIS as radical Islamists. However, the 
Islamic belief system espoused by these groups, especially Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 
former leader of ISIS, is considered by followers to be the pure and true Islamic 
representation of the religion. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi grounded this movement as political 
in establishing the Caliphate or Islamic nation-state. 
al-Qa’ida and ISIS look to the 7th century for their “radical” belief that Islam is 
the only true religion. In the 7th century, the prophet Mohamed created Islam, conquered 
Makkah, and swept the idols from the Ka’aba, leaving the black building, the Ka’aba, as 
the center of Islam. ISIS had stated that it would like to sweep the idols from the Ka’aba 
and destroy the building (Romey, 2015). 
The broader Islamic faith believes the meteor was placed there by Abraham and 
Ishmael, representing the covenant between the people and Allah. ISIS and Boko Haram 
claim to represent the pure form of Islam, practiced in the method Allah and Mohammed 
destined. The groups follow the Salafist (Salafiyyah) belief system, which is a violent 
form of Wahhabism (Al-Muwahhidun), an austere practice of Islam that insists on a 
literal interpretation in the Qur’an. 
While ISIS and Boko Haram do not represent most Muslims, Khalil (2017) stated, 
“it is not unreasonable to claim that ISIS represents the essence of Islam like no other and 
that it is the perfect embodiment of the early era of Islamic history that followed Prophet 
Mohammad’s migration to Medina” (para. 5). It is in this structure that ISIS and Boko 
Haram “serves as an honest and authentic mirror that reflects the face of Islam” (Khalil, 
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2017, para. 5). ISIS and their associates believe the purest form of Islam existed during 
the Prophet Muhammad’s era, and, in the period after the Prophet's death, the four 
Caliphs reigned. 
Who ISIS Represents 
ISIS, Boko Haram, and ISWAP believe their actions, regardless of how barbaric 
or criminal, are condoned by Allah and accepted through the Salafist belief system while 
following Islamic law and teachings (Khalil, 2017). The burning, crucifying, beheading, 
the slaughtering of humans, Muslim and Christian, and the dropping of homosexuals 
from rooftops are simply a means to an end. According to Khalil (2017), some Muslim 
scholars find it difficult to dispute this ultra-pure belief system once practiced by the 
founder of Islam. 
 Iyad el-Baghdadi (no relation to Abu Bakr el-Baghdadi, the former ISIS leader), 
a prominent proponent of Middle East democracy, stated that “The dominant paradigm of 
Islam is rule-based. It’s a rule-centric Islam. It’s not values centric. This plays very well 
with ISIS because ISIS can just use the same rules and arguments that the establishment 
scholars use” (Williams, 2015, para.4). 
Iyad el-Baghdadi noted that the Salafist belief system offers something to many 
young people they are not getting from mainstream Imans and religious scholars tied to 
authoritarian regimes (Williams, 2015). The young feel they are not getting answers or 
are given wrong or nebulous answers to spiritual questions. ISIS provides simple rule-
based solutions which are easy to understand and follow. Baghdadi stated, “You can’t 
beat a simplistic answer, rather just answering with another question. Because life is a 
question, but these guys just want answers” (Williams, 2015, para. 4). 
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ISIS represents Salafist Muslims and practices a strict interpretation of Islam 
(Olidort, 2015). Comparisons between the radical violent Salafist movement and 
Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and is representative of ultra-
conservative Sunni Islam practiced mainly in Saudi Arabia have been made; however, 
they are both part of the same ultra-conservative movement, although Salafists consider 
being called “Wahhabi” derogatory (Olidort, 2015). However, terrorism experts had 
identified Wahhabism as one source for global terrorism (Senate, 108th Cong., 2003). 
When the CIA had completed their interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, 
which included waterboarding, Mohammed began to offer information. However, it was 
not through interrogation; Mohammed began to hold “classes” on the Sunni Salafist 
Muslim belief system and doctrine (Mitchell, 2016). According to Sheik Mohammed, the 
Western view of peace is far different than the Salafist Muslim. It was Sheik Mohammed 
who gave the Western world an abject lesson in radical Sunni Islam. 
Sheik Mohammed explained that unlike the definition of “Western peace” 
between nations and peoples, peace for the radicalized Salafist Muslim means one of 
three things; death to the infidel or apostate, subjugation of the infidel in which a tax is 
paid to Islam, or conversion to Islam (Mitchell, 2016). The radical Muslim believes the 
end is coming for Western civilization when Islam destroys all non-believers and ushers 
the return of the Mahdi, the eschatological redeemer of Islam who will appear for several 
years before the Day of Judgment and rid the world of evil. Peace to the Salafist means 
complete control and strict adherence to Sharia by every living human. 
According to its followers, Sharia is the one true Muslim religious, legal, and 
political belief system, and those who practice fervently can approach near-mystical 
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status. Khalid Sheik Mohammed referred to those who follow this ideology as “True 
Muslims” (Mitchell, 2016). Radical Islamists use the true form of Sharia to justify killing 
the infidel or apostate and is a sacrifice to Allah. Allah condones the killing of infidel and 
apostate women and children. 
According to Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Western women birth the infidel, and 
their children represent the future of Western influence. Therefore, the children must die. 
Democracy is the enemy of Islam because only Allah dictates how people live and are 
governed (Mitchell, 2016). The radical Shia (Iran) and the Sunni Salafist are 
theologically disparate but share the same belief that infidels and apostates must be 
eradicated or enslaved. This is the path the Iranian theocrat (Shia) is currently following.
Faithful, true Muslims believe that there are no innocents, men and women who 
fund the governments who fight the Muslims by paying taxes, are as guilty as their 
soldiers. Children give comfort to the infidel father and mother and, therefore, should be 
eradicated (Mitchell, 2016). Allah mandates true Muslims convert, kill, or enslave every 
human being; it is their focus, their calling, their job, and is grounded in their devotion to 
Allah (Mitchell, 2016). 
On democracy and Western freedoms, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, 
wrote, “The disease is unbelief, and as Allah says, disorder is worse than killing (Qur’an 
2:191)...Everyone knows democracy is unbelief, and everyone knows the constitution is 
unbelief, and everyone knows that there are things Allah has forbidden in the Qur’an and 
forbidden in countless hadiths of the Prophet that are going on in Western schools...We 
haven’t forbidden anything; we haven’t told the Muslim community to abandon anything, 
we simply stand on the path of truth” (Thurston, 2016, p. 16). 
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Finally, a “truce” in Western terms refers to a cessation of hostilities and restoring 
peace and harmony, if short-lived. The True Muslim believes a truce is for regrouping, 
training, planning, then springing into action against the enemy (Mitchell, 2016). And, 
while peace is considered the goal in any conflict, to the True Muslim, peace means 
uniting the world under the flag of Islam and imposing Sharia law (Mitchell, 2016).
International Law and Conflict
It is challenging to access confirmed and corroborative literature on the abuses 
carried out by the Nigerian Military and National Police Force against the Nigerian 
population. However, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented 
human rights violations in countries across the globe for decades. Both humanitarian 
groups are on the ground in Nigeria, documenting the military's actions, Boko Haram, 
and the CJTF, established to fight Boko Haram. 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports are accepted as reliable, 
and the US Department of State uses the reports as confirmed evidence of violations (US 
Department of State, 2016). In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry used information 
from an Amnesty International report to press for human rights in Nigeria (Gordon, 
2013). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are incorporated into 
State Department memos, position papers, and official reports (US Department of State, 
2017). 
The violence perpetrated by Boko Haram began in 2009, and according to a 2012 
Human Rights Watch report, the Nigerian government established a Civilian Joint 
Military Task Force (CJTF) to supplement the military. This civilian group has killed 
Boko Haram suspects and civilians (The Home Guard, 2016). Human Rights Watch 
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obtained civilian testimony that the CJTF has used excessive force, physical abuse, 
extortion, theft from civilians, rendition (forced disappearance), performed extrajudicial 
detentions and killings, and recruited child soldiers (US State Department, 2016). 
CJTF members are the local civilians who can be viewed in the Amnesty 
International video (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64) assisting the 
Nigerian military in extrajudicial killings. The victims are suspects and not combatants. 
According to Amnesty International, the CJTF have little training and are poorly armed, 
using machetes and locally sourced weapons. While this is a loosely organized militia, 
the members appear to act as vigilantes. 
The video purportedly documents extrajudicial killings of potential suspects. In 
addition, military soldiers are seen ordering civilians, the CJTF, to kill civilians (Amnesty 
International, 2014). The military personnel are identifiable as Nigerian military due to 
the insignia on their battle dress. It is illegal in Nigerian for anyone but military soldiers 
to wear camouflage (Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, 110). One stated reason was the 
ability to acquire camouflage uniforms for impersonation. If found, the clothing is 
immediately confiscated, and the individual arrested (Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, 
110).
International law is clear on civilians fighting within their country. Civilians have 
the right to bear arms to meet a foreign invader and protect their home and family. 
However, The CJTF was established and sanctioned by the Nigerian government. 
Therefore, the CJTF is a State-sanctioned institution and is subject to the Law of War, 
international law, and International Humanitarian Law (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 
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2005). According to the Economist, the CJTF membership approached 26,000, with 1800 
members receiving a salary of $50.00 US a month (The Home Guard, 2016). 
Luban (2004) noted that crimes committed against fellow nationals, whether 
carried out by civilian or military personnel, are considered international crimes and 
humanitarian crimes. The Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) codified that international 
law crimes committed by a nation-state against its residents represented an intrusion 
into state sovereignty (Luban, 2004, p. 94; Nuremburg Charter, 1951). 
However, Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) deny nation-
state sovereignty as the Articles abolish sovereign immunity and the superior orders 
defense (Luban, 2004). The Nuremberg Articles override the claim of domestic 
authority and immunity. Therefore, when a state participates in crimes against 
humanity against its nationals, “criminality overrides state sovereignty, turning them 
into international crimes” (Luban, 2004, p. 95). When a nation-state commits crimes 
against humanity against fellow nationals, those actions represent a pure case under the 
law; that is, those violations are also war crimes (Luban, 2004).
Finally, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter identifies two archetypes in crimes 
against humanity jurisprudence. The first type includes “crime of the murder type;” 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation (to a ghetto or slave camp), and other 
inhumane acts” (Luban, 2004, p. 95). Subsequent statues added (en)forced disappearance, 
sex crimes against women, torture, and “imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules 
of international law” (Luban, 2004, p. 95).
Article 6(c) second type of crimes against humanity includes the “crimes of the 
persecution type.” These are related to racial, religious, ethnic, or political persecution. 
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They include deprivations in the right to citizenship, marrying freely, arrest and 
confinement, beatings, mutilation, torture, slave labor, confiscation of property, and 
denial to obtain an education, practice a profession, and teach (Luban, 2004).
Boko Haram can target a civilian population to extract taxes, forced 
recruitment, kidnap slaves, hate for the apostate, or out of a distorted god condoned 
radicalism representing political Islam. The Nigeria military may target the 
population as the simplest way to eradicate the insurgency living among the people. 
Therefore, counterinsurgents attempt to separate the people from the insurgency to 
protect civilians and reduce the opportunity for crime against humanity. 
Luban (2004) also wrote that no assertion could be made that small-scale, 
government-inflicted abuses or atrocities remain the business of the nation-state, whether 
the government attacks a small community or individual as a matter of deliberate policy, 
or wanton individual dereliction of duty, each example carries the same weight. 
According to Luban (2004), the main animating idea in identifying and outlawing crimes 
against humanity, chiefly, is that humankind is interested in preventing and punishing the 
grievous crimes governments inflict on nationals, whether large or small. 
The research was devoid of any example or evidence that abuses against the 
Nigerian population by the military (specifically in the fight against Boko Haram) were 
motivated by hate, religious belief, tribal affiliation, or ethnic identification; however, 
this cannot be ruled out as causation. More likely than not, in flailing about the bush to 
fight Boko Haram, the Nigerian Army simply kills those they believe are associated with 
the group. 
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It appears abuses were carried out because the Nigerian military was and is 
grasping at conventional war tactics in the fight against Boko Haram; however, this does 
not relieve the Nigerian government of responsibility. If this is the fact, then the Nigerian 
military is not absolved of any legal jurisdiction in that the Nigerian government is 
responsible for potential crimes against humanity (Luban, 2004). 
In the Nigerian conflict, the Joint Civilian Task Force is a representative of the 
Nigerian government, and in fact, some in the task force receive pay from the 
government. In this case, the JCTF is held to the same international standard as a 
government representative and is a “politically organized group acting under color of 
policy,” making the group liable to international law (Luban, 2004, p. 95). 
However, what cannot be ruled out is the premise, as Luban offered, that a 
culture’s moral baseline is inclusive of violence and blood feuds are an accepted societal 
norm (Luban, 2004). Rorty (1993) noted that most people “live in a world in which it 
would be just too risky--indeed, would often be insanely dangerous--to let one’s sense of 
moral community stretch beyond one’s family, clan, or tribe” (p. 125). For such people, 
the claim to the right of a moral baseline in violence eschews crimes against humanity. 
However, it is the right and the international community's responsibility to set the 
standards for crimes against humanity, and the claim of cultural norms is not excused 
(Luban, 2004). 
Boko Haram eschews any worldly law and convention. They follow their 
interpretation of Islamic Law and the Qur’an. While Boko Haram excludes itself from 
Western laws, the Nigerian military is held accountable to international law, including 
international humanitarian law. It is incumbent in the civilian and military leadership to 
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ensure the army follows the international community's laws and conventions pertaining 
to war and conflict. 
The Rules of War
Carl Von Clausewitz noted that war is an extension of diplomacy, the 
imposition of one nation-state’s will upon another, and that war was simply a duel 
but on an extensive scale (von Clausewitz, 1832). Like duels, there are rules to guide 
war, including distinguishing between “civilians and combatants with attacks 
directed only against combatants” (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005, p. 198). 
Additionally, “Attacks must not be directed against civilians. Civilians are persons 
who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all 
persons who are civilians” (p. 198). 
Using civilians to commit acts of war, murder or torture, denial of quarter, 
extrajudicial killing is illegal, immoral, unethical, and violates the international rules of 
law governing combat (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). Civilians are considered 
unlawful combatants. The civilian militia must be trained by the armed forces and subject 
to the same rules of engagement, the laws of war, and humanitarian laws as militaries, 
including wearing a uniform, which signifies their combatant status. In addition, a militia 
must wear signifying uniforms of service to denote their combatant status. 
One of the most widely cited rules of war is the Geneva Conventions. First 
adopted in 1864, the international community has accepted the conventions as a guide for 
war. The First Geneva Convention, in 1864, sets rules on how to deal with sick and 
injured combatants, including the creation of the Red Cross-Geneva (ICRC, n.d.a; 
Abrams, 2001). 
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The Second Convention adopted in 1949 included the “amelioration of the 
condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked member of armed forces at sea” (ICRC, 
n.d.b), and the Third Convention addressed the treatment of prisoners of war (ICRC, 
n.d.c). The fourth convention addressed civilian safety during war (ICRC, n.d.d). The 
first Geneva protocol, adopted in 1977, addressed the protections afforded victims of 
armed international conflicts.(ICRC, n.d.e). Subsequently, Protocol II dealt with 
protecting victims in non-international armed conflicts (ICRC, n.d.f).
Teaching combatants the international laws of war are required by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and not doing so is a breach of international law (Detter, 2007). 
Even if a state does not instruct soldiers on the laws, the soldier cannot use the ignorance 
defense if charged with war or humanitarian crimes (Detter, 2007). A state’s 
understanding of these rules must meet international conventions. In addition, a nation-
state or non-state actor who was not a cosignatory to international charters or laws is not 
relieved in the responsibility of lawful and humanitarian conduct on the battlefield 
(Detter, 2007). Terrorists and insurgents are considered unlawful combatants under Ex 
parte Quirin, which determined that unlawful combatants are subject to the same rules as 
soldiers, including capture, detention, trial, and punishment by military tribunals (Detter, 
2007).
In 2003, with the dawn of the “new war” on terrorism and insurgencies, the Red 
Cross decided that civilians could fight for one’s country and that terrorists and unlawful 
combatants be afforded the same rights as lawful combatants (Detter, 2007). However, in 
2005, the Red Cross reversed its position, writing “that if civilians directly engage in 
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hostilities, they are considered “unlawful” or “unprivileged” combatants or belligerents 
(Detter, 2007). 
As an example of implementing international law, the US military’s Law of War 
Manual, FM27-10, was produced using the Geneva Conventions, The Hague 
Conventions, ICRC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and various additional sources 
related to international law to address the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war 
victims (Department of Defense, 2015). 
All told, the Law of War manual uses 120 years of international history, research, 
and settled law to establish parameters by which the US military operates in war. FM27-
10 is appropriate for this study as the US and the British military work closely in creating 
military doctrine. The Nigerian army traces its roots to the British, including its military 
doctrine. The British army advises the Nigerian military in training in the fight against 
Boko Haram (Ministry of Defence, 2016).
The law of war is an international law and is explained by US doctrine from the 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Department of Defense, 2015, Chapter 8). 
All countries are expected to follow the Law of War. FM3-24 and other US army 
doctrinal manuals expound on the law of war and are repeated in the British, German, 
Australian, and French doctrinal manuals as excepted international law. 
The Law of War denotes the reality in military law that as soon as a combatant 
becomes severely wounded, surrenders, or is captured, they become hors de combat, and 
no military purpose is gained in continuing the attack on that individual or unit 
(Department of Defense, 2015). The Law of War states, “Thus, the principle of humanity 
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forbids making enemy combatants who have been placed hors de combat the object of 
attack” (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 59).
The Law of War states that there are generally two classes of individuals 
contained within the enemy state, combatants and civilians. Therefore, it is imperative 
that separation between civilians and combatants exist. Certain types of persons do not fit 
into the civilian or combatant designation. These include spies, mercenaries, child 
soldiers, and civilians who directly participate in combat (ICRC, 2011). However, a 
civilian has every right to take up arms to fight an invading force, or if they must defend 
their life, the lives of their family, or property from combatants. 
The internationally accepted Rule of Distinction requires nation-states to 
distinguish the armed forces from the civilian population. Distinction denoted the 
protected class from the unprotected class on the battlefield. Using camouflage is 
consistent with distinction because foliage is not a protected category and because 
civilians generally do not wear camouflage (Department of Defense, 2015), which 
explains the illegality of wearing camouflage in Nigeria (See Section 251 of the Nigerian 
Criminal Code). The Rule of Distinction applies to the CJTF, who are specifically not 
considered legal combatants and are not distinct in their appearance from the civilian 
population. 
The Law of War, the Geneva Conventions, and the International Red Cross do not 
address the treatment of nationalized civilians by the home country. It is assumed that a 
nation-state would do whatever possible to protect its citizens. According to the Geneva 
Conventions, the Law of War states that nationals who are in the care of their state are 
not protected persons. This idea yields to the rule of international law in that the Geneva 
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Convention does not interfere in the conduct of the state with its nationals (Department of 
Defense, 2015). However, international humanitarian law is not precluded, and it is here 
the Responsibility to Protect intercedes in domestic affairs. 
However, the Law of War addresses the civilian population of the enemy state. 
The civilian population of an enemy state is a protected class. Specifically, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and Protocols I and II protect civilians from harm from an 
intervening army (Department of Defense, 2015). 
War is immoral and unethical. However, war is inevitable based on the human 
condition and diplomatic failures within the international community. As such, the 
international community attempts to guide nation-states through the moral and ethical 
considerations in the waging of war. Jus ad bellum is used to establish a threshold of 
gravity of offense sufficient to justify military force (Kretzmer, 2013). Jus in bello 
establishes the conduct pursued in war by the warring factions, just as jus gentium (law of 
nations) establishes the laws of society people accept throughout the international 
community (Kretzmer, 2013). 
The literature on morals and ethics in war is derived from international law and 
International Humanitarian Law from which the Geneva Conventions were constructed. 
Lawful and humane conduct in war is expected. However, these international laws are 
based on Western law and sensibilities. The Muslim world also follows the rules of war 
based on Sharia law, Usal al-fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence. Islam is primarily a political 
system but contains and administers a legal code. The Islamic legal code is called Sharia 
(Shariah), meaning “the way.” The source of the Sharia is the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
(also found in the Al-sīra al-Nabawiyya [Sira] and the Hadith) (Warner, 2017). 
99
Since Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims disagree on which Hadith to use, they 
have slightly different Sharia systems. As such, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
is represented at the UN, and Sharia is noted to be complementary to the UN Charter in 
that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation “reaffirms the commitment of its member 
(Islamic) states, to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the purposes and 
principles of which provide the basis for fruitful cooperation among all people” (Ali & 
Rehman, 2005, p. 343).
Non-state actors, like Boko Haram, ignore any Western-influenced law, including 
the accepted laws, tenets, and conditions put forth by the Muslim faith and endorsed by 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, taking from the Qur’an a narrative that suits 
their 7th-century Salafist belief system (Khalil, 2017). 
Figure 11




With new tactics and weapons developed since the late 1800s, ethics and morals 
became ever more critical in warfare. The use of chemical and biological weapons is 
denied by jus in bello. It violates the discrimination and proportionality clause and the 
international ban on chemical weapons by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Orend, 2000). The Geneva Conventions guide jus in bello, which protects civilians and 
calls for proportionality in war. The 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations sought to 
outlaw war, but this proved to be impossible. 
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, established in 2005 by the 
international community at a world summit, sought to ensure the international community 
prevented genocide and other gross forms of human rights abuse (ICRtoP, 2017). 
Responsibility to protect requires nation-states to protect their citizens from mass 
atrocities. If unable to do so, the international community should assist the nation-state in 
fulfilling its obligation. 
Responsibility to protect represents an “emerging norm” and a political 
instrument (ICRtoP, 2017) pertaining to war. Though not international law, this has 
replaced the international policies in UN resolution 50/172 in not interfering in the 
domestic affairs of a sovereign nation (UN, 2005). Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo 
brought to light that civilian populations cannot be left to genocide or mass killing 
while the world turned its collective back (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007). 
However, according to Gentile (2009b), Responsibility to Protect is 
expeditionary, and like counterinsurgency, if military force is applied to protect 
civilians, more often than not, the force ends up killing those it was designed to 
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protect. As the Nigerian insurgency continues, these policies and emerging norms 
should be enforced but are willfully ignored. 
In viewing the Nigerian Army and their summary executions of suspected 
Boko Haram members (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v= GA7SIbv EO64). Sharia 
may provide the battlefield remedy in cutting off heads post-battle or after capture. 
However, the Nigerian Army is held to international law and the Geneva 
Conventions, and as such, Sharia is not justifiable in guiding the army. 
Just War Theory
Just War Theory is part of an all-encompassing international group of laws and 
theories which guide the application and processes of war. Operating in their home 
country does not relieve a military from auspices of Just War, the Law of War, 
International Humanitarian Law, the Geneva Conventions, or Right 2 Protect (ICRC, 
n.d.-h). Just War Theory or jus ad bellum dictates that a nation-state must provide a 
legitimate reason for going to war. These rules focus on specific criteria for what makes a 
war just. Article 51 of the UN Charter clarifies: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations” (UN, n.d.a., Article 51). The world community 
has set the parameters for going to war. 
The three most influential documents which guide the international community 
include the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, the 1945 London Pact, and the UN Charter. 
Beyond inherent self-defense, the UN Charter requires nations to seek a diplomatic 
solution and, if not possible, requires UN authorization to initiate force (UN, n.d.b). 
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There exist six criteria under jus ad bellum, which determines a Just War. All six criteria 
must be met to affirm a nations moral right to wage war (UN, n.d.b): 
1. Just Cause: There must exist just cause to implement the last resort in 
diplomacy. Protecting the innocent and re-establishing order are two just 
cause factors. 
2. Proportionate Cause: The cause must be proportional to the offense. A 
nation-state cannot go to war because a nation burned its flag; however, if an 
aggressor state steals land (Russia into the Crimea) by attacking the nation-
states, a proportional response is required and allowed. The offender can be 
removed from the territory, and this is when escalation usually occurs. 
3. Right Intention: The nation-state, in seeking war, can address a wrong and 
bring lasting peace to the area. 
4. Right Authority: In the late 20th century, the UN has been the arbiter in 
confirming a nation-state has the authority to launch a war. However, 
sovereign nation-states generally hold that in self-defense, no authorization is 
needed. There are cases in which the nation-state went on the offensive, 
destroying men and equipment to deny future incursions. The 1990 Kuwait 
war stands out as an example of right authority by removing the offending 
nation-state from Kuwait and destroying the offending military’s ability to 
fight. 
5. Reasonable Prospect of Success: War is an unknown. The nation-state must 
assume a specific relative position of victory to ensure a better situation 
would exist after the war was won.
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6. Last Resort: Diplomacy is always the preferred method of settling 
disputes. Violence can only ensue after all moral and legal efforts have been 
exhausted (Lazar, 2016). Under jus in bello, three criteria exist for the 
imposition of violence to achieve a political means. As follows:
1. Discrimination: The conduct by combatants must be ethical and moral. The 
rights of civilians must be protected. Civilians must not be targeted in a 
targeted attack. This line has blurred in counterinsurgent operations as the 
insurgency is entangled with the civilian population, and belligerents use 
civilians as human shields. 
2. Proportionality: The principle of using no more force than is necessary is in 
play. A nuclear nation could not use a tactical nuclear device to respond to an 
infantry attack. The lives of all on the battlefield, even the enemy, must be 
considered. However, proportionality is pragmatic. 
3. Necessity: Collateral damage within the civilian population is permissible only if, 
in pursuing an objective, the least harmful means feasible are chosen (Lazar, 
2016). Necessity is guided by: “take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack to avoid, and in any event to minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. (ICRC 
1977) Geneva Convention, Article 57, 2(a)(ii); Lazar, 2016).
Nigeria’s War: The Rules of War and International Humanitarian Law
Nigerian Army Action
International humanitarian agencies moved to build internal displaced persons 
camps for those Nigerians attacked and those affected by Boko Haram. However, it was 
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the Nigerian airforce who bombed an internal displaced persons camp. The Nigerian air 
force later apologized for the error, but according to Murray (2017), this was not the first 
time “errors” have occurred, suggesting the attack was deliberate. The camps have been 
attacked repeatedly by the Nigerian military, and Murray (2017) noted the military gets 
away with atrocities because the world is simply not interested. 
Murray (2017) described an attack on a village elder and a group of villagers by 
the Fulani in which army troops observed as 13 were killed. “When challenged after a 
massacre, soldiers often claim that they didn’t receive any orders — or had been 
commanded not to intervene” (para. 9). This may be more a state than a federal issue. 
When performing security tasks in a state, the state’s civilian leadership guides the army. 
However, the army's actions against Christian civilians mirror the actions against 
civilians in the states dealing with Boko Haram (Murray, 2017). Murray (2017) suggested 
that it was indeed a plan of the Nigerian federal government to remove Christians from 
Northern lands (para. 13). 
The Fulani, like Boko Haram, are a serious threat to Nigerian stability. In 2016, 
Baroness Caroline Cox, a member of the British House of Lords and president of 
Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, traveled through the Jos Plateau State to address 
humanitarian rights for the Christians (Daily Mail, 2016; Hart Publications, 2016). The 
Fulani targeted Cox for assassination in an attempt that failed. In the attack, the Fulani 
dressed in all black and yelled Allahu Akbar (God is Great), mirroring ISIS in their 
ferocity and ruthlessness (Daily Mail online, 2016).
The Nigerian Army conducts Foreign Internal Defense operations across Africa to 
assist the Economic Community of West African States, ECOMOG, and various UN 
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missions such as UNIFIL, UNMIL, and UNIMID (Adeniyi, 2016). The Nigerian military 
had acquitted themselves professionally in these missions (e.g., Firsing, 2014). However, 
the Nigerian military is not held to the same level of professional operation and 
responsibility on the home front fighting Boko Haram. Over the years, peacekeeping 
demands have diluted the effectiveness of the Nigerian Army at home fighting Boko 
Haram (Firsing, 2014). 
In December 2011, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of 
emergency that restricted or suspended constitutional guarantees for six months in 15 
areas of four Northern states (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The state of emergency failed 
to increase security, and Boko Haram continued attacking civilian targets (Human Rights 
Watch, 2012). In 2012, the administration issued enhanced emergency powers to the 
security forces. Boko Haram increased its activity and eventually carried out more attacks 
than in 2010 and 2011 combined (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
Boko Haram suspects held in detention were not charged and therefore are not 
accorded a speedy trial as directed by the Constitution. Nigeria would have the authority 
to hold these suspects as combatant prisoners of war, but Nigeria had not officially 
declared war on the insurgent group. In 2014, African leaders met in France to formulate 
a plan to eradicate Boko Haram after the Chibok School kidnapping. 
Cameroon’s President Paul Biya stated, “We are here to declare war on Boko 
Haram.” At the same time, Idriss Deby of Chad said it would be “total war” (Africa 
Leaders Declare ‘War’ on Nigeria Boko Haram, 2014). The declaration of war was 
necessary as Boko Haram was not a nation-state but an insurgent entity and non-state 
actor. However, Boko Haram could be construed as a nation-state under Political Islam. 
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These public declarations can be construed as a binding declaration of war but only 
indemnifies Cameroon and Chad (Department of Defense, 2015). 
Military doctrine is designed to prevent civilian casualties through rules of 
engagement. However, according to Human Rights Watch (2012) and Nigerian civil 
activists, the CJTF's abusive actions against civilians enhance Boko Haram’s narrative of 
fighting government brutality. Community members and leaders are subjected to abuses 
that ultimately denies cooperation with security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
This is another tenet of counterinsurgency that the populace can provide intelligence, 
local knowledge, and material support to the intervening forces. 
The Nigerian Network on Police Reform found that between 2008 and 2012, the 
Nigerian security forces extrajudicially killed 7,198 people (Campbell, 2013). John 
Campbell (2013), former US ambassador to Nigeria, wrote that the police are so hated in 
the country, and that hatred motivates Boko Haram to murder police officers and security 
forces at a high rate. This thinking represents a misunderstanding of Boko Haram; it is 
not that the group hates the police, the police represent the state, the only authority in 
Islam is Allah, so any entity of the secular nation-state is an affront to Allah and must be 
eradicated (Mitchell, 2016). 
The police are as much an enemy of Boko Haran as are the Christians and the 
Muslim apostate. As a result, reports indicated that the Nigerian government responded to 
Boko Haram with a disregard for international human rights law using torture, 
incommunicado detention, rendition, arbitrarily arrests, forced disappearances, and extra-
judicial killings (Amnesty International, 2016a). 
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Although Boko Haram utilizes brutal methods against the civilian population, the 
Nigerian military cannot respond in kind against Boko Haram suspects or the population. 
Doing so nullifies the Nigerian constitution, the rule of law, international law, and the 
government's moral authority. A 2016 report issued by the US State Department Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, noted that extrajudicial vigilante killings 
represented a serious human rights violation (US State Department 2016). It was the 
government of Nigeria, along with the military, who established and set into motion the 
operational mandate for the CJTF (Amnesty International, 2016). 
In May 2016, 737 suspected Boko Haram fighters or supporters were sent to the 
prison in Maiduguri. They were charged for being “incorrigible vagabonds,” which 
indicated that no real connection to Boko Haram had been established (Amnesty 
International, 2016a). According to Amnesty International, women in the internal 
displaced person's camps were exploited for sex by both the army and the CJTF for 
money, food, or the ability to leave the camps (Amnesty International, 2016a).
Through collected eyewitness accounts, Amnesty International reported that 
thousands of young men, women, and children were arrested as they returned to the 
repatriated towns of Banki and Bama in the Borno state (Amnesty International, 2016a). 
The arrests reportedly were based on profiling and not evidence. In the same vein, 
thousands were arrested fleeing Boko Haram atrocities, and those arrestees were not 
allowed contact with family members or lawyers (Amnesty International, 2016a). 
At the GIWA military barracks detention center in Maiduguri, cells were filled 
beyond capacity while disease, dehydration, and starvation claimed 240 lives, including 
twenty-nine children and babies (Amnesty International, 2016b). In February 2016, 
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soldiers opened fire on approximately 200 members of the Indigenous People of Biafra 
who had gathered for a prayer meeting at the National High School in Ada, Abia State 
killing seventeen and injuring scores (Amnesty International, 2016a). 
In March 2014, after a Boko Haram attack on the GIWA military barracks 
detention center, the military executed 640 detainees (Amnesty International, 2016a). 
Further contained in the Amnesty International report are additional military and national 
security forces’ reports of torture, extrajudicial killings, and unauthorized detentions. In 
addition, humanitarian agencies accused the CJTF of recruiting children, primarily 
teenagers, to fight Boko Haram (Okeowo, 2014).
The lesson for Nigeria from Mao Zedong is this; “It is only undisciplined troops 
who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, 
cannot live” (Tse-tung, 1961, p. 93). Mao’s quote does not pertain to Boko Haram but to 
the Nigerian military, who treats the population as their enemy. While the CJTF has 
exercised brutal treatment against Boko Haram suspects, fighters, and civilians; the 
sanctioned government, represented by elected and appointed officials, condone crimes 
against humanity as it serves their purpose of confronting Boko Haram leading to the need to 
evaluate both groups’ actions during the insurgency (Okeowo, 2014),
In 2013, Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga, Borno State, Nigeria. The 
Nigerian military moved in to confront the terror group, and reports indicated the army 
used a scorched earth policy on the town. The army simply walked through the town, 
burning buildings as they attempted to flush out Boko Haram fighters (Nossiter, 2013). 
In the end, the army had torched some 2000 mostly thatched roofed homes and 
businesses, and  200 inhabitants were killed (Nossiter, 2013). The soldiers shot civilians 
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as they ran out of the conflagration. Mohammed Muhammed, a 40-year-old taxi driver, 
gave eyewitness testimony, “People running into the flames, I saw that. If they didn’t run 
into the flames, the army would shoot them” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 12). 
Isa Kukulala, an eyewitness, stated, “They (soldiers) poured petrol on the 
properties. At the same time, they are shooting sporadically inside the fire. They took a 
small child from his mother and threw him inside the fire. This is what I have witnessed” 
(Nossiter, 2013, para. 13). Eyewitnesses to the atrocities include refugees, survivors, 
relief workers, and observers from other towns. Kole Shettima, chairman of the Center 
for Democracy and Development in Ajuba, the capital of Nigeria, stated, “People are 
tired of the excuses the military is giving, and that’s why they are demanding an 
investigation. This time it’s different. There is a crisis of legitimacy in the military” 
(Nossiter, 2013, para. 7).
Kashim Shettima, governor of Borno State, upon reaching Baga, stated, “They’ve 
(the army) not adhered to the rules of engagement when you burn down shops and 
massacre civilians, you are pushing them to join the camp of Boko Haram” (Nossiter, 
2013, para. 9). Baga represented a vindictive and retributive action against civilians for 
reportedly assisting Boko Haram, although evidence was not produced to that effect. This 
is precisely what counterinsurgent tactics and doctrine are designed to prevent. The army 
attacked the town because one of their own had been killed by Boko Haram near the 
village. 
After the attack, the army responded. Brigadier-General Chris Olukolade, director 
of defense information, “angrily rejected” the accounts of residents and others. Olukolade 
stated, “The burning, the killing is done by Boko Haram, not by the soldiers. Anybody 
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blaming the soldiers must be a sympathizer with Boko Haram.” He said that “Boko 
Haram was using the houses to shoot out at soldiers” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 16).
Brigadier General Austin Edokpaye stated that the soldiers used restraint and 
“soldiers were ambushed by the insurgents and that a soldier was killed, and the terrorists 
were shielded by the community members” (Channels Television, 2013, para. 5). The 
army denied torching the village, blaming the action on Boko Haram. General 
Olukolade’s assertion that if the population accuses soldiers of abuse or committing 
atrocities, then “they are Boko Haram sympathizers” denies the truth and prevents the 
military from accepting responsibility, looking inward to assess doctrine address serious 
operational issues. It is this attitude that denies appropriate and forward-thinking 
leadership. 
Finally, Alhadji Adamo, a retailer in the Baga market, recounted, “I saw them 
(soldiers) putting fire on people’s houses. They are the security of the state. They have no 
right to kill anybody. They are supposed to protect the people” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 22). 
The Nigerian Army believes that if civilians run when the army approaches, then the 
civilians must be Boko Haram. This is not the reality on the ground; civilians run because 
they fear the soldiers. This fact was reported in 2015 through the media and eyewitness 
accounts (Nossiter, 2013; Wojtanik, 2015). 
The Nigerian Army has boasted of successful operations and announced three 
times that the army had defeated Boko Haram (Kazeem, 2017; Mora, 2017). Army public 
relations officers apply positive rhetoric to their messaging. In September 2017, the army 
announced they had defeated the insurgent group in Operation Lafiya Dole (Maina, 
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2017). This operation proved to be more difficult than thought, and Boko Haram 
remained active. 
Nwachukwu noted that this operation came on the heels of Operation Rescue 
Finale, which routed the insurgents out of its tactical headquarters at Camp Zeiro in the 
Sambisa forest and out of its spiritual headquarters in Alargarno (Maina, 2017). 
Nwachukwu also noted that it “is very crucial to set the record straight by making it 
crystal clear that contrary to opinions, the Boko Haram terrorist group does not hold or 
control any local government area in Borno state or the northeast as claimed in the 
interview” (Maina, 2017, para. 4). 
However, in October 2017, the UN reported that Boko Haram still held three local 
government enclaves (Goodwin, 2017). Eventually, international organizations turn a 
deaf ear to overheated rhetoric and false information provided by the host government, 
introducing a level of skepticism and distrust in official government positions. The 
population, conditioned to hear and not believe government rhetoric, turns a blind eye to 
events. 
The Nigerian military conducts massive sweep operations to stop Boko Haram 
and to gather intelligence. However, as noted in this literature review, prisoners are 
treated poorly, abused, the sick are left to suffer and die, with no substantive intelligence 
gathered. Women and children are taken without deference to due process. It had been 
reported that between 2011 and 2015, 7000 men and boys had died at GIWA prison 
(Human Rights Watch, 2016b). In June 2013, 1400 bodies were sent from the jail to the 
mortuary, with an untold amount simply buried by the military (Human Rights Watch, 
2016b). A full accounting of the Nigerian prison system and its conditions can be found 
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in the British Home Office report, “Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Prison 
conditions” (Home Office, 2016).
The outcome of a Nigerian military sweep operation led to civilian imprisonment 
at the GIWA military barracks prison in which “cells were filled beyond capacity while 
disease, dehydration, and starvation” claimed 240 lives, including 29 children and babies 
(Amnesty International, 2016, pp. 10-15). David Rieff (1992), from an observation in the 
Bosnian-Serbian war, noted, “To the Serbs, the Muslims are no longer human, Muslim 
prisoners, lying on the ground awaiting interrogation were driven over by a Serb guard in 
a small delivery van” (p. 94). This is the threat of dehumanization, and Africa is long a 
witness to dehumanization (Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Central African Republic, and 
Darfur). 
Abuses and atrocities also plague the population un-involved in the Boko Haram 
fight, indicating a systemic problem in military training, discipline, and the imposition of 
moral and ethical clarity in conducting operations. In 2016, in Zaria, Kaduna state, the 
military attempted to pass a convoy through protestors linked with the Islamic Movement 
in Nigeria, a Shi’ite minority group (Amnesty International, 2016). 
Some of the protestors carried machetes, knives, and batons. After failing to 
negotiate an opening in the road, the army opened fire on the civilians killing seven. 
Later, the military returned to Zaria, hunted down the Shia, and executed 347 people. The 
State government then confessed to secretly burying the bodies in a mass grave (Amnesty 
International, 2016). In 2019, reports between 2015 and 2017 indicated the Nigerian 
military “killed hundreds of mostly Christian ethnic Igbo civilians advocating for self-
determination” The army’s response stated that they had killed “terrorists” during 
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“Operation Python Dance” (Smith, 2019, para. 11). However, it is difficult to justify the 
killing of women and children as “terrorists.” 
With the onslaught of ISWA attacks, the military has demonstrated poor 
performance. In December 2018, ISWA seized the entire town of Baga, a hotly contested 
town in northeastern Nigeria. It took the multi-national force from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, 
and Cameroon to remove the terrorists. 100 soldiers were killed out-right when ISWA 
stormed a military base. In addition, the group captured a large cache of weapons and 
ammunition. 
ISWA attacked an army base causing the soldiers to flee, and when the soldiers 
returned to recover the bodies, they were hit again, sustaining a high casualty count. In 
these cases, it may be leadership that is the problem. Military doctrine indicates that a 
force should not return to a battle scene without using counteroffensive tactics or 
prepared to meet an ambush. According to Carsten (2019), army bases and towns by the 
dozens have sustained attacks since mid-2018. A recurring theme in many of the attacks 
is soldiers fleeing the base for ISWA to ransack and loot.
Because of the increased operational tempo by ISWA, the Nigerian Army has 
moved into “super camps” for better protection; noted to be a Vietnam area strategy and 
considered a failure in counterinsurgency doctrine; soldiers should be out among the 
population, engaging, cultivating (friendship and trust), and protecting. As a result of this 
change, ISWA attacked the towns Gubio and Magumeri, took control, and burned 
government buildings, killing those identified as government workers. Babagana Zulum, 
Borno state governor, stated that it would “create a vacuum the insurgents could exploit 
with the army leaving” (Campbell, 2019, para. 1).  
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Unprotected towns are raided, insurgents manage roadblocks, and have more 
unrestrained movement across the bush. The army is ambushed at will by ISWA, and 
soldiers have vacated a large swath of northeastern Nigeria, leaving key roads open to 
attack. Humanitarian workers have pulled out, leaving a disaster for humanitarian aid; in 
addition, the army removed humanitarian NGOs from many areas to intimidate the 
organizations (Dewast, 2021). The military has forsaken 223,000 people in the area. In 
June 2019, 30 civilians were killed by the Shekau faction in a suicide bombing at 
Konduga village in the Borno State. However, it is Boko Haram-ISWA who has 
determined operational tempo and had taken momentum. 
In December 2018, Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai announced (again) that 
Boko Haram had been defeated and was nothing more than a band of criminals. This 
narrative, like those pronouncements before, had no foundation. This even though Boko 
Haram insurgents had a few weeks earlier overrun the 157 Task Force Battalion in 
Metele, killing 53 soldiers and removing caches of weapons and four tanks (BBC News, 
2018a). 
Nigerian soldiers are under immense stress, and morale is low (Admin, 2020). 
This has led to continued population abuse. Children are victims of army brutality. 
According to the UN, between January 2013 and March 2019, Nigerian armed forces 
detained over 3,600 children, including 1,617 girls, for suspected involvement with non-
state armed groups. Children described beatings, overwhelming heat, frequent hunger, 
and being packed tightly in their cells with hundreds of other detainees “like razor blades 
in a pack,” as one former detainee said (Human Rights Watch, 2019, para.10). 
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Prior to launching an attack on Jakana and Mailok in January 2019, ISWA 
informed the inhabitants to flee the coming fighting (The Defence Post, 2019). The 
Nigerian Army does not inform civilians of coming or current conflicts and allows 
civilians to stay in harm’s way. According to army sources, this is done to prevent tipping 
off Boko Haram. A July 2018 attack on the base at Jilli was devastating. The base held 
734 soldiers and was overrun. The base commander and 63 soldiers made it out to a 
nearby town, leaving hundreds missing, captured, or dead (Postings, 2019).  
ISWA has understood how the Nigerian Army operates. Military bases and camps 
are open to attack, and many times the attacks cause troops to flee. The group’s activity 
also corresponds to seasonal changes. The insurgent operational tempo increases from 
June to September, when the rainy season is active. This prevents the army from 
navigating washed-out roads (The Economist, 2020). 
Media from over the world have reported on the problems in Nigeria. Multiple 
reports are documenting ISWA attacks against the military. The Nigerian Army expects 
Nigerian news outlets to report events positively, favoring the army. On January 7, 2019, 
the army raided The Daily Trust, a Nigerian newspaper, and arrested two reporters. The 
army banned UNICEF and accused them of training “spies” for Boko Haram. In addition, 
in 2018, the Nigerian military attempted to ban Amnesty International for reporting that 
“3,641 people had died in clashes between farmers and herders in Nigeria since 2016.” 
The army called the report “fictitious” (“Nigerian Military Calls for Amnesty 
International Ban,” 2018). 
According to Postings (2019), “Nigerian forces are overstretched and lack 
initiative, often face multiple attacks on bases; inflicting casualties, causing damage, and 
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sapping morale, with each time increasing the risks defenders will not be able to stave off 
the next assault (para. 39). Nigerian Army failure and civilian abuse continue to this day. 
The US opened arms sales to the country despite Nigeria’s human rights record. President 
Trump continued the $363-million-dollar sale of the Super Tucano A-29 and provided an 
additional $600-million-dollars for defense. Delivery of the Super Tucano should have 
occurred in 2019; however, delivery has been pushed back to 2021-22 (Onuah, 2017; 
Sirota, 2019). 
In September 2019, reports indicated that Boko Haram, more likely ISWA, had 
obtained sophisticated drones armed better than the Nigerian Army after continuous raids 
on brigade bases (Searcey, 2019). Boko Haram does not simply appear walking out of the 
bush but travel in trucks fitted with heavy machine guns and RPGs to attack government 
troops. 
The army is under material stress; arms are scarce, as is ammunition. Armor and 
tanks have fallen into disrepair, and soldiers must scavenge for food, water, housing, 
even a bed to sleep on; and many units have not received their pay for months at a time 
(Postings, 2019). Army infrastructure does not exist, and logistics consists of whatever 
the field soldier can cobble together. In 2021, the conditions for the army and soldiers 
had not changed. While the army is entrenched in their super camps (a Vietnam-era 
tactic) and large towns, Boko Haram owns the countryside. ISWA also controls four out 
of ten zones adjacent to Lake Chad (Searcey, 2019). 
Counterinsurgency is expensive, and justifying the expense to a nation requires 
understanding and support from the governed. It is the people who justify the government 
and provide legitimacy; therefore, an insurgency cannot offer a better or viable means to 
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govern. Notably, the population provides a crucial avenue to gather intelligence about 
Boko Haram and other internal forces threatening Nigeria. If the population fears the 
military and refuses to engage, civilian assistance, including intelligence, field support, 
and comfort, is forfeit. 
Internal issues tend to focus on the extreme variances in social structure, with an 
increasing number of writings in the literature devoted to the Boko Haram issue (The 
Conversation, 2018). Tribalism maintains a firm hold on social and political structures. 
However, Boko Haram does not represent all Muslims; however, it represents Islam to 
many. Boko Haram (Shekau faction) kills Muslims at will unless they support the terror 
group. Therefore, it is still possible for the government and the Army to cultivate trust, 
camaraderie, and the soulful (within the people) purpose of bringing peace to Nigeria. 
Nigeria’s Use of Vigilantes 
The use of a vigilante force to augment a nation-state’s military is unethical, 
immoral, and violates international law; however, one can understand the frustration of 
the Nigerian people and the raids against them by Boko Haram. According to Okeowo 
(2014), Shettima, the Borno State governor, stated the CJTF was doing commendable work 
identifying and arresting Boko Haram members and that any abuses committed were 
most likely “the fault of the military on joint exercises” (para 31). 
Shettima described the CJTF as “almost a divine intervention” but stated that one 
could not rule out “some infractions from some overzealous members” (Okeowo, 2014, 
para. 31). In 2013, Kalli, who leads an 8,000-member CJTF militia unit, turned his 18-year-
old nephew over to security forces and watched the military execute him. According to 
Kalli, “I saw him with AK-47s, so that proves he’s a Boko Haram member” (Okeowo, 
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2014, para. 33). However, the CJTF does provide military intelligence. Kalli recalled, 
“You know, I’m tired of this thing,” he said. “We gave the security forces everything---
information about the camps, where they are, and they’re not doing anything” (Okeowo, 
2014, para. 41).
Vigilantism is a deviation from socially acceptable ethics and the law, but as 
Luban (2004) asked, “how can we be certain which situationally induced moral beliefs 
represent the baseline, and which represent the deviations? Why not suppose that 
murderous attacks on supposed blood enemies of one’s ethnic, racial, or religious group, 
encouraged by community leaders and moral authorities, do represent some people’s 
moral baseline” (pp. 137-138)?
In 2017, the UN Development Programme developed an agreement with the 
Nigerian government to train CJTF members and former Boko Haram members on 
reintegration into society. According to the UNDP (2019), “training was conducted to 
provide a basic level of civic understanding and build capacity in critical skills that will 
allow members of CJTF and vigilante groups to improve their civil and social 
engagements and to function better in civilian life” (para. 2). However, this program was 
accomplished in the Plateau State, where Boko Haram activity has ceased, and not in any 
area with activity still progressing. 
Social Change
Social change is a change in the social structure or the order of a society. Social 
change may include changing social behaviors, social institutions, symbology, behavioral 
rules, value systems, or the social environment (Barkin, 2016). Social change is not 
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stagnant but evolutionary. The Nigerian military, as are all militaries, is a social 
institution. 
The military of a democratic nation-state should mirror the society it emanates in 
that society guides the culture and behavior of its army (Rosen, 1995). If society is not 
unified towards a goal and dysfunctional, the military will follow suit. However, the 
Nigerian army could lead social change in Nigeria by adopting counterinsurgency 
concepts grounded in protecting the population. Chapter 2 demonstrated the need for 
social change in Nigeria in both society and the army. 
For example, in 2006, the US military, under the guidance of General David 
Petraeus, initiated a complete realignment of how the US Army and Marine Corps 
prosecuted the war. Counterinsurgency is grounded in social theories, and the US military 
realized the need to change to effect social change. A shift occurred from conventional 
warfare tactics to counterinsurgency tactics on a theater-wide basis. It was not an 
overnight phenomenon as education and training needed to permeate the senior officer 
corps down to the platoon level private. In addition, intelligence gathering, logistics, and 
planning were required to shift to the new counterinsurgency paradigm. 
Strategy and operational tactics changed the military structure, changing the 
thinking and application of war execution and social dynamics. The US military evolved 
in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the challenges brought by insurgency and terrorist 
warfare. Those actions implemented by David Petraeus implemented social change for 
Iraq. Civilians were protected and gradually turned to the coalition’s side while 
supporting the Iraqi government. 
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Vilfredo Pareto observed that social change occurs when the elites of society 
become decadent, and a new elitist replaces them (Smith, 2003a). In Washington, David 
Petraeus and General Jack Keane convinced the army command structure, the president, 
and the Pentagon (the elites) that counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine could end 
dysfunctional and failed war efforts by replacing conventional doctrine to win the peace. 
Petraeus convinced the “elites” in Iraq, the tribal elders, city mayors, councils, 
Imams, and neighborhood leaders to trust the US army through change of deed. 
Therefore, the example (or experiment) had been set to influence future wars. Nigeria 
may require an elite, someone with the perseverance to change how the army operates 
and implement reform. 
Marshall McLuhan (1994) wrote, “We live mythically and integrally, but we 
continue to think in the old, fragmented space and time patterns of the pre-electric age” 
(p. 2). Societies are a living, breathing, complex system(s) struggling to maintain 
homeostasis, evolving through a web of complexity, lacking any single influencing driver 
to induce change. Evolution moves in chaos and includes transformation, bursts of 
growth, collapse, randomness, disruption, and novelty (Xu, Yang, & Li, 2013). 
Kotter’s eight-step model explains transformational change. It is a well-defined 
well-delimited effort in which a leader establishes a new end state goal and moves the 
organization to that end goal (Webster, n.d.; Kotter, 1996). Kotter’s model requires the 
ability to create a sense of urgency to identify resistance and treat it as obstacles to be 
overcome or suppressed (Webster, n.d.; Kotter, 2008). A single Nigerian soldier 
recognized the need for change in advocating for a “Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or 
constant patrols,” and that leadership placed soldiers at a post to remain stagnant 
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(Akinola, 2017, Postings, 2019). The soldier stated, “that’s why Boko Haram insurgents 
have space to move around” (a Maoist philosophy) (Akinola, 2017). The understanding 
of this reality is a component of asymmetric warfare and has proved a successful tenet of 
US Army doctrine noted in FM3-24. 
In the case of Nigeria, military change may lead to social change in that Boko 
Haram must be addressed in counterinsurgency terms. However, the army is a product of 
society, so to change society is to change the army. US counterinsurgency doctrine was 
developed for the US military and, as such, is not a remedy for a force structure 
represented by the Nigerian Army. US military doctrine reflects how an interdicting 
military force successfully approached an insurgency in a host country. 
However, FM3-24 is easily transferrable to a country fighting an in-house 
insurgency; one needs only an intelligent understanding of how to do so. There are best 
practices and tactics in counterinsurgency that should be adopted by a force 
representative of the Nigerian Army. The watchword in counterinsurgency is adaptation, 
and Nigeria must adapt. In doing so, the Nigerian military can follow the success realized 
by the US military in Iraq when changes were made to doctrine. Ultimately, social 
change is afforded when the Nigerian population is no longer treated as the enemy but as 
an asset to be protected.
Summary
Chapter 2 provided an exhaustive study of the literature; the realities of Nigeria, 
the military, and the social and cultural structure so crucial in understanding the African 
country. Nigerian society and army “society,” its actions and operations, were studied to 
assess whether they may be tied to one truth, that a dysfunctional, corrupt society may 
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indeed beget a dysfunctional, corrupt military. Chapter 2 also presented a history of 
conflict within the country and the failures and abuses wrought upon the population by 
the army (citations over ten years and breaking with APA convention). This was done to 
demonstrate a pattern of military abuse, dysfunction, and failure. 
The Nigerian military may attempt to operate under rules of engagement that 
follow the Nigerian Constitution. However, as demonstrated, the activities of the 
Nigerian Army fail in this endeavor. The Nigerian Army is guilty of humanitarian crimes 
in the treatment of the indigenous. A discussion of the Law of War, Just War Theory, and 
International Humanitarian Law advanced the moral and ethical understanding of how a 
well-educated, trained, disciplined, and competently led army operates.
To fully understand the epistemological reality of Nigeria, it was necessary to 
study the complexities of war, the social constructs that drive men to act and understand 
the legalities of violent action. Military norms, culture, and leadership thinking on the 
battlefield were discussed to identify the processes for thinking under stress and identify 
normal and abnormal functioning by soldiers under pressure. I addressed the recent 10-
year Nigerian history to demonstrate a pattern of army action. 
To understand Boko Haram and ISWA, the chapter discussed the foundations of 
Islam to understand their culture, ethnic and religious belief system, and socio-economic-
political factors which drive the insurgency. The US military experienced a moral and 
ethical drift in Iraq until the military changed its thinking and tactics to 
counterinsurgency, viewing the population not as the “playing field” of war but as 
partners who should be engaged and not confronted as the enemy. 
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The literature presents accepted rules of law governing war which Nigeria 
follows. Nigeria is a cosignatory of the Geneva Conventions I-IV and Protocol I and II. 
Protocol II addresses the population and victims of an internal conflict. Therefore, the 
military understands its obligations on the battlefield towards civilians, combatants, and 
non-combatants. Morals and ethics have a place on the battlefield and are enforced 
through the Law of War, Just War Theory, International Humanitarian Law, and the 
Geneva Conventions. Because Nigeria is fighting an in-house insurgency, it does not give 
the army leeway or relieve them of their obligation through international law to treat the 
population as required according to the Nigerian constitution.
This study would add to the literature by addressing how a nation fights an in-
house insurgency. It would also add to how a military is affected by the society from 
which it emerged. Many articles have addressed Nigeria and Boko Haram; however, a 
study does not address why the army acts against the Nigerian people and fails on the 
battlefield. This study can act as a leap forward in understanding post-colonial African 
nations heavily imbued with tribalism and how it can affect military performance. 
Chapter 3 explains the scientific protocol for the research. In Chapter 3, I address 
the research design for the study. The central phenomenon and research tradition are 
reviewed, as is the role of the researcher in conducting the study. I also discuss how I 
plan to manage ethical concerns and bias from the researcher’s role and the research 
study participants. I explain the population used for the study and the procedures by 
which the participants would participate. In addition, protection and security for the 
participants and measures are described. I explain data management and storage, 
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emphasizing safety, confidentiality, and security. Finally, how I plan to data-mine and 
analyze the information is addressed to produce the outcomes for this study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural 
dysfunction might affect military performance denying success on the battlefield and 
abusing the Nigerian civilian population. In addition, this study hoped to identify the 
endemic obstructing agents which negate full and unfettered support for the Nigerian 
national government from the Nigerian population in the fight against Boko Haram. The 
Nigerian military has not defeated Boko Haram, but their use of conventional tactics has 
exposed the Nigerian population to institutional abuse, atrocities, and death. 
Specifically, and to the previous paragraph, this study sought to understand if and 
how civilian society and culture affect military performance. In that vein, this study also 
sought to determine if the Nigerian military could defeat Boko Haram through a doctrinal 
shift to counterinsurgency warfare. In adopting a population-centric counterinsurgency 
doctrine, the army would reconsider its interaction with the population and change from a 
confrontational relationship to population engagement. 
This change would foster goodwill and cooperation, increase intelligence 
gathering capabilities, encourage civilian support in the field through tangible 
contributions, and unite Nigeria through fostering dialogue, thus assisting in vanquishing 
disunity, tribalism, and religious conflict. In addition, there is evidence that adopting a 
population-focused counterinsurgency doctrine reduces abuses, atrocities, and deaths 
among the population. 
Prior research on counterinsurgency has focused on formulating and 
implementing US Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering 
126
Insurgencies (Cancian, 2017). In addition, NATO countries also undertook academic 
endeavors to addressing counterinsurgency. Research has been conducted on historical 
insurgencies to ascertain best practices and formulate current counterinsurgency 
practices, including the shape-clear-hold-build strategy (FM3-24, 2014). In this 
qualitative study, I sought to understand Nigeria and its deviant machinations, which 
affect the Nigerian military, its fight against Boko Haram, and those actions which harm 
and denigrate the population. 
Chapter 3 addresses critical foundations embedded in the study, such as how the 
qualitative grounded approach affected the study design, the purpose of the study, the 
central phenomenon, and the efficacy of performing qualitative interviews within a 
specifically identified population to gather data for analysis and interpretation to offer an 
outcome to the research questions. The chapter describes the participating subjects, 
sample descriptions, sample size, and recruitment methods to provide a thorough 
understanding of the participants in the research.
This chapter also detailed the data analysis plan, trustworthiness and provided in-
depth information on the participants and any ethical considerations regarding the safety 
of interviewees. All interviewees volunteered for this study, and considerations were 
made through the informed consent to ensure participants knew that foreign terror entities 
could have far-reaching assets and safety was a primary concern. However, those subjects 
interviewed understood the risks involved, and confidentiality was a crucial concern. 
Research Design and Rationale
The research questions were simple. They were designed to affect the interview 
questions that dealt with the social and cultural relationships and associations between the 
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civilian population and military performance. US military action in Iraq has been heavily 
studied both before the surge and after. The US exhibited the same operational troubles in 
Iraq that have occurred in Nigeria. If the military abuses its power by following a failing 
doctrine, innocents are harmed and die. More importantly, is the possibility that the 
Nigerian Army is indeed a reflection of the absolute dysfunction in Nigerian society. 
Therefore, the research questions reflect those realities and include:
RQ1: How and to what extent does a nation’s military reflect or mirror the society 
from which the military was derived? 
RQ2: How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit 
military performance in Nigeria? 
Rationale
The rationale for this study and the methodology used lay in performing deep 
research of Nigeria to determine the dysfunction and the possible societal relation to 
military performance. To do this, I used a grounded constructivist approach to tell a 
detailed and complete narrative. A grounded constructivist places a priority on a studied 
phenomenon instead of the methods used to study it (Charmaz & Bryant, 2010). 
Grounded theory has demonstrated that it is appropriate for studying “people's 
understandings of the world and how these are related to their social context” (Charmaz 
2001). For example, and used in this study, how does societal behavior affect the military 
performance of an army? The methodology used provided a pathway to discover answers 
as to the problems found in Nigeria. Therefore, focused interviews were done to 
accumulate deep, detailed, and meaningful data. 
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It was incumbent on me to choose the most appropriate research design to address 
the identified problem. The literature review identified a sampling of issues within the 
country. Still, the problem in this study lay in the Nigerian Army’s conflict with Boko 
Haram and its interaction with the population, both of which have been potential failures 
because of military doctrine; or the combined culture of doctrine, leadership, discipline, 
and training within the military. The core issue could be that the same dysfunction found 
in society transfers to the military, denying appropriate performance. 
I established the research design to question whether society and its culture 
influenced the military. Interviewing US military professionals produced direction in 
understanding if and how much a nation’s military is affected by society. If the entirety of 
the Nigerian Army continues to follow a conventional doctrine and if the army culture 
army is mired in conventional thinking, Boko Haram will continue to exist in one form or 
another. Therefore, I chose the qualitative method with a constructivist view to search for 
causation and effects. 
The interviewees selected for this study offer the best hope of obtaining 
information to answer the research questions. The questions are noted in the appendices 
and were constructed to provide an open-ended platform that could allow for question-
answer and follow-up, depending on the interviewee's answers. 
Central Phenomenon
Galbin (2014) explained social interactions were found in external relationships as 
external forces influence and shaped an individual’s view of the world or phenomenon. 
Patton (2015) described social constructionist concepts concerning social structures, 
which are understood through individual and collective perceptions. The Nigerian Army 
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is a single unit shaped by internal constructs and societal realities when answering the 
issues may lay in external concepts and truths. There are no individuals in an army, and 
as such, the unit acts as one individual attempting to carry out doctrine and complete a 
task. It is army culture, philosophy, and training that shapes the individual to act as one 
with others as an army unit (US Army. Regulation 600-100, 2017).
Thus, the central phenomenon in this study is how the “individual” (Nigerian 
Army) was affected by society, and in turn, the political structure, which is a societal 
entity. To follow successful counterinsurgency doctrine, the army must act as one in 
doing so. Therefore, the institution is responsible for its success or failure. If the Nigerian 
Army adopts counterinsurgency changes in operations, it must also do so in every part of 
the army, from logistics to intelligence. It may be possible to effect social change by 
protecting the population and defeating the insurgency. 
Research Tradition  
Joint operating doctrine describes irregular warfare as “A violent struggle among 
state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” 
(Department of Defense, 2017). Research on counterinsurgency had come from the 
insurgency historiographies through studying David Galula, Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, 
Castro, and foreign counterinsurgency operations in Algeria, Malaya, Vietnam, and 
Thailand, forming the basis for FM3-24. 
Gumz (2009) stated that authors on counterinsurgency have focused on what he 
called the ‘modern era’ of insurgency, which is a largely extra-European narrative that 
begins with 1945 and involved the colonial empire and third world national liberation 
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movements. Irregular warfare has existed since the war has existed. Robert Rogers and 
Francis Marion practiced irregular warfare long before army doctrine existed.
 Insights had been gleaned by using O’Neill’s Insurgency and Terrorism and 
Hammes’ The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21stCentury. Kilcullen’s numerous 
articles and books on counterinsurgency provide a modern look at global insurgencies. 
Nagl wrote a ground-breaking dissertation later turned book titled Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Much has been 
learned from the US-NATO effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
A vital contribution to irregular warfare was the Philippine counterinsurgent effort 
from 1899 through 1913 when General John Pershing implemented population-centric 
tactics and turned away from violent tactics and strategies. Despite the recent and vast 
studies of irregular warfare, the focus has centered on a country that interdicts into 
another country to defeat an insurgency. 
In Algeria, it was the French who fought against decolonization. Vietnam 
involved the French and eventually the US in practicing insurgent warfare against the 
Communists. Vietnam served as the example of the US Army's halfhearted attempt to 
accept the reality of an unconventional conflict and was not discussed until the US had to 
develop counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 2000s. Malaya found the British fighting 
the Communists and represents the only example of victory for the interdicting force. As 
such, Malaya has been heavily studied by the US and other countries. However, the 
Malaya insurgency campaign contained certain specificities and realities which allowed 
colonial victory. 
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Gumz (2009) noted that “virtually all who write on COIN view the historical 
narrative through the lens of a rigid constructural dichotomy between irregular war and 
the conventional. In publishing counterinsurgency doctrine, the US military has made the 
unconventional conventional. War is made and remade by those entities who participate. 
In addition, it is the technology, environment, and social realities which dictate how war 
is fought, the idea that conventionality may be left to history represents short-sighted 
thinking. New is the conventional turning to the unconventional and irregular, never 
accepting defeat. Iraq and Afghanistan brought this idea to the forefront. 
Although a quantified method, the history of measurement theory was used to 
construct the latest FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. Engelhard (1991) 
noted that the central task in the history of measurement theory is to examine progress. 
By looking back, the US military has projected itself and its doctrine forward. While a 
quantitative concept, the progress witnessed through the historical significance of a 
revamped FM3-24 cannot be understated with its application in Iraq. Historical records 
were analyzed, and the best practices used in each insurgent conflict were coopted and 
made relevant to the 21st century. 
Current counterinsurgency thinking can be applied to Nigeria; however, the 
insurgency represents a unique problem in a unique environment. Any counterinsurgency 
doctrine must come from the viewpoint of a flawed national military fighting a less than 
capable in-house insurgency. However, each insurgency is an independent construct of 
war. No two are alike. To compare Iraq or Afghanistan to Nigeria is a non-sequitur. 
While counterinsurgency is decidedly a population-focused model and the Nigerian 
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population and the dysfunction found therein denies the military complex the functional 
ability to address Boko Haram. 
Role of the Researcher
Initially, I requested permission from Walden University to conduct a research 
study. I received approval, and I proceeded to begin the study by writing the proposal. I 
was the researcher for this study and, therefore, the instrument of record. I collected all 
the data and was the sole instrument of data collection. According to Xu and Storr 
(2012), in a qualitative research study, “the researcher as an instrument is an accepted 
and acceptable stance” (p. 3). Pannucci and Wilkins (2011) stated that the instrument 
decided how the interview questions were structured. I was the instrument that 
determined how the information was collected and recorded. I needed to ask neutral 
interview questions that did not reflect bias to achieve a particular answer or support an 
agenda. My role as the researcher for this study included following the policies and 
research procedures of Walden University and accepted research practices advocated by 
the APA and HIPAA. The interviews were conducted in a professional and timely 
manner.
Reflexivity 
Patton (1990) noted that reflexivity referred to disclosing personal information 
about the researcher to enhance transparency and increase study credibility. Therefore, in 
the interview process, I revealed my relationship with the study and the central topics. I 
had no vested interest in Nigeria or the US Military. I did not have a professional 
connection with any of the interviewees. At the time of this study, I did not work within 




For this study, I chose to enlist military experts in the US. The US military 
maintains a cottage industry of scholars and experts used to examine doctrine, 
procedures, culture, leadership, and a host of other facets within the military-industrial 
complex. I utilized professional command officers and PhDs who study war to act as 
interviewees for this study. It is impossible for any command officer or academic could 
understand every culture, including Nigeria. However, two participants did serve in 
Nigeria and had first-person experience with Nigerian army command and army units. 
Armies over the globe act, train, and function in a professional manner affecting 
leadership, discipline, training, the understanding of ethics and moral responsibility in 
battle, and all must answer to the Geneva Conventions, The Law of War, the U.N.’s R2P, 
and the Rules of War. The Nigerian army follows the traditions of the British army, the 
former colonial force that held power over Nigeria. 
The US set the standard for counterinsurgency operations in the publication of 
FM3-24, adopted by NATO countries as the published doctrine intermeshed with their 
military doctrine. FM3-24 provides a best-practices guide to counterinsurgency and is 
continuously reviewed, commented on, and if new information or case studies are 
discovered that affect doctrine, revised. 
The participants carried either doctoral degrees in their field of expertise or had 
decades of military training, education, and experience. The initial interviewees 
represented purposeful sampling as I identified those military officers with strategic 
leadership education and experience. I did not seek tactical, operational, or strategic 
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expertise. But expertise on military culture, performance, social constructs, and 
leadership.
As for sampling size, Ritchie et al. (2013) suggested that within a qualitative 
research study, the sample size is usually primarily small due to the phenomena that need 
only to appear once to be part of the analytical map. The point of diminishing returns can 
occur rapidly depending on the type and how complex the issue is. 
Diciccio‐Bloom and Crabtree (2006) referred to the process of diminishing 
returns as the event horizon of data saturation and signals that data collection was at or 
nearing completion. Guest et al. (2006) viewed data saturation as occurring within the 
first twelve interviews, and after that number, significantly few new phenomena were 
likely to emerge. Gonzalez (2009) noted that sample size is generally driven by the desire 
or need to reveal the main variants of the phenomenological approach. Gonzalez (2009) 
suggested that small survey samples of less than twenty are considered typical.
Creswell and Creswell (2018) offered that sample size within the qualitative 
method lay in studying a few individuals or cases. I had planned for ten interviews. 
However, saturation occurred early in the interview process, so seven interviews were 
conducted. Since those interviewed had all served in the US military, saturation occurred 
early; the interviewees participated in the same training, doctrinal instruction and were 
culturally aligned to the US military’s culture and academic standards. Thinking among 
the interviewees was linear and provided a clear path to coding. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) noted that saturation occurred when new information 
proved "counter-productive" and that when ‘the new’ is discovered, it does not 
necessarily add anything to the overall story, model, theory or framework” (p. 136). The 
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researcher must decide at what point saturation occurs; generally, no new information is 
gleaned from the data or literature. It is in this way that data saturation occurs. 
Illenberger and Flotterod (2012) noted that snowball sampling allowed existing 
relationships to forge new relationships. I blended criterion, purposeful, and snowball 
sampling to understand better the population I was trying to access and to provide an all-
encompassing sample for the study. I sought individuals who could best contribute to the 
research and then sought their advice on further candidates for interviews. Two 
interviewees did provide contacts with the knowledge that I was seeking. Based on my 
research prerogatives, these interviewees were appropriate to assess the Nigerian 
situation and offer scholarly direction to identify the issues within Nigerian society and 
the military.
The interviewees were recruited through email and phone calls and asked if they 
would be interested in expanding on social/military relational research due to a country 
dealing with an endemic insurgent threat. I knew of three participants by reputation and 
had read accounts of actions in Afghanistan involving two of the participants. I am a 
civilian and had no working relationship or professional connection with any 
participant. I was fortunate in that I connected at a Walden residency, and that 
individual offered to put me in touch with an individual I desired to interview. The 
participant guided me to contact additional interviewees. I was contacted one individual 
through a friend but did not know him prior to meeting him for an interview. 
The participants in this study were also data instruments, imparting collected 
experiential expertise and education to answer the research questions. Using a qualitative 
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approach, I obtained critical data from a select group of individuals during the interview 
process. I sent the potential interviewees an informed consent for signature. 
Sampling Strategy
 I decided the sample size would be at least six to eight interviewees. If new 
information presented itself at eight interviews, I would expand the interview pool. The 
interview group represented a specific group of people who had been trained in the US 
military and served. Therefore, understanding the realities of military culture, doctrine, 
and performance would be quite linear and focused within the group. Consequently, I 
expected saturation at an early point in the interview process. 
Sampling consisted of a theory-based construct. Those interviewed provided the 
researcher with an idea and the data to understand how society and the military function 
in an environment. According to Patton (1990), criterion sampling could be used for 
participant selection because it allowed for a predetermined criterion of importance. 
Therefore, those Americans interviewed could discuss how a society and its culture 
could drive military function ad performance. Military function includes combat and 
doctrine, training, behavior, discipline, and military functioning within a foreign and 
domestic population. 
Sample Size
The number of interviews conducted in a qualitative grounded study to be 15 to 
40 interviewees has been suggested. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) proposed no less than 
20 participants in a qualitative research study assists the researcher in building and 
maintaining a close relationship, thereby improving on and encouraging an open and 
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frank exchange of information. This procedure can help mitigate some of the bias and 
validity threats inherent in qualitative research. 
Consequently, many qualitative research studies' sweet spot sample size is 15 to 
20 homogeneous interview participants (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006). Glaser and Strauss 
combined accumulated data and data analysis into one category until saturation before 
moving on to a new category. As understood in grounded theory, a category is a 
conceptual element under discovery (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
The type of saturation the researcher is aiming for may not be theoretical 
saturation. Bertaux (1981) introduced the concept “saturation of knowledge” (p. 37). 
Bertaux noted that researchers learn a great deal from the first interviews, which quickly 
decreases knowledge discovery as the interviews progress. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 
(2006) proposed that saturation often occurs around 12 participants in homogeneous 
groups. Creswell (1998) noted 20-30 interviews were enough for saturation. Creswell 
indicated that 5 to 25 interviews would suffice for a phenomenological study, and Morse 
(1994) suggested at least six interviews.
Morse (1994) suggested that in using grounded theory, 30-50 interviews were 
enough. However, in an article written in 2000, Morse also recommended: “that the more 
useable data collected from each person, the fewer participants needed” (p. 2). Morse 
(2000) invited researchers to consider study parameters and included “quality of data, the 
scope of the study, the nature of the topic, the amount of useful information obtained 
from each participant, the number of interviews per participant, the use of shadowed data, 
and the qualitative method and study design used” (p. 3). 
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Lincoln and Guba proposed the criterion of informational redundancy guide that 
sample size determination, that is, sampling can be terminated when no new information 
is obtained through data collection. Morse (2015) added, “whilst saturation is the most 
frequently invoked ‘guarantee of qualitative rigor,’ it is the one we know least about” (p. 
587). Sandelowski recommended that qualitative sample sizes be large enough to provide 
a “new and richly textured understanding” of the study phenomenon but small so a ”deep, 
case-oriented analysis” is produced. 
Patton (1990) noted that “qualitative inquiry typically focuses in-depth on 
relatively small samples, even single cases (n = 1), selected purposefully” (p. 169). That 
“sample size adequacy, like all aspects of research, is subject to peer review, consensual 
validation, and judgment” (Patton, 1990, p. 186). Once I reached the fourth interview, the 
following three interviews provided no new knowledge and ended data collection. 
The “senior” officer corps represents 0.012% of all army personnel and is 
incalculable against the US population (Duffin, 2021). Therefore, the interview sample 
size was purposeful and focused. According to Vasileiou, Barnett, Thorpe, and Young 
(2018), “choosing a suitable sample size in qualitative research is an area of conceptual 
debate and practical uncertainty” (para. 1). Vasileiou et al. (2018) noted that research 
showed that reporting and justifying sample size was often poor if not absent in most 
qualitative studies. Vasileiou et al. (2018), in addressing the issue, noted that researchers 
should report “transparent study-specific reporting” (para. 3,4). 
My group was homogenous, almost homologous in nature, but not in the usual 
sense. As an example, a homogeneous group may consist of interviewing CEOs from 
different companies. However, each CEO was educated and trained in various and 
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different higher institutions of learning. Each CEO led an organization whose culture and 
operations would differ. Therefore, they are homogeneous by identity as a CEO, but not 
in education, training, experience, or the company they each operated. While educated in 
differing higher education institutions, including the military academies, my participants 
represented a true and strict homogeneous group. Their training, education, and 
experience focused on this study's topic, so slight deviation from the study’s questions 
and subsequent answers could be anticipated. 
I decided to use the Strauss and Corbin (1998) concept of interviewing until 
saturation reached, instead of interviewing a more significant number of individuals to 
reach an arbitrary and proposed saturation number such as 20 for a grounded study. I 
interviewed for Bertaux’s “saturation of knowledge,” and I interviewed until I was sure 
that “no new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis” (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p. 143). 
Bertaux’s (1981) saturation of knowledge was deemed appropriate for my study 
due to the research questions asked and the extensive knowledge base required of the 
interviewees who participated. I openly coded each interview when completed and 
maintained an understanding of emerging themes, keywords, and ideas as first-round 
coding was ongoing. Initially coded interviews were added to the data set; then, axial 
coding ensued. 
Military Education 
Each interviewee had participated in US military basic training and AIT. Each 
participant was a serving line officer in the US military and, as mandated by rank, 
attended all required schools within the military educational complex as their promotions 
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mandated. For example, U.S. army colonels attend war college or a senior staff college 
equivalent to study joint warfare and war. The majority of army colonels receive 
postgraduate level senior and joint professional military education at the Army War 
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, prior to promotion.
According to the US Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the 
Command and General Staff School “provides Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for 
US Army and sister service officers, interagency representatives, and international 
military officers” (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2019a). 
Intermediate Level Education is a nearly year-long graduate-level academic 
program that includes military history, leadership and leadership philosophy, military 
planning and strategy, and the decision-making process both in combat. One of the 
essential learning attributes in the program is the grasp of critical thinking (Command 
and General Staff Foundation, 2019a). 
The US military provides for a Master of Military Arts and Sciences degree 
through a graduate master’s program at the School of Advanced Military Studies. This 
program is offered to ILE students representing mid-career field-grade officers preparing 
for battalion command or staff positions at the division, brigade, or battalion level 
(Command and General Staff Foundation, 2019b). 
The School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics provides Army officers “continuing 
education towards developing the Scholar-Warrior-Leader from first lieutenant to selection for 
major. The result is mastery of branch-specific technical and tactical skills, staff processes in 
battalions and brigades, direct leadership and command competencies, and initial broadening 
opportunities” (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2014b). 
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The School for Command Preparation “provides advanced instruction for 
lieutenant colonels, colonels, and command sergeants major who have achieved brigade 
or battalion command selection. Courses are taught individually according to the “special 
topics unique to the assumption of command at the levels indicated” (Command and 
General Staff Foundation, 2019b). The US military places a premium on advanced 
education and scholarship. Indeed, there is a cottage industry of academics and 
infrastructure to meet the goal of a highly educated military. 
In this study, I achieved saturation early at the fourth interview. I continued with 
three additional interviews based on differing educational participation and senior leader 
status. Therefore, I used the Glaser and Strauss concept of achieving saturation over 
quantity of interviews and Bertaux’s saturation of knowledge. It was the strict hyper-
homogeneous profile that allowed for seven interviews. 
Selection Criteria 
One of the most substantial reasons I chose seven interviews dealt with the 
military education of each senior leader. The selection criterion for this study lay in that 
each participant either had professional expertise within military doctrine, training, and 
discipline and or had experienced combat fighting an insurgency, either in Afghanistan or 
in Iraq. One interviewee, a senior command general officer, spent four years in Nigeria 
leading American Special Forces and had an acute understanding of Nigerian society. 
The ideal sample size of this study was determined to be six to eight interview 
candidates. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) argued that purposive sampling techniques 
had been successfully employed in research. They noted that qualitative studies which 
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utilized twelve participants were found to have maintained research integrity in numerous 
studies. This study used a purposeful sampling technique in choosing participants. 
Multerud, Siersma, and Guassora (2016) offered that the sample size should be 
driven by informational power, achieving saturation depended on the “goal of the study, 
sample specificity, the use of established theory, the quality of the dialogue, and the 
analysis strategy” (p. 1753).
Selection criteria involved senior military command officers and PhDs with a 
military career who understood military function, theory, and performance. They were 
connected to a system 230 years in the making that delineates similar, harmonious 
thinking and understanding of operational performance, culture, function, and discipline.
As noted earlier in this study, American military officers and military educators 
cannot understand every culture (or multiples of cultures) in every country across the 
globe. However, every nation has an army that shares specific shared ideas on training, 
doctrine, education, and professionalism that makes a nation’s army a successful entity. 
There is no “secret sauce” used to produce a high-functioning professional army. It is a 
combination of military culture, discipline, training, appropriate doctrine, expert 
leadership, and the proper utilization of human resources and equipment. 
In addition, society and its culture determine the existence of the military and how 
it functions. In interviewing the candidates, I determined it would be possible to glean 
themes and ideas from the data to understand how a society and its culture affect military 
performance and function. 
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Instrumentation
I was the researcher for this study and formulated the interview questions for the 
interviewees. In this way, the interview questions acted as the data collection instruments. 
The information sought for this study was unavailable elsewhere and not collectible 
through quantitative research. I determined that interviews with individuals accessing 
their area of expertise offered the most reliable way of data accumulation. 
I designed the protocol for the interview process. The interviews were conducted 
via internet conference or in person, and the interviewee chose their location to provide 
comfort, safety, and convenience. The interviews were semi-structured to allow for a free 
flow of information. 
Although not ideal, interviews occurred using an online conference instrument as 
each interviewee was located throughout the US and across the globe. The target 
collection period for the interviewee was 45 to 60 minutes in one interview session. If not 
possible, then a second interview session would be scheduled. After the interview, I 
asked each participant if it would be conducive for me to contact them for a follow-up if 
needed. The interviewee could decline further follow-up without prejudice.
To assist in formulating the interview questions, I utilized the Survey/Interview 
Validation Rubric for Expert Panel - VREP© found in Appendix A. (Simon & White, 
n.d.). The interview questions, as noted in Appendix B, were developed to be neutral and 
non-biased. Questions were formulated to assist in answering the research questions. The 
research questions mapped with interview questions can be found in Appendix C. 
To ensure the interviewee answered adequately, I required qualification, 
elaboration, and other non-directive probes such as “Can you tell me more about that?” 
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Bachman and Schutt (2017, p. 186). I developed the interview questions to inquire about 
specific aspects of society and culture, extrapolating how they might affect military 
functioning. 
Several questions appear to be redundant but are not. They were designed as a 
self-validation tool to check and validate answers. These questions were specific in 
assessing if appropriate military functioning could occur if the population were 
dysfunctional and experiences an abnormal societal existence compared to well-
functioning democracies. 
Data Collection
Data collection occurred using email and teleconference, specifically ZOOM®, a 
business video conferencing platform; this provided a secure path to collect video and 
audio data from the interviewee. The interviews occurred with the interviewee at the 
location of the interviewee’s choice to allow for security, safety, and comfort. 
To safeguard data collection, ZOOM® records video and audio and backs up the 
conference data in both hard drive and in the cloud, which is secured. ZOOM® is HIPAA 
compliant and uses a host of security measures to ensure privacy and security. According 
to ZOOM®, “HIPAA compliance is based upon the HIPAA Security Standards rule 
published in the Federal Register on January 25, 2013 (45 CFR Parts 160, 162 and 164 
Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule)” (ZOOM®, 2018). In addition, 
security is ensured through Advanced Encryption Codes (AES) with a 256-bit encryption 
key. HMAC-SMA-1 message authentication codes secure transmitted data. 
The instigator of the meetings provides a unique password for the interviewees to 
log into ZOOM® using their chosen email address (ZOOM®, 2018). Interviewees were 
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advised of the parameters for the interviews. All information collected was stored on the 
researcher’s secured computer backed up by the secure digital backup service “IDrive®.”
According to IDrive, information is stored in the digital cloud, which according to 
IDrive®, is secured by the latest 256-bit AES encryption and accessible only by me 
through a self-contained encryption key. Any download of information without my 
encryption key would be unintelligible. Informed consent was obtained from the 
interviewees before the interviews to ensure the interviewees were aware of the 
environmental, digital, and time conditions.
Interview Procedure 
The procedure for the interview included the initial contact with the interviewee 
requesting participation. Once an agreement was reached, the necessary informed consent 
was forwarded to the interviewee to be read, signed, and returned. Both participants 
agreed upon the interview date and time. An email would be sent out to the interviewee 
one week prior to the interview with instructions on how to access ZOOM® with their 
email, and I would then provide the password to enter the meeting in this email. 
One interviewee opted for a face-to-face interview, and he drove from Fort 
Leavenworth to Omaha to meet me for the interview. It was held at a relative's home, 
where he was comfortable.  In this case, all procedures were followed as described, and 
the interviews recorded using my computer. Three interviewees opted to provide written 
answers to my questions, and again, all procedures were followed. In these cases, follow-
up questions, if any, were handled via email. It should be made clear that classified 
information was not discussed or offered. 
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The interview questions were presented randomly to prevent patterning and 
anticipatory answers by the interviewees. I devised a table found in Appendix C to 
demonstrate which interview questions pertained to which research question. Once the 
meeting began, I explained the procedure, including recording both voice and video 
through ZOOM®. The interviews were scheduled to run at forty-five minutes in length, 
but no hard time limit was enforced to allow for completion. The participants were asked 
only the pre-prescribed interview questions. However, follow-up questions were not 
restricted. 
At the end of the interview, I thanked the interviewee, asked if there were any 
questions or concerns, and a request was made to perform a follow-up interview if 
needed. However, the interviewee was asked to be available in the future for questions or 
clarifications throughout data analysis. In this case, all signed documents for participation 
would still be in effect. It was also explained that even though we had completed the 
interview, the interviewee could withdraw from the study at any time. 
I transcribed the recorded interviews using the online transcription software 
“Transcribe®.” This transcription software proved to be the most reliable and precise in 
translating the recorded word. The interviews, once transcribed, were downloaded to my 
computer, and no copy was left in the online portal. Only I had access to the translating 
program as a two-step authentication protected it. After I checked the correctness of the 
transcription against the recording, the interviewee received the hard copy transcription 
for review. If the interviewee found no issue with the transcription, the interviewee did 
not need to return the copy, which they could then keep or destroy at their discretion. 
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Data Collection Management
The requirements for data collection and storage are significant throughout all 
study designs. ZOOM® stores collected data to be accessed by the instigator of the 
meeting for future reference. Storage also occurred through a personal recorder held by 
me in a secured drawer in my office. All recorded data is stored on a separate encrypted 
hard drive specifically dedicated to this study. Transcription of recorded interviews 
occurred through a computer software program, and human interaction with the 
recordings did not occur. 
Three interviewees provided written answers to the interview questions. These 
emails and their attachments were removed from the emails and stored on my computer. I 
downloaded the written documents into a specific file on my laptop. I maintained the 
only copies of hard data. As required by Walden University, I have kept in a secured 
fashion all audio recordings, video recordings, hard copies, and transcripts for a 
minimum of five years. The research study data, including the participants' identities, are 
stored on a USB drive and stored in a safe. 
Data Analysis Plan
It was Lincoln and Guba (1985) who remarked on the qualitative method, “Not 
very much can be said about data analysis in advance of the study” (p. 241). Data 
analysis solely depends on the data collected; too little and the research is for naught, too 
much, and the researcher is mired, lost in incomprehensible data streams. Therefore, the 
amount of data obtained is restricted to the research questions posited and should eschew 
unsubstantiated opinion and conjecture given by the interviewee. Data should be 
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adequate and appropriate for the researcher to provide substantiated answers to the 
research questions. 
Triangulation can affect the analysis, and, in this study, triangulation was 
achieved using interview answers provided by multiple interviewees, interview analysis, 
and real-world demonstrations of military philosophy and societal-military conditioning. 
The sources provided triangulation, not the application of different methods. Senior 
officer leadership, senior NCO leadership, interviewing a sergeant major, interviewing a 
Ph.D. in political science and history, studying military history, policy and war. Each 
offered triangulation by differing points of view and in the structure of their prospective 
careers. 
Data triangulation was applied using historical records, government documents, 
and interview responses to achieve triangulation in the study. Triangulation in qualitative 
research aims to increase the veracity, integrity, and credibility of the results. 
Triangulation is a three-dimensional view from every angle possible, considering the 
positives, negatives, and alternate views of a subject. If the information accumulated 
results in a culmination of data that agrees with itself, the triangulation has confirmed the 
data.
Triangulation leads to confirmability within the study. For confirmability, it was 
necessary to update information as time moved forward. Nigeria is involved in an active 
war, and events occur, and truths can change. As a result, and as the study went forward, 
I informed my committee of changes to realities of life, life-changing events within 
Nigeria, and data or scholarship which may have changed as used in the foundation for 
this study. Simon (2011a) noted that a researcher should follow the initial coding into 
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more elaborate codes and linkages to produce a formal data analysis. Analysis should 
continue and all questions resolved until theoretical saturation is achieved. When no new 
themes, questions, or issues arise in a category, the category is established and validated 
(Simon, 2011a). 
According to Krippendorff and Bock (2008), the most significant harm in data 
analysis can come from human error. Researcher bias can skew the results and 
understanding of the phenomenon. The misinterpretation of data, the intentional 
misalignment of data, or a skewed conclusion can provide an incorrect answer. Content 
analysis should be carried out in a structured format to provide non-bias conclusions. 
Qualitative research is subjective, so the interpretation of the data lay in the researcher to 
complete. Therefore, triangulation is best applied to achieve truth in this framework.
A researcher must adhere to factual determinations of meaning in the data. A 
qualitative researcher must adhere to the facts presented by the data received from the 
interviewees to produce answers to the research questions. Interpretation is a dangerous 
word, and it implies the researcher could assign meaning based on their understanding of 
data which could introduce bias and error (Bowling, 2005). Interpretation of fact should 
be the route taken as facts and truths cannot be smeared by erroneous bias. 
Intentional bias goes to honesty and is a different concern, to imply bias to 
guarantee a specific result. Therefore, in the qualitative method, multiple interviews are 
done to acquire information streams providing linear themes and ideas from unique 
isolated sources to understand the research question.
According to Bernard and Ryan (2014), analyzing data involves five complicated 
tasks and include: “discovering themes and subthemes, describing the core and peripheral 
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elements of themes, building hierarchies of themes or codebooks, applying themes—that 
is, attaching them to chunks of actual text, and linking themes into theoretical models” (p. 
54). 
Data collected through the interview process is coded to reveal themes, patterns, 
linearity, divergence, and discrepant information. According to Miles, Huberman, and 
Saldana (2014), initial coding is done to break down information and assign the data to 
“broad chunk” categories. The second round of coding then breaks down the broad 
chunks, refining and defining the data's focused explanation. Here is where patterns and 
themes become apparent.
Manual coding allows the researcher to immerse themselves in the data, become 
intimate in analysis, enabling the flow of themes and patterns to emerge. Inductive 
coding creates codes based on the qualitative data assembled and is less fraught with 
bias. I used constructivism to create a narrative from thematic coding. I planned to 
manually code the interview data from initial coding to creating nodes and reportable 
results. 
Manual data extrapolation runs the risk of researcher bias, finding themes and 
patterns which are hard to justify and confirm but are accepted as they may fit the 
researcher’s narrative. However, awareness of bias issues and inductive reasoning 
lessened the opportunity of bias to present itself. The researcher must still code and then 
assign unbiased meanings to the coding. Utilizing a double extrapolation method fits the 
explanation provided by Miles et al. (2014), describing this technique as summarizing 
data through basic response topics and identifying common and key phrases or word 
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applications for their significance. Multiple coding avenues would be fruitful to ensure a 
correlation of data. 
Trustworthiness
A qualitative research study is assessed for the value it provides to the field of 
study. The study should reflect a high degree and academic vigor. Qualitative studies are 
known to be interpretive and are more vulnerable to issues impacting trustworthiness. 
Therefore, I made every effort to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of this study. 
This study was completed using a research lens focused on credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. 
Internet sourcing dominates accessibility to literature and research. However, the 
researcher must take care in using any information provided on the internet. What may 
appear as vetted or peer-reviewed information may simply be someone’s opinion. 
Therefore, care was taken to vet internet sourcing used for this study. Unless the 
information was tied to a university, a peer-reviewed journal, a vetted news organization, 
or an expert in a particular field, the information was not used as a foundation of fact, 
merely to continue searching for authenticated, vetted, and factual information. 
According to Shenton (2004), trustworthiness in a qualitative study is suspect, 
especially from positivists, because their view of validity and reliability cannot be 
addressed in a naturalistic study. Humans become the source of conflict and provide 
information on the conflict. Therefore, Shenton (2004) offered Cuba’s constructs of 
trustworthiness using credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, which 
differs from the positivist view of internal validity, external validity/ generalizability, 
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reliability, and objectivity. Cuba’s Four Criteria for Trustworthiness is noted in Table 2 
below, and I became cognizant throughout this work of presenting a trustworthy study. 
Table 2. 
Guba’s Four Criteria for Trustworthiness
Quality 
criteria       
Possible provision made by a researcher
Credibility Adoption of appropriate well recognized research methods.
Development of early familiarity with the culture of participating 
organizations.
Random sampling of individuals serving as informants.                     
Triangulation via the use of different methods, informants, and sites.
Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants.
Iterative questioning in data, collection dialogues.
Negative case analysis.
Debriefing sessions between researcher and superiors.
Peer scrutiny of the project. 
Use of “reflexive commentary.”
Description of background, qualifications, and experience of 
researchers.
Member checks of data collected, and interpretations/theories 
formed.
Thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny.
Examination of previous research to frame findings.
Transferability  Provision of background data to establish the study context and detailed 
description of the phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be 
made. 
Dependability Employment of “overlapping methods.” 
In-depth methodology description to allow the study to be repeated.
Confirmability Triangulation to reduce the effect of investigator bias.
Admission of researchers’ beliefs and assumptions.
Recognition of shortcomings of methods and potential effects.
In-depth methodological description to allow the integrity 
of research results to be scrutinized.
Use of diagrams to demonstrate “audit trail.”
Note: Shenton, 2004, p. 73. 
Credibility
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Some degree of bias is nearly always present in a qualitative study. How it effects 
the result is the researcher's responsibility and should approach null in conclusion 
(Gerhard, 2008). The interviewees for this study were drawn from two specific areas, the 
military, and the military educational complex. As such, credibility was achieved simply 
by interviewing individuals who swore an oath to serve the country and uphold the 
Constitution. In addition, the individuals who functioned as senior leadership studied war 
at the graduate or Ph.D. level or taught within the military educational complex. 
Credibility involves utilizing different data sources within the same method. To 
help ensure credibility, I used the provisions suggested by Cuba in Table 2, including 
“adoption of appropriate well-recognized research methods, development of early 
familiarity with the culture of participating organizations (and individuals), adoption of 
appropriate well-recognized research methods, triangulation via the use of different 
methods, informants, and sites, tactics to help ensure honesty in informants, iterative 
questioning in data, collection dialogues, a thick description of the phenomenon under 
scrutiny, and, the examination of previous research to frame findings” (Shenton, 2004, p. 
73). In addition, study participants would be encouraged to review interview data they 
supplied as a member checking procedure, also suggested by Cuba.
A researcher cannot use one interview to validate evidence as it is impossible to 
triangulate, even if triangulation involves matching against additional source material. 
Triangulation exists within the constructs of the interview process in which information is 
validated among those interviewed, and multiple interviews must be done to complete 
triangulation and saturation. 
Creswell and Miller (2001) offered eight separate validation strategies for the 
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qualitative researcher: prolonged engagement and persistent field observation, 
triangulation, peer review, and debriefing, negative case analysis clarifying, member 
checking, providing a rich, thick description, and external audits. Triangulation was 
utilized to provide the primary validating construct for this study. 
It is beneficial to use multiple streams to construct credibility, and I accepted each 
interview for what it offered, not expecting or wanting congruent and linear answers to 
provide credibility. However, if the answers were harmonious and linear, then the 
interview process could be non-biased.
Each interviewee worked in their specific area of expertise and acquired an 
advanced education. In this study, the military experts I used are well known within the 
military-industrial complex and actively participated in the Iraq or Afghanistan theater of 
operations, providing counterinsurgency guidance to command officers. This reality 
confirmed the credibility of the experts used to comment on military matters. 
Additionally, the Ph. D.s interviewed were retired senior officers in the US 
military and either studied warfare and its components or taught at the various military 
academic schools. This fact provided credibility for their participation. I interviewed an 
officer with less senior status and experience; however, he was familiar with civilian-
military interactions and cultural interactions in a conflict zone. He was attending school 
at the US Army War College at Fort Leavenworth at the time of the interview. Therefore, 
as an army officer engaged in advanced military scholarship, credibility was established. 
A credible interviewee provides for a credible interview and data. The credibility 
of interviews and findings was enhanced using rich descriptions provided through 
interviews enhanced by follow-up questions, member checking, clarification of 
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interviewee or researcher bias where appropriate.  I achieved triangulation between 
interviewee responses and confirmed facts and accounts and negative case analysis where 
applicable to disclose abhorrent or disconfirming information. Wrong answers were not 
considered because every answer contributed to the study. In the interview process, there 
were no wrong answers. In the interview process, and I was determined to follow 
whatever path the research provided. Disagreeable information was not viewed as being 
faulty but simply as providing a different approach to knowledge. 
Transferability
Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can 
be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings (Trochim, 2006). By 
interviewing a select group of experts who participated in, have taught, and have 
commanded using state-sponsored and accepted military doctrine and have followed the 
Law of War and the Rules of War on the active battlefield allowed for a transference path 
in like situations. 
According to Trochim (2006), the qualitative researcher can enhance 
transferability by offering an intimate view of research context and assumptions. It is then 
relevant to a researcher to transfer the results to their study, making sensible judgments 
on transfer (Trochim, 2006). I achieved transferability through Cuba’s proposals, 
including the “provision of background data to establish the context of the study, and 
detailed description of the phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made” 
(Shenton, 2004, p. 73). 
Chapter 2 provided the history and context of population-centric 
counterinsurgency operations. It is not a factor that “Westernized” military doctrine can 
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be transferred to a sub-Saharan African country to realize success. It is the fact that state 
armies are responsible for and carry out activities that are acceptable to the world 
community, represented by the United Nations and global human rights organizations. 
Dependability 
In the quantitative realm, reliability is viewed from the assumption of replicability 
and repeatability. The qualitative researcher uses dependability instead of the 
quantitatively applied reliability rubric and requires the researcher to account for an 
evolving environment and context within the research. Therefore, the researcher 
documents change within the study and how these changes affected the researcher in 
moving forward in the study (Trochim, 2006).
Cuba suggested to achieve dependability; researchers could install the use of 
“overlapping methods” and an “in-depth methodology description to allow the study to 
be repeated” (Shenton, 2004, p. 71). Lincoln and Guba stressed the almost dependent 
nature between credibility and dependability and argued that in practice the “the 
demonstration of the former goes some distance in ensuring the latter” (Shenton, 2004, p. 
71). Therefore, the study began with a rich and detailed review of the literature and 
environment in which the study lay, followed by a rich and complex narrative of the 
research process and outcomes.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the researcher's unique perspective on a study and 
whether the study's results could be corroborated or confirmed by outside researchers 
(Trochim, 2006). In this study, the researcher continuously checked for changes in the 
philosophy, doctrine, and the study of counterinsurgent doctrine. Assessing the 
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theoretical foundations for this study became a continuous obligation. Additionally, the 
Nigerian military history and operational standing occurred through primary resources for 
operational doctrine and tactics changes and whether actions were considered to adjust 
for the Nigerian civilian community. The latest and most up-to-date philosophies and 
doctrine were monitored as counterinsurgency is an evolving doctrinal model. 
Addressing legitimization is a concern for the study. According to Benge, 
Onwuegbuzie, and Robbins (2012), legitimization issues should be addressed 
pragmatically and is justified when sufficient research is conducted to validate results. 
Benge et al. (2012) offered the qualitative legitimation model to assist in significantly 
mitigating validity and verification in the research, with credibility sustained in the 
research study addressing “applicability, consistency, neutrality, dependability, and or 
credibility of interpretations, and conclusions within the underlying setting or group” (p. 
69). Interviews with military experts on the Nigeria problem should produce results that 
are closely aligned. However, if an interviewee presented answers which sway far and 
wide from the consensual quorum, it can be considered either an anomaly or a rationale 
for further exploration.
There exist internal and external threats to legitimation and credibility. Internal 
threats consist of bias from the researcher, the interviewees, miscommunication, 
misinterpretation, or skewed observations (Benge et al., 2012). External credibility 
represents “the confirmability and transferability of findings and conclusions,” or the 
ability of outside researchers to review and test the validity and produce the same 
findings throughout the strategies of trustworthiness put forth by Cuba (Onwuegbuzie & 
Frels, 2016, p. 235).  Constant themes presented for each of the four quality criteria of 
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credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability included the use of a rich 
and detailed narrative, overlapping methods, triangulation, member and peer review, and 
the rejection of bias. 
Finally, the researcher obtained trustworthiness in that the researcher would self-
regulate for bias, obtained a peer to review the work, the research, and outcomes. In 
addition, the dissertation committee assessed the study at a peer level. The researcher had 
no preconceived idea on how the research would evolve or conclude. It was in this format 
that honest, non-biased data collection, analysis, and reporting were achieved.
I followed Cuba’s example in table 2,  and chapter 2 represents an exhaustive 
description involving every parameter involved in the Nigerian story. The credibility of 
reporting was done by cross-checking facts with additional sources. Information was 
taken from eyewitness accounts found in the Amnesty International Reports, reports from 
Human Rights Watch, and independent news reporting agencies. 
 I derived data triangulation from the literature review, interviews with military 
experts, and member checking. The selected participants also added triangulation when 
all facets of study and research provided an accepted, trustworthy narrative. 
Ethical Procedures and Participant Protections
I received approval to conduct research from the Institutional Review Board on 
05/30/2018, and my study was assigned # 05-30-18-0545414. An extension to continue 
research was obtained from the IRB on 06/18/2019 and 08/17/2020. Hesse-Beiber 
(2016) noted that researchers should anticipate ethical issues and use standardized 
format and guidelines to mitigate credibility concerns. I represented Walden University 
as a doctoral candidate and researcher. I understood and adhered to the criteria presented 
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by the Institutional Review Board for Ethical Standards. To ensure ethical practice, I 
adhered to data collection policies, interview protocols, obtaining informed consent and 
permissions, the guidelines regarding the recording of interviewees, and the 
transcription process. 
According to Fritz (2008), all researchers are responsible for ensuring 
participants are “well informed about the purpose of the research they are asked to 
participate in, understand the risks by participating in the research, understand the 
benefits of participating in the research, and should feel free to make independent 
decisions such as withdrawing for the study without any fear of negative consequences” 
(p. 5).
To ensure ethical practice, I followed the five principles of research ethics by the 
American Psychological Association and noted on page 170 (Smith, 2003b). The 
recommendations are to discuss intellectual property, including copyright, frankly, and be 
cognizant of plagiarism (Smith, 2003b). Although APA is related to psychiatrists and 
medical practice, a researcher must be mindful of the multiple roles a researcher can play 
and the roles of the interviewed (Smith, 2003b). No individual should have undue 
influence over the study, and neither the interviewee nor interviewer should use the study 
for-profit or expect compensation. Following informed consent, rules are essential for 
protecting both the interviewer and interviewee (Smith, 2003b). 
The interviewee should be made aware of all the study's parameters and how their 
input is utilized. If parameters change during the study, the interviewee should be 
informed and the informed consent updated, for informed consent is not static but a 
process. The interviewee signed the informed consent “I agree” on the subject line or in 
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the body of the returned email. Each interviewee was identified by name on the informed 
consent. Should the interviewee desire to change their participation status over the life of 
the active study, they had every right to do so. I would have informed the interviewee that 
I would need to obtain new informed consent if any study parameter changed. 
Respecting privacy and confidentiality is the hallmark of any study, and this 
aspect ensures the patency of the research and the protection of the participants (Smith, 
2003b). There are limits to confidentiality, and the interviewee should understand who 
will be viewing the raw data and interview transcripts. In this study, I and my committee 
chair were the only individuals who viewed the raw data or knew the interviewees' 
identities. 
The researcher must be aware of “federal and state laws” pertaining to any 
research study. If a study crosses international borders, the researcher must be aware of 
local laws which may affect the researcher-subject-interviewee relationship (Smith, 
2003b). The researcher must apply “practical security measures” to protect, acquire, and 
store data and evidence. 
Security is applied to protect participants and the accumulated data (Smith, 
2003b). Protection was provided by keeping the identity of the interviewees confidential, 
known only to me. Data was secured on a password-protected laptop. As my computer is 
backed up to the cloud, the data stored there is encrypted and accessible through a 2-step 
verification system using IDrive®. Several interviewees voluntarily offered their 
permission to publish their names in the study. I explained this was against protocol and 
confidentiality must be maintained.
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Once Chapter 4 had been written, the information in the cloud was deleted and 
unobtainable. The data was located on my computer and, once the study was complete, 
transferred to a thumb drive for archiving in a secured location. Finally, the APA 
recommended “utilizing ethics resources” during the study, especially if one is in doubt 
or requires direction on ethical conduct (Smith, 2003b). 
The APA recommends using the Belmont Report, which “provided the ethical 
framework for ensuing human participant research regulations and still serves as the basis 
for human participant protection legislation,” as well as the APA’s guide to Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Smith, 2003b, p. 56). This is a 
complete ethical guide covering ten research and ethical practice areas, and I used the 
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct to guide this study. These 
principles include:
1. Beneficence and Nonmaleficence: To strive to protect the rights and welfare of those 
they work with professionally. 
2. Fidelity and Responsibility: The moral responsibility to help ensure that others 
working in their profession also uphold high ethical standards. 
3. Integrity: should never attempt to deceive or misrepresent. 
4. Justice: the responsibility to be fair and impartial.
5. Respect for People's Rights and Dignity: should respect the right to dignity, privacy, 
and confidentiality of those they work with (Smith, 2003b, p. 56). 
Bias
I took precautions to avoid the actual or perceived influence or bias in performing 
interviews and examining findings. Data collection consisted of one-on-one interviews 
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recorded on my laptop's hard drive and notes taken. Intentional bias is easy to identify if 
the researcher is aware of it; however, unintentional bias is more difficult to perceive. In 
this study, I was aware that my concern for the people of Nigeria could have created 
unintentional bias, which could have affected data collection, analysis, and interpretation. 
A non-biased approach to seeking the truth would have far more meaning than a 
researcher's emotional or professional concern. Interview bias can affect interview data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation, so the researcher must always be aware of bias, 
including self-induced bias (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2011). 
Self-awareness in correcting for bias is a researcher’s prime responsibility to 
safeguard the efficacy of the study. Therefore, the interview questions were constructed 
to remove any bias, and the effort was made through coding to negate infused researcher 
bias. In addition, external bias can come from the interviewee during the interview 
process if the interviewee attempts to sway the argument located in the study. 
Multiple interviews were done to assess any anomaly in accrued information and 
watch for bias interjection from an interviewee. If required, follow-up questions are also 
helpful to clarify intent and meanings from the interviewee and perform all follow-up 
questions. 
The interviewee could end the interview at any time, for any reason. The 
interviews would be scheduled based on an agreement between the participants and 
generally followed the interviewee's schedule. No time frame for interviews was 
mandated, and interviews proceeded in their own good time; however, for scheduling 
purposes, it was suggested to the interviewees that the interviews should not take more 
than forty-five minutes to one hour. 
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A transcript record of the interview was provided to the interviewee to assess for 
accuracy and returned to the interviewee for any changes or clarifications. A request for 
potential follow-up was made to the interviewee at the interview's conclusion, and I 
asked if contact through email was acceptable.
Creswell (2009) noted that specific inclusions must be made available in the 
informed consent. These inclusions consisted of a summary of the research study, the 
reason for interviewee selection, an overview of the research, the purpose of the study, 
the procedures for the interview process, the volunteer agreement, notification of risk-
benefit in participating; this was an uncompensated study, confidentiality, consent 
statement, contact information, and finally, the need to have a printed name, signature, 
and date of consent.
Creswell (2009) provided the substance for the Interview Protocol Form. It 
should include the date, place, time, identification of the interviewee and interviewer, a 
brief description of the study, a confidentiality agreement, informed consent, and finally, 
the interview questions. Include the date, place, interviewer, interviewee, and briefly 
describe the research study, confidentiality, and informed consent followed by the 
interview questions. 
It was incumbent on me to ensure the interviewees understand that I represent 
Walden University as a student and that I had no connection to the military or a 
corporation that may benefit from this study. However, I informed the interviewees the 
study might be written as a journal article, but this was strictly a scholarly endeavor.  
There was the possibility that during the interview process, the researcher could receive 
a name to interview by an interviewee for this study (snowball sampling). In this case, 
164
the name was confidential, and contact was made in the same format as with all other 
initial interviewees. Continuation into data collection from the research study proposal 
occurred after approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board. Ethical 
considerations take on a “do no harm” modality with interviewee participation. 
Finally, when I coded the data. I removed all names from the data to remove any 
bias I might encounter by knowing the interview data came from a Ph.D., a general 
officer, or an officer who served in Nigeria. I also did not realize until after coding 
which interview question pertained to which research question. This again removed bias 
to provide for precise, unadulterated analysis. I simply wanted each data set to stand on 
its merit. 
Ethical Protection of Participants
Participant protection is of paramount concern. I wrote the proposal to account 
for the safety of each participant, and the participants were asked to volunteer. The legal 
mandates of the Constitution ultimately guaranteed the safety of those participants in the 
US and abroad. 
Each participant signed an informed consent authorization based on Creswell’s 
(2009) inclusion list, which consisted of a research study summary, the reason for 
participant selection, the purpose of the study, procedures for the interview process, a 
volunteer agreement clause, the risks and benefits of participation, compensation, contact 
information, consent statement, the name of the participant printed then signed with the 
date of consent, and the printed name.
The interviewee understands their participation, and subsequent interview 
analyses are kept confidential. Only specific members of the dissertation committee may 
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be made privy to the information with the understanding that interviewee participation is 
confidential and not shared outside the confines of the dissertation process. All 
paperwork that identified the participants, including the informed consent and 
participation forms, will be kept secured and available only to the committee if required. 
Procedures. 
The following procedures were performed to ensure ethical function and 
collection of data. The procedures noted guided the researcher in obtaining authorizations 
to collect and analyze voluntarily offered data from the interviewee instruments and to 
win Walden University IRB approval for the study.
Forms were constructed to ensure compliance with ethical and legal requirements 
and protect the interviewee, the interviewer, and Walden University. Walden University 
IRB approval for this research study was received in May 2018 and reaffirmed in May 
2019. As such, initial contact was made after IRB approval using email and phone calls 
to assess the ability of the proposed interviewee's participation in the study. 
Follow-up emails were sent to further explain and expound on the study and 
requirements to ensure the participant was comfortable with the process. Upon agreement 
to participate in the study, arrangements were made with the interviewee or their 
representative on a date, time, and location. Where possible, I attempted to schedule a 
face-to-face interview. If this were not possible, ZOOM®, a business internet conference 
provider, would be used. ZOOM® offers real-time face-to-face interaction via internet 
connection. The interview proceeded only if the consent had been signed and received.
One week before the interview, the interviewee was contacted, and the interviewee's 
availability and interview date, time, and venue (ZOOM®) were confirmed. 
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The day before the interview was scheduled, a third email was sent out, and a 
phone call was made to the interviewee to establish a personal connection and rapport. 
The authorization to interview, authorization to be recorded, and the informed consent, 
was obtained from the interviewee prior to the interview. I provided my cell number to 
the interviewee in case of a connection issue with ZOOM®. This occurred in two of the 
interviews and was resolved quickly through a phone call. 
Once the interview began, the interviewer stated the purpose of the study, the 
procedures for the interview, confidentiality, recording parameters, and how the 
information presented would be transcribed and archived. I stated the interviewee was 
free to stop the interview at any time. The interviewees could withdraw at any time. All 
data collected from the individual who withdrew was destroyed. 
The interview was constructed to allow for a free flow of information and 
accommodate a complete transfer of data and information from the interviewee. Once the 
questions had been answered, and both the interviewer and interviewee were satisfied 
that no further questions or conversation was needed, the interview ended with the 
grateful appreciation of the interviewer. 
A request was made of the interviewee for further contact if follow-up questions 
were needed or clarification of an already answered question. In this case, original 
consents and instructions would still be in force. The post-interview discussion included a 
request for the interviewee to review the transcribed interview document and 72 hours 
allotted for transcription. The transcription document would be sent via email and 
returned via email if the interviewee had a question or felt they needed to clarify or 
change a response. 
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Recorded interviews were stored in a thumb drive for security, with only the 
researcher having access. In this study, no interviewee thought it necessary to return the 
transcript for clarification or change. If the interviewee had contacted the researcher to 
clarify a statement, all consents remained in effect. The name of the interviewee was not 
included in any document to maintain confidentiality. Each interviewee was assigned a 
number that corresponded with their specific transcript.
Time was taken, as much as deemed appropriate by the researcher, to transcribe 
and produce a transcript of the interviews; however, transcriptions occurred within the 
72-hour time goal. An attempt was made to have each interview transcribed within 
seventy-two hours while the interview was fresh in the participant's mind. The final 
interview transcripts were collated, and the coding process began. Interviewees also had a 
choice to submit written answers to the questions. This was done to facilitate time 
management for the researcher and the interviewee. If a respondent felt more comfortable 
writing responses or required a written format because of their work and professional 
schedule, they were accommodated. The written questions were sent via email, and the 
answers received by email. 
This process allowed for data collection using manual coding towards 
completing Chapter 4 and providing results for Chapter 5. A formal letter was sent to 
each interviewee thanking them for their participation. In addition, once Walden 
University accepted the dissertation as complete, the collected data move was securely 
archived. 
Summary
This qualitative study aimed to explore Nigerian society's social and cultural 
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dysfunction and its potential effects on Nigerian military performance. In Chapter 3, I 
laid out the methodology by which this study was conducted. I discussed essential 
foundations embedded in the study, such as how the qualitative grounded approach 
affected the study design, the purpose of the study, the central phenomenon, and efficacy 
of performing qualitative interviews within a specifically identified population to gather 
data for analysis and interpreted to offer an outcome to the research questions. The 
chapter described the population, sample descriptions, sample size, and recruitment 
methods to understand the participants utilized for data collection thoroughly.
This chapter also detailed the data analysis plan, trustworthiness and provided in-
depth information on the participants and any ethical considerations regarding the safety 
of interviewees. All interviewees volunteered for this study, and considerations were 
made through informed consent to ensure participants knew that their identities were 
protected. It is improbable that any foreign actor who means harm would ever have the 
opportunity to target an interviewee in any way. However, that reality, no matter how 
remote, was accounted for. Chapter 4 examines the research collected and provides a 




The foundation for this chapter was collecting data from primary and secondary 
sources to understand the problems and failures of the Nigerian Army. Understanding the 
issues and concerns within Nigeria allowed me to formulate a problem statement and 
research questions. The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social 
and cultural dysfunction might affect military performance in denying success on the 
battlefield and causing the Nigerian army to abuse the Nigerian civilian population. This 
foundation of study resulted in two research questions:
RQ1: How and to what extent does a nation’s military reflect or mirror the society 
from which the military was derived? 
RQ2: How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit 
military performance in Nigeria? 
Chapter 4 is structured as follows: I describe the setting, demographics, and data 
collection. My in-depth manual analysis of respondent answers allowed me to have a 
complete and immersive understanding of the material. I address each research question 
and the subsequent patterns and themes provided by the coding to support the findings. 
To report the results, I decided to utilize the themes I discovered through coding. I 
formulated three themes, and they are (1) society influences military performance, (2) 
failure in military performance, and (3) tribalism influences military performance. A 
summary of the findings is presented prior to Chapter 5. 
Setting
There were three different interview settings. Four interviews were conducted 
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online using the ZOOM® business meeting platform. The interviews were recorded using 
both audio and video through ZOOM® and transcribed using the Transcribe® 
transcription software. This software was found to be highly accurate in reporting the 
recorded voice. Slight correction was needed when compared to the recorded material. 
One interview occurred via a face-to-face meeting and was audio recorded on my 
computer using the Microsoft® recording program. This interview was transcribed using 
Transcribe® transcription software. I conducted the face-to-face interview in the 
interviewee's home, a location he chose after traveling from his duty station. Two 
respondents, at their request, provided a written transcript of their interviews, and these 
were transmitted to me via email. This effort produced a detailed and complete discourse 
on the interview questions to the point that no follow-up questions were required. 
Demographics
For this study, I chose military professionals of senior rank: lieutenant colonel and 
above and Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major for NCOs. The US military is a 
closed society, and as such, I had great difficulty recruiting participants for this study. 
However, I met a retired Army colonel at a Walden residency, and he offered to 
introduce me to colleagues with whom he had served. He had access to high-ranking 
officers, both retired and active duty. He vouched for my ability, discretion, and that I 
could be trusted as a researcher, leading to eight respondents for this study.
I interviewed two lieutenant colonels (ret), who held a Ph.D. in history and 
political science who studied military history and the political challenges of conducting 
warfare. Two Generals, a brigadier (ret) and a major general (active duty), were 
interviewed. The major general had a long and distinguished record of leadership and an 
171
acute understanding of command responsibilities not only to the DoD but to civilians 
impacted by military operations, efforts, and policies abroad. The brigadier was 
experienced in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and spent four years in 
Nigeria working with the Nigerian Army through AFRICOM. 
I interviewed a command sergeant major (ret) with a 30-year career working with 
the indigenous forces and their civilian counterparts to fight the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. 
He had a unique understanding of nation-building and the quality of fighting force. He 
was fluent in army doctrine, especially counterinsurgent tactics and methodology, and the 
importance of the host country's social and cultural dynamics. 
I interviewed a retired colonel who had also spent multiple tours in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Africa. This participant had a unique understanding of counterinsurgency and 
the importance of civilian involvement in counterinsurgent philosophy. He understood 
military-civilian-political dynamics and the necessity of society and their participation in 
counterinsurgency support and tactics. And finally, I interviewed an officer from Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. He attended school at the Army War College but had a history of 
command and was knowledgeable in civilian-military operations. Every army officer is 
fluent in civilian-military relations, which came to the forefront with the insurgent wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
After data collection was complete during the study, I lost one interviewee as he 
withdrew from the study. Saturation occurred at the fourth interview; however, I felt that 
seven interviews provided surety that no new information would be generated. I am 
prevented from disclosing if the eighth interview validated the accumulated data. I 
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utilized all seven interviews in coding and produced a coding book that allowed me to 
catalog responses and integrate coding easily. 
Data Collection
I interviewed seven participants, with each interviewee having undergone similar 
training and military education over their decades of service. 
Six of the seven interviews lasted approximately one hour, with the identified 5th 
(individual) interview occurring over multiple sessions and lasting about 3 hours. Each 
interview provided thoughtful, complete, and in-depth answers. The interviews produced 
approximately 86-pages of coded material. 
In this study, men comprised the interview cohort and provided the data. 
Therefore a zero-gender variation in the sample. No variations did not occur using 
ZOOM® other than the necessity to complete one interview over two sessions. Variations 
did not happen with written submissions. In the end, I did not require data clarification 
from the written submissions, nor did I have any follow-up questions. 
Data Analysis
Strauss and Corbin (1998) proposed that theoretical saturation occurred when “no 
new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis” (p. 143). Glaser and 
Holton (2004) noted that “the analyst develops several workable coded categories, he/she 
should begin early to saturate as much as possible those that seem to have explanatory 
power” (p. 54). Strauss and Corbin’s theoretical explanation of saturation was met with 
seven interviews. 
Tabor (2013) noted that grounded theory “is only considered ready for publication 
once theoretical saturation is reached. That is when new data collection (indicated by 
173
theoretical sampling) does not lead to any further changes to the theory, as the scheme of 
categories and their properties and relationships fit new data without further 
modification” (p. 103). Again, seven interviews provided theoretical and saturation of 
knowledge, as identified by Bertaux (1981). 
Before I began the coding process, I deidentified any information that might 
provide the interviewee's identity, using only a number. I also removed any names 
supplied in an interview. Therefore, I did not know whose interview I was coding. This 
allowed for confidentiality and mitigated bias. 
I began coding using the manual open coding method. I copied each response for 
the first interview question into a word document. I read through each answer to question 
one to get a feel for content and flow. I then read through each question while listening to 
the recorded response. It was through this process that I understood emotional inflections 
in the response. Emotion does creep into qualitative research. An interview question 
invoked emotion from the interviewees. However, emotion cannot enter the scientific 
analysis. The emotion produced came directed at the lack of appropriate functioning and 
professionalism so ingrained in each interviewee. Face-to-face interviews were done 
(Zoom) to recognize the affect portrayed by the interviewee to the interviewer. 
I coded each response using a pen and different colored highlighters to highlight 
keywords, themes, phrases, and opinions. I looked for consequential passages that 
represented an idea. I began to pull these out and memoed, assigning meaning to the 
notations. I assigned “theory,” “concept,” “code,” or “theme” to items that may be 
representative of a more significant idea throughout each answer. I looked for both overt 
and underlying patterns. 
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When I had completed coding question one, I assembled all keywords, ideas, and 
themes into a table and then visualized an answer to the interview question. More 
importantly, how the answer related to the specific research question for which it was 
designed. Once I completed the two-step method, I axially coded the data by connecting 
codes (concepts and categories).
According to Scott and Medaugh (2017), “axial coding requires researchers to 
continually modify and reshape their emerging conceptual framework as more data is 
examined” (p. 1). According to Allen (2017), axial coding accounted for “behaviors, 
events, activities, strategies, states, meanings, participation, relationships, conditions, 
consequences, and settings” (p. 80). I found this helpful as I discovered synonyms, like 
ideas and concepts expressed differently by different interviewees.
I presented the data and its interpretation as a scholar, devoid of emotion and bias. 
I decided through coding what was important and relevant in interpreting the answers. 
The first review of the accumulated data offered the path forward to pull every data 
nuance from the interviews, distilling the information out as the second and third analyses 
continued. In chapter 4, I presented a plethora of interviewee quotes to provide grounded 
theory analysis in providing a deep, rich, and detailed understanding of the problem. 
Because of the nature of interviewees, their “hyper-homogeneous” nature, coding 
was relatively straightforward and uncomplicated. Responses to the interview questions 
were quite linear and provided a solid foundation to understanding the research questions. 
In the end, coding produced three primary themes to answer the research questions. There 
was a multitude of codes to combine to produce themes. The theme, society influences 
military performance, was taken from the following codes: army subservient to civilian 
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government and people, democracy in jeopardy, society reflected in military, societal 
traits affecting army, affect military performance, civilian culture into the military, 
society influences the military, poor civilian control part of culture, tribalism, external 
and internal cultural influence, civilian and cultural Influence, poor culture and societal 
values (inadequate or non-existent morals and values), anarchy, population involvement, 
government and societal credibility, systemic civilian violence, societal acceptance of 
institutional corruption, corrupt society, military corruption (endemic in all government 
entities), people of the country are responsible, elected officials, societal influence, 
military cannot separate from society (societal beliefs and values). 
The theme, failure in military performance, produced the following codes: army 
cannot enforce domestic policy, army a tool for foreign political policy, leadership, moral 
and ethical behavior, inadequate training, poor leadership, poor discipline, poor military 
behavior, army assists in humanitarian actions, army trained to kill, heavy-handed tactics. 
army could disavow civilian leadership, coup d'état, army breaks laws—will do anything 
to maintain order, (lack of) discipline, values, professional military, training and 
instruction, moral and ethical armies involved in atrocities, education to achieve a 
professional military, attributes of a professional and successful military, commanding 
officers, chain of command. 
And finally, the third theme and the theme presented as a revelation added 
validity to the first two themes: tribalism affects military performance. The codes 
included: tribalism, army a tribe, tribalism and sectarianism, act as a tribe, Nigerian army 
a tribe. However, this was not the tribalism as found so entrenched in Nigerian society. 
But tribalism is found in the army as a standalone and internal societal structure. This 
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finding is discussed in depth in the results section. Coding produced a coding book of 
approximately 86 pages in length, and documents my journey to identify themes 
Evidence of Trustworthiness
A research study’s value is demonstrated through trustworthiness and academic 
rigor. Qualitative research studies can suffer from a lack of transparency in justifying 
sample size. I explained the rationale behind the sample size used for this study and the 
qualifications of the data collection participants. In addition, qualitative studies can be 
viewed through the lens that quality may suffer due to the accumulation of unstructured 
data and the interpretation and analysis of that data. It is up to the researcher to interpret 
the data and report findings. After all, a quantitative study is based on numerical science 
and does not suffer from interpretive findings. 
Credibility
Credibility addresses the linearity between the participant's views and the 
researcher’s representation of them. To ensure this, I followed the coding rubric and 
coded only the data that directly impacted the research question. I triangulated the data 
based on the data received from each interviewee, the research noted in Chapter 2, and 
those documents, both government and private, used in chapter 2 to explain Nigerian 
social realities. I also member checked the data accumulated through interviews; no 
interviewee returned the interview manuscript for correction. The data collected 
represented phrases, ideas, words, codes, and themes culled from each member into a 
combined thematic understanding of the data accumulated. In addition, questions were 
structured to determine validity in responses. For example, two aligned interview 
questions are noted below: 
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 1K. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of 
corruption, tribalism, ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism” 
(political patronage), media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, 
religious power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, and economic 
disparity. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced 
education, use your command experience, education, and training. How is 
it possible for a nation’s army to isolate itself from society’s ills, 
exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain. 
And.
 
1M. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, 
use your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe 
that if a nation’s army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society, 
where corruption is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism 
rules the culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil 
accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social and cultural 
failure; could field a professional and successful army? Please elaborate. 
I would have expected to see data from the closely aligned and comparative 
answers, establishing an intuitive member checking narrative. All seven interviewees 
answered the two questions comparatively. As for credibility and recognizing bias, I was 
the instrument for interpreting the information, reminding myself that discrimination 
could be present and guarding against it. In residency 4, I had been asked by a peer, a 
student from Nigeria, “how can you not have bias” after researching Boko Haram. Boko 
Haram operates based on their understanding of Salafist Islam, and the group leads a 
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simple life guided by simple rules provided by the prophet Muhammed and Allah. Boko 
Haram does what they do, and I understand them. 
To be honest, I found bias in my understanding of the Nigerian Army. An army of 
a democratic nation should stand as a force for good, help citizens, and restore balance by 
addressing a horrible violent uprising. The standing army of a democratic nation should 
exist to serve the people, not to add to the population’s misery and insecurity. I constantly 
checked my writing, mindset, and interpretation in analysis to fend off any implied or 
explicit bias in understanding this bias. 
The student then rechallenged in asking me, “How can a white man with no 
knowledge of my country possibly carry out a study of Nigeria. He missed the point of 
scholarship and research. Through this study, I learned to understand Nigeria. I have not 
lived the culture or social constructs. However, I utilized research and data collection to 
point to a solution based on accepted professional military operations and functioning. 
Transferability
Trochim (2006) noted that transferability referred to the extent the results of a 
qualitative research study could be transferred (generalized) to other settings or contexts. 
This study dealt with a democratic nation and the nation’s social dysfunction. Nigeria is a 
near post-colonial country and has existed in its fourth republic form for 21-years. I 
assumed this study could apply to any democratic nation, especially when assessing post-
colonial African states, tribalism, or studying the societal effects on military performance. 
The transferability of this study should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as is the 
norm for qualitative studies (Tobin & Begley, 2004). 
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Dependability
Tobin and Begley (2004) stated that to achieve dependability, “researchers could 
ensure the research process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented” (p.91). The 
research process lies in the theoretical foundation built upon providing a rich and detailed 
explanation of the problem and subsequent evidence in Chapter 2. The interview 
questions were constructed based on the evidence discovered on Nigerian societal 
dysfunction. The data accumulated directed the answers to the research questions and 
provided no further bearing on the study or any outlying issue. 
Confirmability
According to Guba and Lincoln (1989), confirmability is established when 
credibility, transferability, and dependability are achieved. Coding the data was a long 
and arduous task and provided a clear path to understanding the data. Axial coding fine-
tuned the data so that interpretations and conclusions could be made without bias and 
erroneous researcher input. 
Results
The results of this study provided three themes to answer the research questions. 
The results were reported by theme instead of the research question. While coding, I 
discovered a unique framework that I had missed during the literature review and 
subsequent research. This idea led to an exceptional understanding of the Nigerian Army 
and their immersion in a tribal environment, and therefore I included tribalism as a coded 
theme. 
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Theme 1: Society Affects the Military 
Theme 1 was based on answers to interview questions, 1B, 1C, 1D, I, 1K. I asked 
interview question 1A to identify if a nation’s army should be used to carry out or enforce 
domestic policy. This question pertained to research questions 1 and 2, and all seven 
respondents answered that yes, the army should not be used to enforce domestic policy. 
While the officers and Ph. D.s interviewed represented a western-centric school of 
thought; this reality applies to any state military. Much negatively can occur between the 
army and the civilian population, which denigrates and harms the manner of a democratic 
nation. Chapter 2 notes the terrible interactions between the military and the people in 
attempting to counter an insurgency. 
The interviewees, veterans, and active duty understood that the US does not use 
its regular army to enforce domestic policy. European nations are reluctant to use their 
armies against the people. This mandate falls to the national guard or law enforcement. In 
Western countries, the use of the military to enforce domestic policy is rare and frowned 
upon. The US and their NATO allies understand the unique roles and responsibilities play 
on the international scene. 
To that point, in 2000, Condoleezza Rice advised President Bush: “The president 
must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. 
It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not 
designed to build a civilian society” (Rice, 2000, p. 53). The army, as an organization, is 
designed to be an effective killing machine. This is true of any nation-state army. Two 
respondents discussed the Kent State shooting as an example when army troops are used 
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against civilians. In that case, the national guard troops were poorly trained, had no clear 
rules of engagement, lacked discipline, and suffered poor leadership. 
All respondents reported that it was not appropriate to use the nation’s standing 
army for domestic policy. Terrorism is a law enforcement mandate. However, countering 
an insurgency is a military function. Boko Haram is considered a terror group as they 
focus their attacks on the civilian population. ISWA is an insurgency group as they focus 
its attacks on the military and government institutions. Each has its mandate to establish a 
caliphate in the Northeastern region of Nigeria. 
Unfortunately, using the army to fight Boko Haram was necessary as the national 
police force is corrupt, underequipped, undertrained, undermanned, and is a ghost law 
enforcement agency devoid of a real presence in Northeast Nigeria (Campbell, 2018a). 
According to the data, the reasons for not using the army domestically included harm to 
the public, a potential threat to the sitting government owing to Nigeria’s history of 
military coups, and the possible abuse to the democratic system in general. 
 All participants indicated that a nation’s military is reflective of a nation’s 
society. The society that exists in a military organization is grounded in the society and 
culture of the nation. That is the point; the military is a representative and caretaker of the 
people, much like Nigeria's president and national assembly. The army exists to serve the 
people through the rights and guidelines provided by the constitution. Additionally, the 
military embraces the culture and belief system of the country. Respondent 2 stated: 
If a society has strong leadership, if the laws are strong and the structure is 
in place to administer those laws, and strong expectation[s] are made in 
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how society acts, then the answer is yes, the army is a reflection of the 
society.
Because Nigeria does not have strong national leadership, the country's laws are 
tossed aside by a corrupt government. The people do not demand accountability; they do 
not expect their government and army to do better. The army exists to serve the people 
and should follow the rule of law and the constitution. The army is not an island unto 
itself in the middle of chaos; an army is designed to restore order from chaos, and a 
military reflects the members' norms, values, and cultures. Respondent 3 offered: 
The military does not strip anyone of their culture, their belief system, or 
their heritage. After all, we soldiers live among civilians. We eat with 
them, party with them, go to church with them, play with them and help 
them as they help us. We are them, and they are us. 
Military Culture
The results indicated that the military of a democratic nation adopts its culture 
based on the culture and societal influence of the nation. Society is a strong motivator 
affecting military performance both on and off the battlefield. Respondent 1 stated: 
As an example, if you view the US or France through the political lens of 
republicanism and as a republic, you find high functioning societies and 
militaries. Britain is also a high functioning society that fields a strong and 
high functioning army but is a constitutional monarchy and exists without 
a particular founding document. What do I mean by ‘high functioning?’ It 
is a nation and political system entrenched in the law, accountability to the 
people is strong, has processes and methods that ensure open and honest 
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functioning, and maintains a high moral and ethical code. On the other 
hand, Nigeria and from what I have read and seen, appears to be a low 
functioning society with a low functioning military where the rule of law 
is a burden, corruption runs rampant, and society is disengaged in the 
political, economic, and societal systems.
Respondent 3 offered on Nigeria: 
Countries with low-developed law enforcement, such as Nigeria, and I use 
Nigeria because I served there, must depend on their army to keep the 
peace, not always successful because the Nigerian Army has been accused 
of abuses. In the end, it is not a good idea for the army to be used to 
enforce domestic policy. The potential for harm against the people and 
institutions is far too great. It also should not happen because political 
factions may use the army against the people in general to enforce their 
will.
Respondent 3 continued: 
Recruits enter the [Nigerian] military indoctrinated in society’s culture; in 
boot camp, they are stripped of their civilian mentality and introduced to 
military culture. However, soldiers are not stripped of their cultural traits, 
religion, or societal belief system, including tribalism.” 
A significant component for the military in a democratic society is civilian 
authority's control over the military. In Nigeria, this comes from the Nigerian constitution 
and is a crucial anchor for society. It is the responsibility of the national assembly, the 
president, and the people to provide oversight to army actions. The Nigerian military is 
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responsible for being accountable to the people and takes its directives from civilian 
control as found in the constitution. However, this is tenuous and is a concern based on 
Nigeria’s history with military coups.
Structuring Military Culture
Analysis indicates that, first and foremost, military culture is taken from 
civilian culture, the founding documents, leadership, the rule of law, and expectations 
the international community places on a nation. The army enforces and reinforces 
societal expectations on moral and ethical behavior taught from a young age by 
parents, schooling, mentors, athletics, and religious experiences. The army is not 
expected to teach foundational moral and ethical behavior, rather carry on societal 
expectations to the military and reinforce the importance of expected correct 
behavior. 
Society carries the burden of maintaining and ensuring the nation's military 
culture represents the country. Parents and teachers are the first authoritarian figures to 
impart knowledge of acceptable social behavior. The military is a lethal weapon trained 
to kill, and moral and ethical values are continuously taught and reinforced in high-
functioning armies. Army leadership, including NCOs, are solely responsible for the 
moral and ethical performance of the military. Respondent 6 stated:
“It is the repetition of seeing it in your leaders, expecting it from one another. If that's 
honesty and trust, for instance, it would undoubtedly emphasize repetition as the key to 
pedagogy there.” 
A proper military makes every effort to train in ethics, morals, and rules of 
engagement to guarantee lawful behavior. The NCO corps has daily contact with the 
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soldier and is responsible for reinforcing discipline, morals, ethics, and a positive attitude. 
According to Respondent 1: 
Morals and ethics are taught; these two components are not intrinsic in the 
upbringing of anyone. They must be taught, which starts young and at 
home. Parents are the first teachers to impart knowledge of acceptable 
social behavior. 
However, Nigerian society is fragmented, attributable to the societal reality of 
tribalism, creating protectionism and isolationism. As the norms of social functioning are 
different across the world, African society does not replicate nor identify with Western 
society. Nigeria is unique even among its African brothers, a tenuous democracy with 
tribalism affecting and sometimes negating democracy. To say the Nigerian army must 
operate on a particular moral and ethical plane is not guaranteed by the world order or 
any country and resides in post-colonial thinking. One society's brutalism could be 
another’s norm; “that a culture’s moral baseline is inclusive of violence and blood feuds 
are an accepted societal norm” (Luban, 2004, p. 138). 
From the outset, soldiers are taught discipline, what rules of engagement mean, 
the ethics and moral behavior expected on the battlefield and in peacetime; this is 
universal. Respondent 5 stated: 
My military instruction included the foundational concept that I was 
entering a profession as elite as that of doctors or lawyers, but one 
entrusted with the capability to kill. And that Officers are consistently 
reminded of army values and morals which emanate from the nation.
Respondent 1 added on moral and ethical values: 
186
A society that follows the founding documents follows civilian leadership, 
is grounded in the law, and has high moral and ethical expectations 
produces an army that follows suit [US]. [Our] Congress has mandated 
additional training on social issues such as human trafficking, suicide 
prevention, illegal discrimination, and sexual assault. The cumulative 
effect of this training emphasizes the morals that we are expected to 
uphold.
To answer the actions of the Nigerian Army operating against the people, 
Respondent 7 elaborated on the training he received to define his understanding in the use 
of force and the rules of engagement which are utilized for “Operational Law discipline” 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005). 
Every year for over thirty years, I have received instruction on the Laws of 
Armed Conflict (a collection of international treaties and domestic law) 
that define the limits of how I can employ lethal force.
Military Corruption 
In their interview, Respondent 5 eschewed the top-down model of command and 
control that made the situation in Afghanistan worse and untenable. Instead, he believed 
the bottom-up model made for a far better fighting force: 
Let the NCOs train and lead their men and decide what is needed daily to 
create a successful fighting force and deny corruption. You have that kind 
of organizational structure, that kind of corruption in a government; it will 
extend itself inside all the institutions. And that's why I have been a huge 
critic of top-down programs because they feed that corruption and at the 
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expense of where the problem is and where we need to apply resources to, 
and that's the bottom-up level.
Respondent 5 went on: 
[M]y views about feeding top-down because it feeds corruption, you don't 
build the house from the roof down, you built it from the bottom up, and 
that applies to local governance connected to national governance. And 
the biggest mistakes we made in Afghanistan were trying to turn it into a 
western society and two, trying to turn its military, its police, and its 
government into western-style and investing all kinds of money up there. 
It perpetuated an already corrupt system... it took functional corruption 
inside Afghanistan and turned it into a booming business where it was no 
longer functional anymore; it just took care of the people at the top at the 
expense of everybody else.
Respondent 5 was correct about Afghanistan, and it translates to Nigeria. In 
Nigeria, corruption at the top affects the serving line soldier and inhibits satisfactory 
function. However, Nigeria fosters corruption at every level. Nigeria uses the top-down 
command model. This is made evident by the fact that the army uses order-based tactics 
(Onuoha et al., 2020). Junior officers are not provided leeway to use initiative in battle. 
Any initiative, any change in an order, must emanate or be approved through command. 
American and British Special Forces have served in Nigeria, training the army in 
tactics through a seven-week course emphasizing “offense and defensive tactics such as 
reacting to contact, countering an improvised explosive device, and seizing an objective” 
(Sheehan, 2019, para. 5). The translation from training ground to the Northeast battle 
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zone is lost. The American and British instructors must adjust to the Nigerian army's 
command and leadership style; however, the Nigerian army does not adjust to new 
training and doctrinal influences.
Civil to military corruption. As Respondent 3 noted, 
An army is tied to society, and military culture is based on that society. It 
is not possible to isolate an army from those social issues you described” 
(interview question 1k, 1m). Although the issue of ‘cleans’ and ‘dirties’ 
was done away with before the fourth republic, respondent 5 reported that: 
A corrupt government, a predominantly corrupt government, a 
government that doesn't espouse values and ethics, violates laws of war, 
putting people in positions, and I've heard it said in Nigeria. In the police 
and the military, everybody takes their turn inside commands designed to 
get them wealthy; they leave, somebody else comes in, designed to get 
them rich. I saw it in Afghanistan too. 
Corruption permeates every aspect of the Nigerian government. Nigeria is ranked 
145 out of 188 countries in Transparency International’s  Corruption Perceptions Index 
(Krek, 2019, para. 4). It is especially hideous when the population accepts the condition 
as the status quo and does not challenge the norm (Ubi, Ecko, & Ndem, 2012). 
The top-down corruption pattern is evident in Nigeria and noted when the defense 
minister absconded with 2 billion dollars meant to fund the military.
On social issues, Respondent 3 stated: I know the society which you 
describe (Nigeria). As I said prior, an army is tied to society, and military 
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culture is based on society. It is not possible to isolate an army from those 
social issues you described.” 
Respondent 7 went so far as to state: The international community should 
not let such a country have an army without oversight. Military aid and 
training could be used as an incentive to adjust the army’s culture, but that 
would not be enough. 
Could the Nigerian Army escape the social ills that surround the organization?
According to Respondent 1: 
I believe that it would be impossible in this context to produce a 
professional and successful army. A nation’s army is the society. It is not 
possible to separate the ills of society, especially ills that are so pervasive. 
Every individual who joins the military has been immersed in society for 
at least 18 years, if not more. They take with them what their parents have 
taught and their situation of growing up. Tribalism would seem to [be] a 
serious stumbling block in military leadership, discipline, and unit 
cohesion, both on a large divisional level to the platoon level.
Respondent 1 went on to state: 
The military can't escape societal norms, which I am talking about, 
societal norms that transfer to the army. Society lives and breathes inside a 
national organization. Society and its influences permeate every aspect of 
military operations and culture. Separation or extraction of deeply 
embedded abnorms of social behavior is not possible.
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Respondent 7 was blunt in saying: No. No. No. No. I think it would probably be a 
basket case. Militaries generally are microcosms of their larger culture, of 
the parent culture. I think that military would be bad news. Respondent 3 
stated on the army in Nigeria: 
The only way for an army to be free from those issues is if the army were 
tied directly to the state or to a dictatorial or oligarchical regime in which 
the military is held above the population and cared for. The military owes 
their allegiance to the ruler or political party and is taken care of as a tool 
of the state. 
Summary of Theme: Society Influences Military Performance 
The data answered the first research question; “How and to what extent does a 
nation’s military reflect/mirror the society from which the military was derived?” The 
respondents were quite clear that it was a flawed idea to use a nation's military to carry out 
or enforce domestic policy. The harm that could be perpetrated on the civilian population 
was simply too great, and in Nigeria, civilian harm has been documented. Having an army 
operating within the confines of the country could open the door to military hegemony in 
politics and provide a threat to the sitting government. 
The army of a democratic nation is subservient to the civilian government and 
the people. As far as effectiveness and performance, the army must be free from the 
overwhelming societal dysfunction as and according to the data, militaries generally are 
microcosms of their larger culture. The data produced the idea that the military follows 
the actions and desires of the population and civilian leadership in how they perform on 
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the battlefield. An army also mimics society in action, so dysfunction produces 
dysfunction. 
According to the respondents, the army cannot isolate itself from society; to 
somehow escape societal norms, societal norms transfer to the military. The only armies 
not tied to the people are the armies of the dictator and the many authoritarian regimes 
that exist. In those structures, the army serves the state and its system and is frequently 
used against the people to enforce the edicts of the ruling party. 
Therefore, a nation’s army is the society, and according to respondent 3 who 
stated, 
it would be impossible in the context of Nigeria to field a successful and 
professional army. The army is tied to society; its culture, belief system, 
and military culture are derived from the parent society; thus, it is 
impossible to isolate an army from those negative social issues ingrained 
in the population. 
As far as corruption, all the respondents agreed that corruption was an indelible 
problem. The government structure, a structure that allows, if not encourages corruption, 
extends itself inside all state and many private institutions. In this corrupt atmosphere, the 
government does not espouse the values and ethics required to prosecute a just war. 
Corruption is overwhelming in both the civilian sector and in the military (Banini, 
2020). According to Banini (2020), military corruption denies success on the battlefield. 
Banini (2020) stated, “corruption in the defence sector weakened the military’s capacity 
to respond to security threats swiftly” (p. 131). Soldiers fighting Boko Haram do so 
without adequate weapons, without adequate transportation, or armor. Air support does 
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not exist, and when used is poorly executed, killing civilians. Troops must scrounge for 
food and a place to sleep. Morale is low, as is the will to fight. 
The Nigerian Army, without government or societal control and intervention, 
violates the law of war, humanitarian law, and its constitution. In the obverse, a 
government that follows and adheres to the country's founding documents follows 
civilian leadership, is grounded in the law, and has high moral and ethical expectations 
produces a highly successful army and creates an army the people can trust and depend 
on.
Finally, the army recruits officers, the enlisted, and the soldier from a society that 
has been underperforming and ill-performing their entire lives. A population in which 
tribalism is the central anthropological-socio-political system has learned and endemic 
societal traits and culture based on the Muslim or Christian religion, tribalism, and 
centuries of expectations. Respondent 5 noted that “army recruits are immersed in society 
in their formative years. A nation does not remove learned traits or learned societal 
culture from army recruits.” 
This is especially true in a tribal system where tribalism is revered. Therefore, 
societal traits and culture are present within the military, and the two realities are joined. 
According to five respondents, it is impossible to remove the abnormal societal 
characteristics (tribalism, sectarianism, lawlessness, godfatherism, patronage, media 
manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, 
high crime rates, illiteracy, economic disparity, unemployment, high child mortality, and 
poor educational opportunities) unless those societal structures are replaced; by an army 
193
which may represent a new tribe for the soldier. The tribal system is explained further in 
the third theme. 
Theme 2: Failure in Military Performance
The following interview questions provided the second theme, Failure in Military 
Performance: 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H, 1I, 1J, 1M. Theme 1 identified how society and the 
military are inexorably linked in dysfunction. Therefore, the question then becomes how 
that linked dysfunction affects military performance. If the research to answer RQ1 had 
demonstrated that society and its military are not connected, and the army was not a 
reflection of society, RQ2 would have been nulled. 
According to the literature, Nigeria is exclusively dysfunctional, where corruption 
is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian violence 
is pervasive, political, and civil accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of 
political, economic, social, and cultural failure (Globalvoices, 2020; Kinnan, 2020). The 
Nigerian military has matched the dysfunction of society by being utterly ineffective 
against the insurgent groups. 
It has been documented throughout the eleven years of conflict that the Nigerian 
Army has little concern for human rights (Campbell, 2018b). Therefore, there must be a 
cause for the unsolicited harming of innocents, the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram 
suspects, and the burning and pillaging of entire villages. 
Data indicated that if a society does not have a history of respecting human rights, 
then the fight will be unconstrained by Western norms. There is little chance for a 
military member to overcome the societal tendencies from which they are immersed. On 
this, respondent 7 stated: “If recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect 
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for human rights, soldiers are nothing more but armed thugs carrying out murder.” 
Respondent 1 stated on army action: 
[The] Nigerian constitution means nothing to the people or the military, 
and you know what they say a behavior a lot of times is how you act when 
no one else is looking. The honor portion of it, having a military 
organization believe in a set of values that instill honor and the sanctity of 
life, is a very difficult thing in certain combat circumstances; cruelty 
occurs in any culture. It can occur. Maybe some are more prevalent than 
others.
Determining causation for the Nigerian Army to commit acts of violence may be 
embedded in the culture, tribalism, and poor military performance. Military performance 
would include leadership, training, discipline, and potential self-acknowledgment of a 
tribalistic environment.
Lack of Professionalism
To answer two interview questions, I had the interviewees view an Amnesty 
International Video and a New York Times article on Nigerian army abuses, extrajudicial 
killings, and wanton violence against the population. This video produced emotion from 
four of the interviewees when they watched the video. This reaction was due to the men 
being professional soldiers and sickened by what they viewed. 
This video represented a singular incident caught on tape. However, research 
indicated the video was not representative of an isolated incident. The army had a long 
history of abusing and killing civilians, as reported by the UN, relief agencies, and 
humanitarian groups. The US State Department stopped providing arms based on 
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humanitarian reports. The video was shown to the interviewees to obtain responses and 
provide assessments on military performance. Respondent 3 offered: 
This looks like anarchy; these are not professional soldiers but armed 
thugs carrying out murder. Respondent 3s incredulity continued. When I 
served 
in Nigeria training their soldiers, we were not allowed to accompany them 
into the field. Now I think I know why. Respondent 3, to no one in 
particular, trying to wrap his mind around what he saw: Where was the 
leadership on this incident? Did they condone this? This is not 
professional, nor does it represent what it means to be a soldier by 
anyone’s measure.
Although the video represents one incident, many cases of abuse and killings are 
associated with the insurgent conflict and societal violence affecting all of Nigeria 
(Murray, 2017; McGregor, 2017). No Nigerian state has been free of army abuse and 
misbehavior. In response to an incident in 2019 nearly identical to the 2014 Amnesty 
International video, the Nigerian Army vowed to apprehend the soldiers responsible in 
the video acting to commit extrajudicial killings of suspected Boko Haram terrorists 
(SaharaReporters, 2019, para. 1).
The results of watching the video produced statements from the coding from the 
respondents such as “lack of professionalism, poor or absent leadership, lacking any 
morals or ethics.” Several respondents noted a breakdown in society, and all respondents 
bemoaned the absolute lack of professionalism demonstrated by the soldiers. Coding 
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indicated that anarchy, tribalism, a complete lack of discipline, and a lack of control and 
supervision were present. 
Military Performance
How society and its dysfunction might affect military performance was identified 
as a theme in coding. The interviewees provided material related to the performance they 
witnessed by the Nigerian Army. General responses included the fact that army members 
exhibited zero regard for the law, no regard for the army as a professional organization, 
and absolutely no regard for the people. All respondents noted the abject lack of 
discipline and leadership in the video. 
The more professional the army, the fewer issues of violence and corruption you 
have. Respondent 1 stated: 
This represents anarchy by an organization specifically tasked with 
preventing anarchy. I am seeing potential war crimes and these soldiers 
are no better than the enemy. Respondent 6 noted: There's no difference 
between them and the rest of the crowd that's there. What I see are soldiers 
who are nothing more than vigilantes and thugs, with little to no discipline 
in the unit or the military.
Each interviewee discussed the lack of discipline and leadership demonstrated in 
the video and article. Respondent 1 noted: “Discipline is nonexistent, societal values are 
non-existent.” Respondent 5 stated: “A complete lack of discipline, structure, the soldiers 
are acting just like the terrorists we know Boko Haram to be.” On both media files, 
Respondent 1 noted: “These soldiers lack leadership, unless their immediate leadership 
was involved, making the scenes all the worse.” 
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Respondent 6 observed: “no seemingly tactical leadership other than one guy with 
a machete and now turns to people.” (the people are urging and driving the actions of the 
soldiers). Finally, in disgust, Respondent 6 said: “they're ill trained; they don't truly know 
how to do even what they're doing other than murdering people.” The interviewees 
decried the lack of professionalism and the absence of leadership. Two interviewees 
thought using a primitive weapon (machete) by army members to kill smacked of tribal 
influence. 
Affecting Military Behavior and Performance
At question are the norms of military behavior. The norms of the military are 
affected by society. This fact is made clear in the following description and evidence 
provided by the interviewees. The interviewees continued to comment on the video and 
news article. The insurgent battlefield is located not along static lines but within the 
population. Respondent 1 stated: 
Military power is no longer tied to material power but power granted by 
the people. In an insurgency, the people are the goal in victory. It is the 
people who grant legitimacy to either the nation’s army or to the 
insurgency. Respondent 1 then concluded: The norms of military behavior 
are not present when viewed through the YouTube video. This is extra-
normal in military behavior. Those soldiers remind me more of the Nazi 
SS than a democratically grounded army.
 Respondent 2 made an interesting observation of Nigeria and African armies in 
general: I guess the point I'm trying to make is that in other armies and 
other cultures, getting hit on the head, or getting hit with an open fist, or 
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whatever slapped up or whatever. It's just something that happens. I think 
we've kind of maybe advanced as a society, and we can't really expect, 
some might say third world nations, to be all nice, I guess. 
Respondent 2 intimated that: 
African armies or third-world nations simply have a differing view on 
violence than the higher developed Western system. That ancestral and 
cultural systems hundreds of years old have not advanced to the level seen 
in highly developed countries. Therefore we who study Africa may not be 
able to assign causation or blame for violence. 
From the answer provided by Respondent 3: A nation’s military is always a 
professional organization. A nation’s military lives and breathes doctrine, 
the rule of law, and the imposition of discipline.” Respondent 3 stated that 
based on the video: I do not see leadership, discipline, or the effects of 
training. The norms of behavior expected for a professional military are 
sorely lacking. These are not professional military soldiers but lawless 
thugs who are nothing but vigilantes. The culture within this army must be 
one of unaccountability and morass. 
The Respondent (3) went on to say: …if these are Boko Haram, the 
military is required to protect them, treat them fairly, and bring them to 
justice. These soldiers violated the law of war and any international 
convention regarding non-combatant prisoners.
Respondent 7 referred to their answer for question E, which answered if the army 
is reflective of the democratic society: If recruits are sourced from a 
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corrupt society with little respect for human rights, only a purposeful 
training and indoctrination program has any chance of creating a 
professional military force. Without such inculcation of professionalism, 
there is no chance for a military member to overcome the societal 
tendencies from which they were drawn.
Training and Leadership
The data accumulated on military performance pointed to leadership, training, and 
culture within the army. In the end, five out of seven respondents noted it was leadership, 
training, and discipline which alter the norms of military behavior. These lapses 
contribute to poor military functioning against Boko Haram and ISWA and how the army 
treats the population.
Respondent 7 remarked that the video indicated “a breakdown in civil society and 
a lack of professional leadership.” Another respondent (4) noted that, 
I think we touched base on the leadership aspect of things, but the training 
aspect is that they might not even have any type of moral ethic-type 
training. Respondent 4 continued, But it's kind of the training aspect of it, 
leadership. The military norms, it's…(pause)… how you put it? I think it 
is not expected. It is not normal for that kind of conduct to happen. I 
believe that lack of leadership, training, accountability, and discipline are 
to blame.
From Respondent 5, who commanded in Africa: 
You're looking at a military that's lost complete control of its junior 
officers. There's probably a lot of defections there. There's probably a lot 
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of AWOLs; there's probably a lot of people that have left. They have 
absolutely no control over this Northern environment from Maiduguri to 
Bama and in all the areas in between.
In speaking of military behavior, societal failure, and the stresses brought about 
by cultural, military failure, respondent 5 added (about the US troops training the 
Nigerian Army): “We have to do things that teach them the right way to take care of 
people inside their country. And it's the large reason why Boko Haram and ISIS West 
Africa exists there.” 
The New York Times article drew specific responses from the interviewees. I had 
asked about the professionalism, internal culture, and actions demonstrated by the 
Nigerian Army in committing atrocities against the population. On the contents of the 
article, Respondent 7 stated: “I can’t draw any conclusions from the article.” However, 
the respondent did add: “Atrocities are committed in war, even by armies of a moral 
country. The response of the government and military leaders to those atrocities is more 
indicative of the culture than the atrocities themselves. Respondent 3 added: “It is 
difficult to believe that anyone could open up on unarmed civilians, let alone a soldier.” 
Respondent 3 added, I read this passage (from the article). As more 
combatants from Boko Haram have been hiding within the civilian 
population, the line between who is civilian and who is not has been 
blurred.” This is the reason counterinsurgent doctrine exists, to protect 
civilians and turn the tide of supporting the insurgency. 
Respondent 1 offered a stinging rebuke of the army: 
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…that innocent civilians pay the price for an inept and unprofessional 
army. What I read from the article is an army out of control, flailing 
against an enemy. I noticed that when the army provided explanations for 
the deaths and abuses, they pointed to the civilians, cults, criminals, and 
Boko Haram as the cause. 
The army does not own what they do, even though President Buhari, in the 
article, pledged to stamp out corruption, promised to clean up the abuses (Searcy, 
2017). So, while the army denies, the civilian leadership vows to clean up abuses. 
Respondent 1 then offered: 
What is clear from the article is the pattern of abuse and killings by the 
army over the years. The article discussed the Baga massacre from 2013, 
which matches the current abuses by the army. The article is from 2017, 
but I have read of the same abuses in 2019. The pattern continues. It is 
hard to argue with patterning. The army is out of control and practices 
anarchical violence, flailing about the countryside and lacking a strategy.
A hedge against this behavior could well be training and education. All 
respondents reported on the importance of education from the bottom up. It is not enough 
to train and educate the officers; the enlisted and soldiers must be exposed to continuous 
training and education. The Nigerian Army suffers from poor leadership, discipline, 
training, and many additional problems associated with a poor example of 
professionalism and existing as an unsuccessful army. 
I asked what it required to be a highly successful army. There are certain social, 
cultural, and expectational norms adherent to a professional army. Respondent 1 offered: 
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This is simple. A well-functioning, professional, and successful army 
adheres to the rule of law. The army is disciplined, follows orders, carries 
out the expectations put forth by the civilian leadership and the population. 
They train consistently and are schooled on a regular basis in all aspects of 
behavior and in military professionalism.
Respondent 1 stated: Aberrancies in behavior are dealt with swiftly with 
follow-up training to prevent repeats. Above all, discipline is followed and 
enforced. Through military norms of behavior, soldiers keep their 
comrades accountable for proper conduct. 
Respondent 2 stated: Yeah, I think the big thing, I guess, if this is norms 
and expectations, is for people, is for soldiers, military personnel to be 
mission-oriented and be willing to do what it takes to perform the mission.
Unfortunately, the Nigerian Army operates under an order-based leadership 
system, not a mission-based system. Completing the mission is not taught to officers or 
their men. Once the objective of the order is achieved, activity may stop (Onuoha et al., 
2020).
 From the responses in general, and I am paraphrasing, a single personal failure 
could begin a tidal wave, and expectations are high for a soldier to perform. One soldier 
could start to abuse civilians, and a tribal mob mentality ensues. Professionalism, 
training, and discipline negate negative behavior. Most of all, any professionally trained 
and disciplined soldier invested in the group would instead take a bullet than abandon his 
comrades and friends on the battlefield. A single personal failure by a Nigerian soldier 
who runs from battle causes a tidal wave of soldiers to abandon their post. Fear, although 
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irrational, is a powerful motivator. This goes to leadership and training, which then 
disavows discipline on the line. 
This is the same military behavior that soldiers follow on the battlefield to 
enhance the battle experience. Trust among soldiers in battle is crucial, that comrades 
will not cut and run when it gets tough; they stand side by side against overwhelming 
odds. A successful, aggressive, well-trained army is a force multiplier, fighting as a 
singular entity to achieve success. 
To these ideas, respondent 6 stated: I think trust is a hallmark of an 
effective unit, and obviously, the door swings both ways. If the 
commander can't trust his guys and they can't trust him to have their 
backs, then effectiveness breaks down. The trust is built, I think, from a 
disciplined work ethic that ensures that they're doing the right thing when 
no one's watching.
The respondent went on: We spend a tremendous amount of time training, 
but he (the soldier) has to demonstrate that expertise in the application of 
his responsibilities. So that nexus forms between discipline, trust, and hard 
work that allows a unit to be highly effective. 
Respondent 4 stated: “I really think it's driven by a top-down leadership 
structure, but also, when I first got in, there's a set of morals and values that are 
instilled or expected out of you.” Respondent 7 offered the viewpoint of respect: 
The underlying cultural norm should be one of respect for others. Most 
importantly, respect of all the joint and coalition partners and respect 
extending to civilians and even the enemy. The problem arises when the 
204
need for respect is balanced against the need to kill the enemy. This 
involves a certain level of dehumanization to accomplish state-sponsored 
taking of life. 
It does take a certain amount of dehumanization to kill. However, that 
dehumanization cannot extend to the population or captured prisoners. To this idea, 
Respondent 3 offered: 
A well-functioning army is an army of discipline, training, a solid 
command and control structure, and an army that is focused on education. 
Training and education lift an army out of mediocrity and allows an army 
to perform at a high level. 
It is command and control which ultimately has the responsibility for their 
soldiers and their actions in combat. Rules of engagement exist to protect the soldier as 
well as civilians and noncombatants. Respondent 5 offered this in closing: 
What you have, first and foremost, is a value and ethics system that allows 
the military to be able to employ good order and discipline. The chain of 
command understands that it works for the people inside their command 
as opposed to the other way around. You see less drug and alcohol 
problems. You see less AWOL problems. You see less desertion 
problems, and you find high morale. If recruits are sourced from a corrupt 
society with little respect for human rights, soldiers are nothing more but 
armed thugs carrying out murder. In Iraq, as the war dragged on and the 
standards for enlistment got lower, that's when we started having some of 
these same issues.
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Respondent (5) discussed a higher level of thinking towards command. 
We have to develop this idea of servant leadership in accountability and 
responsibility in our senior leaders for the people below us. Importantly, 
and in an ending statement 5 noted: trust is the biggest force multiplier in 
the military at all levels. And when that is sacrificed, in my experience, 
that is what undermines the good order and discipline and the functioning 
that you need in a military unit. The character of the individual that 
matters. It's that person's ability to understand what is right and what is 
wrong and to hold their ground on that.
Trusting your comrades, trusting in your ability and the ability of the army to 
support you in a firefight by providing layered forms of intervention (i.e., artillery 
support, close air support) allows the soldier to stay in place and fight an overwhelming 
force on the attack. It was made clear by the data accumulated that there are multiple 
threads of contribution to military function and performance. 
Leadership, military culture, training, discipline, and quality of recruitment play 
an integral part in military performance, whether in large or small units. Leadership, 
training, and discipline mitigate if not remove the irrationality of fear. These attributes 
affect the normative theory of military performance and the injunctive norms that dictate 
military performance. There are a host of additional considerations. Pertaining to 
performance and action, the military of any country is not an isolated monolithic 




In general, Nigeria and African countries may be accountable to different ideas on 
morals and ethics due to tribalism, an ingrained ancient anthropological culture, or 
sectarianism. To understand counterinsurgency, I constructed an interview question to 
uncover whether the Nigerian situation was a mimic of 2006 Iraq when US troops were 
indiscriminately killing Iraqis when fighting the rising insurgency (Ricks, 2006). What is 
occurring in Nigeria is more likely than the Nigerian Army leadership's inability to fight 
the insurgency. Thus, the field troops do not have a tactical plan to address the issue. 
Conventional warfare tactics do not work when addressing an insurgency. David 
Galula, a French officer, fought in Algeria and formulated one of the first 
counterinsurgency doctrines. One of the first attempts at counterinsurgency can be traced 
back to General John Pershing and his efforts to quell the 1901 Moro insurgency in the 
Philippines. In countering an insurgency, the garnering the people's consent is the 
essential asset to conduct a successful campaign. It is the people who provide the 
government and the army with legitimacy. Respondent 3 stated: 
Field troops do not know who the enemy is, so they may shoot at everyone 
because they don’t want to be shot or attacked. It is entirely possible that 
Nigerian Army troops attack and kill civilians because they simply do not 
know how to conduct intervening actions.
Respondent 5 noted: 
Yes, absolutely. I give Petraeus a lot of credit, one for what he did in Iraq. 
And in these rural kinds of areas where bottom-up security really matters 
more than top-down security, bottom-up really matters; this is what you 
end up getting. And so, yes, the conventional approach does not work... 
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same thing with the counter-terrorism approach. The top-down counter-
terrorism approach does not secure areas. It kills bad people. Good should 
be part of the strategy. But it doesn't secure areas. 
Respondent 6 said: Yeah, if you could say it. I'm trying to get my arms 
around it. I don't believe it's a fair comparison unless I'm mistaken that 
what U.S forces were doing in Iraq is comparable to the, I guess, wanton 
slaughter of random civilians in Nigeria. 
As an aside, in an interview, Ricks described the treatment of Iraqis by US troops. 
“…some soldiers in Baghdad decided that the best way to deter looters was to make them 
cry--and they sometimes did this by threatening to shoot the children of looters, and even 
conducting mock executions” (Nissley, 2006, para. 8) 
Respondent 6 stated: [I]f you're treating everybody as a combatant, then 
regardless if they are or certainly in those circumstances are not, then 
order and discipline breaks down, mission direction is lost. Any sanctity of 
life then in what you're trying to achieve, which is tied to every military 
operation in accomplishing ultimately the political objective is lost. So, it's 
even in trained, disciplined armies at times because of the stresses 
associated with combat. I guess degrees of violence and the rapidity or the 
rapidness in which it unveils itself can certainly lead one to believe that 
there's a value breakdown. 
Respondent 1 indicated: “I would say what is viewed in the video is more related 
to personal accountability, training, discipline, leadership, and the lack of a moral and 
ethical base.” Respondent 1 did not believe Iraq and Nigeria were identical platforms 
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with insurgency issues. Instead, he believed the Nigerian issue was related to his answer 
of “personal accountability, training, discipline, leadership, and the lack of a moral and 
ethical base.” 
The discussion on Iraq and Nigeria provided an uncomfortable moment for a few 
interviewees. They did not seem interested in discussing Iraq. However, the difference 
between the Nigerian Army and the US Army is that the US military command 
recognized the problem and moved as quickly as possible to remedy the situation. 
I sought to identify if the Nigerian Army may be experiencing what the US did in 
2006 with frustration, adrift in doctrine, applying conventional warfare strategies to an 
insurgency, and identify whether civilians' damage might represent an association 
between the two armies. In the end, the interviewees simply did not have enough 
information to fully confirm that Nigeria might reflect what occurred in 2006 Iraq. 
The data indicated that the Nigerian situation was reflective of a poorly 
performing army attempting to combat an insurgency. From the historical record, it was 
clear that what occurred in Iraq represented a change in warfare from a conventional 
platform to counter-insurgency. While first struggling with the change and how to 
prosecute counterinsurgency, the US made mistakes and committed a moral drift. 
However, the “surge” and change of tactics remedied the situation. Therefore, there is no 
tangible connection between 2005 Iraq and Nigeria in addressing an insurgency. 
Nigeria uses conventional tactics and cannot make the doctrinal change to 
counterinsurgency either out of incompetence, leadership failure, or simply the command 
staff incapable of correctly prosecuting asymmetric warfare. The US dealt with tribalism 
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in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the Nigerian Army is tribal, totally standing on its own in 
military performance. Luban (2004, p. 117) offered: 
To criminalize acts of a government toward groups in its own jurisdiction, 
and thus to pierce the veil of sovereignty through international criminal 
law, is tantamount to recognizing that the cancerous, auto-polemic 
character of crimes against humanity represents a perversion of politics, 
and thus a perversion of the political animal.
Initial Military Training 
War is the implementation of political policy through violent means. Training and 
education appeared to be a foundation by which the army flourishes on the battlefield. 
The Nigerian Army puts its recruits through a nine-week boot camp. After boot, the 
recruits are sent to Advanced Individualized Training (AIT) to learn their specific job. 
From AIT, the soldier is sent to their unit, which may be involved in combat in the 
Northeast.
However, there is little evidence the Nigerian Army continuously trains and 
educates the troops in the field. Even on the battlefront, training should be mandatory and 
ongoing. Successful armies conduct after-action debriefings to discuss performance and 
to make changes in tactics and performance if necessary. 
Training continues if doctrine changes or the operational theater exhibits a shift in 
combat nature. For example, in 2019, the Nigerian Army moved from disseminated bases 
and town fortifications to “super camps” (Wolf, 2020). The super camp change delivered 
entire localized populations to the insurgents as the army abandoned towns (Wolf, 2020). 
The army changed its tactical doctrine to confront the insurgents in a new way, but 
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education and training must adapt to and provide for the new plan for super camps. 
Moving to a super camp but carrying on the same doctrine denies any intention of a 
conventional shift to counterinsurgency. The super camp became an extension of 
conventional warfare failure (Carsten, 2019).
Participants were asked whether a 90-day basic training boot camp is enough to 
instruct recruits in appropriate discipline, military culture, expectations, and moral and 
ethical responsibilities in combat? The following evidence was garnered from the data. 
Respondent 1 suggested that: 
90 days of basic training is a start, an introduction to the concept of the 
profession of arms. That training must continue throughout their military 
career and be exemplified by their senior non-commissioned officers 
(most importantly) and the commissioned officers in their chain of 
command. Only in continuing to emphasize proper and moral conduct will 
a recruit grow to understand that no matter the societal norms before they 
entered the military, this level of professionalism is the new expectation.
Respondent 3 added: 
We teach soldiers how to function at a minimum level. These soldiers are 
not yet ready to be deployed and fight a battle. It is an introductory course 
at best, and no army is ready to fight straight out of BT. I should note that 
the US army tries to be selective. Morals and ethics are constantly taught 
because a soldier can be easily swayed to do poorly in the fog of war. 
Therefore, the military enforces rules of engagement which makes 
warfighting easier for the individual soldier.
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In disagreement, respondent 4 stated: 
Yeah, I think 90-days is good. There might be some social proof that 90 
days is or isn't, but I can tell you from my experience that 90 is enough 
time to establish again what the expectations are the morals and the ethics 
expected within the military. However, respondent then 4 added: But I 
also think it doesn't permanently change somebody's thought process and 
beliefs. It's enough to just make them cognizant that this is where the 
military stands. And if you don't want to, in a sense, play ball or conform 
to that, then we don't want you in this organization. Yeah. And yeah, that 
gets to the frequent amount of training that we receive just to reiterate that 
this is still part of our culture, practiced morals and ethics.
Respondent 4 believed that a 90-day training regimen was acceptable but then 
reiterated the fact that frequent training is a must to perform as an organization, and if 
that was not possible, “we don’t want you in this organization” (Respondent 4). 
Respondent 6 had a different take as he actively commanded a training program 
in Afghanistan. He offered: 
No. And I guess the question can become more complex if we're going to 
go to another country and try to implement a 90-day boot camp and create 
an entity, a security force that possesses our own military’s values, it won't 
happen. The ALP example that I provided, the Afghan Local Police 
example, I think is evidence of that. If it's taking us 15-months to get our 
local police trainees who were going through a six week how to shoot a 
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gun, wear a uniform, those kinds of things walk in formation, riding in a 
truck.
Respondent 5 then offered that it took just as much time to train and to get 
the recruits to stop stealing from the local [Afghan] population, stay awake 
during nighttime guard sifts, not to use drugs and abuse detainees. 
Respondent 3 stated that it took a tremendous amount of time to overcome 
native cultural values and instill a comprehensive inculcation of a set of 
professional military values.
Respondent 1 stated that: a ninety-day boot camp is designed to move a 
civilian into the military. The program is an introductory endeavor to all 
aspects of the military. The one item most enforced during boot camp is 
discipline. 
Respondent 1 went on to say for AIT: Depending on the MOS, such as 
infantryman, as an example, these soldiers are further instructed in small 
and large unit tactics, firearms, heavy weapons, and various other aspects 
of operations.
Respondent 2 offered: That's a good question, 90 days. Oh wow. I would say at 
least possibly. I think with basic training, you just get some of it. Then you 
go onto your advanced individual training, and you're going to get some 
there too, usually. Then when you get to your unit, hopefully, you're not 
thrown into the fray right away but kind of eased into things. Now with 
Murphy's Law and how things go in life, especially in the military, it can 
happen that you don't get the training you need. For instance, when I 
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deployed to Bosnia and Iraq, they gave me a nine-millimeter handgun, 
Beretta pistol. Well, I'd never fired one before. I'd fired other pistols 
before, so I wasn't too worried. But they didn't have the training for me 
there at home station in Heidelberg and Stuttgart.
Respondent 3 agreed simply by stating: 
A 90-day basic training course is just that. Basic. We teach soldiers how to 
function at a minimum level. Bootcamp is an introduction and formulates 
the beginnings of military behavior. Appropriate military behavior is 
consistently taught and reinforced. Training cannot stop after 8 months of 
training. (boot + AIT). 
From respondent 2: I believe the key statement here is: Hopefully, you're not 
thrown into the fray right away, but kind of eased into things. Young 
inexperienced soldiers who are put into battle cannot function as expected. 
Fear is real, and it is an irrational construct of the mind. For the army, one 
avenue to decrease or eradicate fear is extensive training to build skill and 
confidence. In battle, the fog of war amplifies and contributes to that fear.
Soldiers might run from battle, experience fears, panic, and forget their 
training. 
It is unknown why Nigerian soldiers flee the battlefield, tearing off their uniforms 
as they run (Al-Jazeera, 2020; Ogundipe, 2019; Ross, 2015). However, fear and lack of 
trust in the army to have their backs must be a strong motivator and the fact they may not 
trust their comrades to stand with them. The answers I received indicated discipline, 
leadership, training, and the lack of, induce this battlefield behavior. 
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Society, the Army, and Failure
In March 2020, the Emir of the Kano State, Lamido Sanusi, was removed by the 
state for “disrespect to lawful instructions” (Campbell, 2020). Many believe this was 
done to quiet his objections to government corruption and ineptitude (Campbell, 2020). 
Nigerian is highly corrupt; in fact, the country suffers from not only corruption, but 
tribalism, ethnic conflict, kidnapping, lawlessness, godfatherism, which is political 
patronage, media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, 
female subjugation, high crime rates, illiteracy, and economic disparity, unemployment, 
high child mortality, and poor educational opportunities among many other social 
function problems. Although addressed earlier, I asked an additional question; 
Considering these social issues, is it possible for the army to isolate itself from society's 
ills exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? 
Respondent 5, who served in Nigeria, made the following statement: 
No, I don't think so at all. I think from a civilian view, anything that the 
military does is going to be a direct representation of the government. So, 
Nigeria is worse today than it was in June of 2017. It is bad today, and the 
military has not been able to separate itself from its rogue NCOs, its rogue 
enlisted people. Even when you have good division commanders and good 
battalion commanders that are trying to do the right thing, they're existing 
inside a system in Nigeria that has gone to hell in a handbag, and we're 
partly at fault for that. We had it going in the right direction, and then we 
left, and we left them to their own devices, and they weren't ready to be 
left to their own devices.
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Respondent 5 continued: “I think we're seeing a collapse of military 
behavior. Yeah, Nigeria. It's a terrible thing. It's a terrible thing to read 
about, to watch, to see the videos like you showed. Not in a country that 
has all those problems, I don't think.” Respondent 3 added: 
As in the previous response concerning social problems. In a democracy, 
it is not possible to separate or isolate the military from the people. 
Society is the anchor for the military. A high-functioning society that 
expects a high-functioning army will see that they have one. A society 
that suffers from the social issues listed cannot, by the nature of a 
democracy, carry a successful military. 
Respondent 3 continued: 
For the Nigerian Army to perform at a high functioning level, the army 
would have to isolate completely from society, root out any of society’s 
ills, be funded to a high level, have a military education system second to 
none, weapons systems second to none, discipline, cohesiveness, a strong 
moral and ethical compass, and enjoy a strong civilian control system 
which expects excellence. None of this is possible, so the army languishes 
alongside the corrupt civilian and political structure fumbling their way 
through war.
Respondent 7 offered the example of Egypt as an example of an army that existed 
in the same social and political climate as Nigeria. 7 stated: “This has taken decades of 
professional military training with the U.S. and military-to-military interactions that have 
explicitly or implicitly emphasized professionalism.” 
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Respondent 4 added on the military reflecting society: 
Is it possible? I guess anything is possible, but probable, I would say 
probably not. Here, it asks (interview question) about the religious beliefs, 
terrorism, tribalism, and if you're getting an organization that has all these 
problems, and I mean, it's very hard to weed it out, to not have an 
influence on the way business is conducted. I, and in that case, yeah, you 
could say that it would be a very, a pretty accurate (societal) reflection. 
(Yeah).
Respondent 6 added: I would say the characteristics you described, I 
would say no. It's just, it's seemingly an impossible task when the society 
is so fractured and dysfunctional to solidify it under a unified entity. 
Respondent 1 stated: 
I can refer to my answer I gave for 1K. It is not possible for a military to 
isolate and separate itself from the society it emerged from and the society 
which supports the military and sends its young men to fight. Society’s ills 
and abnormal functioning follow from organization to organization 
throughout society. The army is no exception. It's just, it's seemingly an 
impossible task when the society is so fractured and dysfunctional to 
solidify it under a unified entity.
Respondent 2 discussed the conditions in 1989 Romania when Ceausescu formed 
his Praetorian Guard and gave them extra favors, paid them well, provided them with 
better food, what have you, similar to North Korea. That is how an oligarch enjoins army 
loyalty to protect the dictator. But as far as the democratic state of Nigeria, he (2) stated: 
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As far as Nigeria goes, and this kind of goes back to the previous question 
of societal impact on a military, whether the army could overcome all the 
negatives in society, and with the culture, and operate or act as an 
independent institution of success. Okay. Yeah, I would think Nigeria is, I 
hate to use the term, but a basket case in so many respects, that I don't 
think an army is going to be able to rise above that.
Societal constructs affect how the military functions; if society is dysfunctional, 
then so will the military. Boot camp and AIT are the basic training courses used to create 
a soldier. However, you have a command system and a training system mired in the 
mediocrity that society imposes on the army. 
Responsibility and Oversight 
In a democratic nation, who bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in 
how a military conducts itself? Senior leadership accepts responsibility on the battlefield 
for how their soldiers act. They are also responsible for their soldiers in peacetime, 
expecting appropriate behavior. However, in a democracy, responsibility does not end 
with army control. Respondent 5 suggested that the commanders, “those closest to the 
operation, have the responsibility on how the unit operates. It is the responsibility of 
elected officials to maintain oversight, to make sure that the senior military leadership is 
taken to task on what they're doing.”
Respondent 5 also offered: 
Oversight's one thing, providing advice and guidance, giving them 
information, resources, working for them so that they can do their job 
better. Respondent 3 noted that: there exists a chain of command in 
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accountability. A military conducts itself through the will of the people. 
The people elect their government representatives, who in turn administer 
the military.
Respondent 7 was blunt: “In a democratic nation, that responsibility lies with the 
population. An easy answer is to blame the politicians, but in a democracy, the people get 
the government they deserve.” Respondent 4 discussed who bore the ultimate 
responsibility in that it was society. It was the society that understands what is happening 
in both peacetime and war. 
Respondent 6 said: “I would fully endorse our system that the military has to 
ensure the liberty of the people it's protecting the entity has to answer to those people or 
political leadership as our country does.” Respondent 1 provided an enlightened 
argument: 
In a democratic nation, and strictly pointed to democracy, civilian political 
control is the hallmark of civilian-military association. Since civilian 
authorities take their power from the people, it does befall the people of a 
nation to expect their military to function in a manner befitting societal 
expectations.
When discussing Nigeria, respondent 1 stated: 
Military leadership must hold those under their command accountable, 
followed by the civilian authority holding the leadership accountable. If 
this does not happen, then it must be the people of the country to demand 
accountability.
Respondent 1 discussed the reality of Nigeria, stating: 
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In Nigeria, it would appear the army is a domestic threat to the people. It 
appears the people do not have a voice; their people are simply humans 
caught in a terrible war and are abused by both sides. Sometimes, 
humanity is lost. They do not have a voice to demand better of their army.
Social dysfunction negates oversight of army function. The Nigerian tribes are 
anthropologically inclusive and strive for national hegemony but tranquility in the tribe. 
If the tribe has reached a positive level of functioning in the system, then they do not 
bother with the country. For example, if the Hausa-Fulani live in peace and have a 
hegemonic control system, then the tribe is at homeostasis. They do not engage other 
tribes to reach the same level of harmony, which would be a nationalistic narrative. 
Summary of Theme 2: Failure in Military Performance
Failure in military performance was intrinsically tied to societal dysfunction. The 
data made it clear how a dysfunctional society can affect military performance. The 
results are summarized through respondent 5: 
For the Nigerian Army to successfully function when society is so 
fractured and dysfunctional is an impossible task. It is not possible to 
solidify the army under a unified entity and fight in a professional manner. 
It is not possible for the army to isolate and separate itself from the society 
it emerged from. It is society that sends its young men to fight, young men 
who have been exposed to society’s ills their entire life. Society’s ills and 
aberrant behavior follow through an organization to organization 
throughout society, and the army is no exception.
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Recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect for human rights. In 
this situation, only a purposeful training and indoctrination program throughout a military 
career can create a professional military force. Without the continuous inculcation of 
professionalism, there is no avenue for any military member to overcome the societal 
tendencies from which they were drawn. In a democracy, it is not possible to separate or 
isolate the military from the people. Society represents the anchor and foundation for the 
military and for all societal organizations. 
All respondents noted that a well-functioning and successful army has discipline, 
training, education, a solid command and control structure, and a staunch moral and 
ethical belief system. Through training, discipline, education, and a culture of excellence, 
demanding the highest of professional performance, an army is lifted out of mediocrity 
and despair. The army has many weapons; they are a lethal killing machine, and in the 
end, the Nigerian people are at the army’s mercy. 
In a democracy, the army is a representative of the government and the people. 
Respondent 5 was clear on the Nigerian Army and rogue NCOs he witnessed in 2017 and 
stated that it was bad. The situation has not changed. The army had rogue NCOs then, 
and he believes the army still has rogue NCOs. 
Respondent 6 tied Afghanistan and Nigeria together as he had seen similar 
conditions in Afghanistan and applied those witnessed conditions to Nigeria. In the 
Amnesty International video and the New York Times article, the respondents were vocal 
about the abject lack of discipline and leadership. 
The Nigerian constitution and the Geneva Conventions specifically direct that 
noncombatants are treated fairly and without compromise. The Nigerian constitution also 
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protects the rights of all Nigerians. Respondent 1 discussed the Nigerian constitution in 
that it means nothing to the people or the military. He offered, and I paraphrase, that it is 
easy to conduct behavior when someone is looking, but actual behavior comes when no 
one is looking. It is here that the rogue NCO problem comes into play. It is the NCO who 
is directly commanding the soldiers. If he is terrible, then the norms of military behavior 
are jeopardized if not lost. The norms of military behavior are not present when viewed 
through the YouTube video. This is extra-normal in military behavior.
Response to the video, which represents a singular event, specifically included 
that the video represented anarchy by an organization tasked explicitly with preventing 
anarchy. Respondents agreed that potential war crimes were committed and the soldiers 
were no better than the enemy. To respondent 5, the soldiers appeared to be thugs and 
vigilantes, completely lacking discipline and proper military culture. 
According to respondent 5, army members demonstrated a complete lack of 
discipline, structure and acted like Boko Haram. In addition, the soldiers lacked 
leadership unless the leadership on the ground was involved, which makes the actions 
even more deplorable. Respondent 6 discussed (paraphrasing) and relating to 
counterinsurgency that no one knows who the real enemy is. In rounding up people and 
executing them, they are ill-trained. The soldiers do not know what they are doing other 
than murdering people. The tribal narrative began to emerge from the data from 
secondary descriptions such as this. 
In conjunction with tribalism is corruption, not in a monetary sense, but 
sociological patterns. One would assume then the elements of corruption are there as well 
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so that they do not know if they are killing a terrorist organization or are they being hired 
to or told to go out and eliminate a rival faction of people. 
It then becomes apparent in viewing the video and reading the New York Times 
article that there is a pattern of army abuse and killings. This is further confirmed through 
the historiography in Chapter 2 documenting the years of army abuse and killing. In this 
way, innocent civilians pay the price for an inept and an unprofessional army.
These types of military maneuvers demonstrate the army has lost control of its 
NCOs and junior officers, an army out of control and flailing at an enemy they do not 
understand. In the end, it represents a collapse of military behavior, a complete abdication 
of the normative theory of military performance and the norms of military behavior. 
This reality goes to leadership, training, discipline, and oversight. Each is a part of 
the greater holistic approach to army function and success. The incidents presented here 
and in chapter 2 indicate that leadership, training discipline, and oversight are sorely 
lacking, making for an army out of control. Additional data exists as background 
information and contextual data, confirming the validity of the data collected reported 
here. 
Sun Tzu wrote that everyone depends on the arts of war. This is a lesson for 
Nigeria in that military strength begins with a single soldier, and unity is crucial. 
A united nation is strong, a divided nation is weak. A united army is strong, a divided 
army is weak. A united force is strong, a divided force is weak. A united unit is strong,
a divided unit is weak. United men are strong, divided men are weak (Tzu, 2004, p. 42). 
So goes the nation of Nigeria. If Nigerian society is fractured and weak, then there is 
absent control over the army, citizens will die by the army’s hand and Boko Haram.   
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Theme 3: Tribalism and Military Performance
I identified a third theme, Tribalism and Military Performance. Tribalism 
presented as somewhat of a revelation in the coding. The tribalism narrative emerged as a 
completely organic subject offered by the respondents. I did not structure any interview 
questions to inquire about tribalism or its possible influence on the army. Four 
respondents brought up the tribalism theme in that the army operated as a tribe, 
implementing tribal actions (violence) against the people. If tribalism is a main animating 
factor in the negative actions of society, then undoubtedly, that concept transfers to the 
military. The soldier does not view a citizen as Nigerian or a victim, but simply an 
individual from a competitor or antagonist tribe who must be dealt with. If you are not 
with the army, you must be with Boko Haram. 
Four respondents organically suggested tribalism as causation for deviant military 
performance. As stated in chapter 2, tribalism rules Nigerian society, and sectarian 
violence is prevalent across the country. Tribal imperatives drive much of the violence as 
tribes seek hegemony over a competing tribe; an example is the Muslim Fulani fighting 
against the Christian farmers in the Sahel to control lands to graze cattle (Murray, 2017; 
McGregor, 2017). 
The data indicating the Nigerian Army is a tribe unto itself. The respondents 
indicated that the military's actions mimic a tribal mentality of it is them or us. In fact, 
one respondent noted: “The army operates as its own tribe and carries out punishments 
based on some anthropological narrative of violence…This is tribalism as practiced by 
the army.”
As noted earlier, respondent 6 offered: 
224
And one would assume then, the elements of corruption are there as well 
so that they don't know if they're killing a terrorist organization or are they 
[army] being hired to or told to go out and eliminate a rival faction of 
people. (sectarian violence).
Tribalism is the principal foundation of Nigerian culture. Long before the colonial 
powers carved up the African continent to fulfill their imperialistic mandates, the African 
tribal system had a thriving, prosperous, social, cultural, political, and economic success 
story. Tribalism continues to be the overriding cultural and structural component of 
society. In viewing the video and reading the New York Times article describing 
additional abuses documented in Nigeria, respondent 5 stated: 
It's leadership, and its discipline, it's tribal tensions. It's historical violence 
against each other that is now left unchecked without governance to 
maintain security. Tribalism is global; it is a narrative that transcends 
national boundaries and Western conceptions.
Respondent 4 tied Afghanistan and Nigeria together as he had seen similar 
conditions in Nigeria while serving there: 
[In] leveraging the Pashtunwali code (Afghanistan), the tribal affinity that 
the people have, and having them we're recruiting from those bases. 
Allowing them to be in a formalized security force but still working under 
the belief, they're protecting their tribe, their families, and themselves in 
local areas. And that's part of the reason I think the Afghan army has 
struggled a great deal because coming in, we didn't understand any of it 
arguably of their culture, values. We just grabbed whoever we could 
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regardless of tribe and ethnic affiliation and put Pashtuns in Hazaran areas 
and Hazaras in Pashtun areas. And we ignore those differences and the 
tribal differences within the Pashtun tribe itself, and that ultimately caused 
those soldiers to be strangers in those areas that there's- Even in their own 
country and the people wouldn't talk to them. They knew they were 
different, and so they couldn't make inroads very easily at all, even though 
they were Afghans trying to win over the people. 
Respondent 1 referred to the video in discussing tribalism: 
The fact that the populace is condoning this behavior is even more 
disturbing. Today, it might be Boko Haram suspects; tomorrow, it could 
happen to the very Nigerians cheering the activity on.
Westerners do not understand the tribal condition which exists across the Middle 
East and Africa. Westerners understand the concept of tribalism, but cultural realities are 
lost when applied to the daily machinations in living a life. It is not possible to know if 
Nigerian army brass understands their tribalistic environment, and it cannot be assessed if 
a tribal army is by nature assumed from society or is actively encouraged by army 
leadership and culture. 
The army has repeatedly demonstrated its penchant for moving against the 
population. This was noted in Chapter 2 when, after Boko Haram had killed a soldier, the 
soldier's comrades torched the town and shot anyone trying to flee the flames. This had 
the earmarks of acting as a tribe. If army units feel threatened by the population, the army 
will take adverse, punitive action if the populace is seen as Boko Haram supporters.
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It cannot be underestimated the hold tribalism has on the Nigerian people and the 
army. Isolated in their country and viewed as a violent arbiter of policy, the army has 
assumed a tribal identity and views the population as an uncooperative enemy element.
Summary of Theme 3: Tribalism as a Theme
This theme provided food for thought in reassessing the first two identified 
themes. Tribal culture dominates Nigeria and predominates the military. So disjointed is 
the thinking that any group, tribe, or organization could feel the army's violence. As it is 
structured and applied in Nigeria, Tribalism may be as dysfunctional as any of the 
country's disorders. In fact, tribalism may be a foundational aspect of dysfunction 
contributing to a national narrative of cultural insolvency. 
The interviewees recognized tribal realities in watching the videos and in reading 
the New York Times article. Four of the interviewees believed the Nigerian army was 
tribal in its application of violence towards the population. The interviewees had 
witnessed tribalism in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and it took the US army quite some 
time to come to grips with how to approach the tribal theater. Tribalism presents a 
political quagmire. The condition presents one of the most challenging and convoluted 
diplomatic enterprises as any leader bent on national and state-to-state cooperation. Each 
tribal state has specific and usually diametrically opposed views on cooperation, tribal 
needs and desires, and leadership, and this reality makes Nigeria a fragile state. 
Summary of Chapter 4
In chapter 4, I presented three themes culled from the codes identified from the 
data. Tribalism presented as a unique idea in describing army action. The data revealed 
that societal dysfunction and function, in general, are carried over to the institution of the 
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army. If not a direct mirror, the army reflects Nigerian society; as such, ancient violent 
narratives are found in society and are carried out by civilian groups and the army. 
A nation’s army should be a force for good to protect the country's people; that is 
their first and foremost mandate. Nigeria is a republican democracy with a constitution 
centered on the population. However, Nigeria seems to forget that the country is mired in 
a dissociative political, economic, religious, social, and military system.
The data and analysis presented in Chapter 4 provided a clear path to discuss the 
findings, form conclusions, and make recommendations for further study in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 uses the data to explain the sociological outcomes of military function 
compared to existing theories, including the normative theory of military performance 





Since 2009, the Nigerian Army has been fighting Boko Haram, a once peaceful 
youth community group founded in 1995. The Nigerian Army has failed to adequately 
address the insurgency of Boko Haram and ISWA, formed in 2016, and a splinter group 
from Boko Haram. Incontrovertible documentation and eyewitness accounts of army 
abuses, including extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram suspects, false imprisonment, 
Fulani attacks bordering on genocide (Stanton, 2020), and the murder of civilians, 
demonstrates an army out of control and unprofessional. 
I conducted this study to identify base causation for Nigerian military actions and 
offer recommendations for moving forward. Counterinsurgency carries the moniker of 
“The Long War” (Berger, 2009). However, countering insurgencies cannot become a 
never-ending war. Countless lives can be saved, and the suffering can end by acting on 
appropriate military doctrine with strategic and tactical initiatives. 
I asked whether the military of a democratic nation reflected or mirrored the 
society from which it emerged. I asked this question because Nigerian society is 
dysfunctional (Fagbadebo, 2019). Nigeria has long documented issues of basic 
sociological maladies where corruption is endemic and pervasive; tribalism supersedes 
national unity and democratic rule, ethnic conflict and sectarian violence are pervasive 
(Fagbadebo, 2019, p. 58). 
Nigeria suffers from media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious 
power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, severe economic disparity, and political 
and civil accountability is non-existent (Fagbadebo, 2019, p. 59). The socioeconomic and 
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political issues have been present in Nigeria for centuries. The British played the tribes 
against each other to prevent a movement from forming to declare nationalism. That 
conflict and animosity exist today as each tribe competes for hegemony. 
Interpretation of Key Findings
Based on the data, the Nigerian military mirrors Nigerian society. The issues may 
be complicated and abundant, but in reflecting the society from which the Nigerian army 
emanates, Boko Haram will continue to be a scrouge on the land causing death and 
destruction. 
The patterns of social, economic, and political dysfunction found in Nigerian 
society are the same patterns denying positive military performance. The social disorders 
found in Nigeria, which were responsible for the founding and rise of Boko Haram, are 
the very reasons why the army is a failure. The society of a nation is directly reflected in 
the nation’s military. The military cannot extract itself from societal influence. The 
analysis of data revealed this fact. All respondents concluded that a nation’s military is 
the society in which it is immersed. 
Therefore, if a society is high functioning, that is; where the rule of law is adhered 
to, where accountability is present in every aspect of society, where corruption is not 
tolerated and dealt with when discovered, where the people are engaged in every aspect 
of society and government, and the military understands that it is subservient to the 
people the rule of law, and the civilian government, then the army will be high 
functioning as well. 
A successful and high functioning army has high standards and supports an 
educational and training system designed to maintain and improve on professionalism, 
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maintains a high level of discipline; not through coercion, but through their culture and 
professional expectations, and practices a mission-driven leadership program of self-
accountability expected not only of officers but of NCOs and the basic soldier. Finally, 
the army understands the law of war, the rules denoting combat, and instills rules of 
engagement on the battlefield to protect civilians. 
On the contrary, the Nigerian society is dysfunctional where the rule of law is not 
adhered to, accountability is lax if not absent, where corruption is endemic and tolerated, 
where the population is not engaged in every aspect of society and government. The 
military does not understand or ignores that it exists to serve the people and the civilian 
government. 
The Nigerian Army is an unsuccessful low functioning organization that does not 
display high standards, where education and training are inadequate or non-existent, 
thereby negating professionalism. Discipline is lacking, sometimes enforced through 
coercion, and the leadership uses military doctrine designed not to enhance army 
performance but to hinder success. The army does not practice a mission-driven 
leadership program of self-accountability expected of officers and NCOs and the basic 
soldier. 
This is the crux of RQ2. Nigerian society affects military performance negatively, 
negates the normative theory of military performance, and abolishes both the injunctive 
and descriptive norms within the military environment. In this reality, aberrancy becomes 
the norm. 
Tribalism isolates and protects tribes while seeking hegemony over other tribes 
negating nationalism, essential in the national consciousness. The wealthy Christian 
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South is not engaged with the Muslim North, viewing Boko Haram and ISWA as a 
Muslim problem. In discussing a tribal army, it may be true then that religion propagates 
tribalism based on the Muslim faith, dominant in the army. In 2016, the army made a 
move to recruit more Christians into the officer corps. The Muslim Rights Concern 
criticized this move (MURIC), stating that “it gave undue military advantage to 
Christians thereby endangering the lives and properties of Muslims nationwide” 
(Godwin, 2016, para. 4).
The army may indeed be a tribal entity. In a society dominated by tribal 
protectionism and isolationism while striving for hegemony over neighboring tribes, the 
army becomes a tribal unit to facilitate operating amongst the various Nigerian tribes. 
This has been evident recently in Nigeria when the army threatened to move against 
Lagos and Abuja protesters. Spokesperson for the Army, Sagir Musa, stated, “The NA 
[Nigerian Army] hereby warns all subversive elements and trouble-makers to desist from 
such acts as it remains highly committed to defend the country and her democracy at all 
costs” (Ewokor, 2020, para. 7). The protestors were protesting the Special Anti-Robbery 
Squad (SARS), a police unit known for debauchery and brutality. (Jones, 2020). The 
army seemed to forget that the people exist in a democracy and were exercising their 
constitutional rights. 
The tribal army was ready to inflict violence and death on the protestors (Jones, 
2020). Therefore, the army should not be allowed to enforce domestic policy. According 
to Orjinmo (2020), “Nigeria's army has a bloody history quelling civil disobedience” 
(para. 10). The army is a lethal hammer, and to the hammer, everything is a nail. 
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Corruption is endemic, pervasive, and is accepted as a social construct. 
Corruption then flows to the Nigerian Army as the army is a social institution within the 
national structure. This research documented the performance issues of the army. 
Command may have a pristine headquarters in Abuja where dignitaries and foreign 
soldiers are entertained and impressed by rows of spit and polished soldiers, but the 
reality in the Northeast war zone is far different. 
Military corruption, specifically in the Nigerian army, takes the form of 
inadequate supplies, poor or non-existent logistical support, poor leadership, diversion of 
funds, a mechanized force that is not mechanized as units lay in disrepair. Tanks, which 
have little use in counterinsurgency operations, are merely 40-ton paperweights. Troops 
suffer from inadequate supplies, including basic weapons and ammunition, mercenary 
tactics (accepting funds from corporations to protect their assets), and propaganda 
designed to enhance army credibility. These actions deny the neorealist theory of combat 
balance. 
The research indicated that training appeared to be sorely lacking. The Northeast 
is undermanned, and Nigerian soldiers are outgunned, outmaneuvered, outled, and their 
pay is pilfered right from the battlefield (Kelly, 2020). These conditions form the basis 
for systemic organizational (military) corruption. 
There may be a reality that the insurgents are better armed and better led by 
ISWA leaders, which changes the dynamics of the normative theory to the benefit of the 
insurgents (Searcy, 2019). ISWA does not carry the baggage of society. Their soldiers 
function on a simple premise; to serve Allah and follow Islamic law and its rules. 
233
The army abuses civilians, and the troops fire entire villages to remove Boko 
Haram (Amnesty International, 2020). Civilians are thought of as the enemy and not an 
asset to be protected. For the army, this is the extreme form of tribal social ostracization. 
The Nigerian people are the primary source of intelligence in a country without 
sophisticated intelligence-gathering methods. When soldiers look at civilians, they do not 
see people or humans; they do not see Nigerians; they see an impediment to their job.
In Nigeria, the “social” army mirrors the “social” society. The military of a 
democratic nation adopts its culture based on the cultural and societal influence of the 
nation. It is impossible for the Nigerian army to adequately address the insurgency using 
current conventional military strategy or tactics. The army is culturally and professionally 
neutered to perform at a high level. 
The army cannot advance counterinsurgency theory or action because leadership 
lacks creative thinking and has demonstrated a monolithic thinking regimen. For 
example, in 2020, the army decided to create “super camps” in the Northeast (Wolf, 
2020). In these super camps, the army has a base from which to operate and offers a safe 
haven and a defensive structure. 
The population has been encouraged to join the army in the super camps for 
protection. This is Vietnam-era thinking. Boko Haram now roams free in the countryside, 
attacking villages and towns at will, knowing the army is ensconced in their super camp. 
Instead of serving the people of the country, the Nigerian Army operates as a self-serving 
entity. 
The Nigerian Army does not practice the social and cultural norms and 
expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and successful military. The 
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dysfunction of Nigerian society directly and negatively affects the norms of military 
behavior. No individual, institution, or population holds the Nigerian military responsible 
or accountable—the military acts at will without accountability or repercussion. 
The Nigerian Army practices nearly every social ill found in Nigerian society and 
noted in this study. This situation then denies the norms of military effectiveness and 
denies the normative theory of military performance through illicit and unprofessional 
behavior. Each respondent indicated that the army could not break away from its societal 
parent and function independently as a socially accountable and professional 
organization. 
The norms of military behavior are directly affected by societal influence. In 
Nigeria, both the injunctive and the descriptive norms become skewed in their application 
to military function. I noted the military norms of behavior earlier in this study. This is 
the oughtness of behavior, the positive expected behavior of military units and their 
members. They reflect a group assessment of approved and disapproved conduct, and it is 
the shared belief system of a group. In this regard, norms signify values or the shared 
belief system of a group. 
Both the injunctive and descriptive norms of military behavior are bastardized by 
the actions and culture of the army, which is inculcated by society. The basic principle 
that soldiers fight for each other and not one soldier would abandon their comrades in a 
firefight is not purely a Western prerogative but exists through discipline, training, and 
the innate desire to be with your buddies and support each other (Gaub, 2014). 
The warrior ethos provides this idea; that the mission comes first, a soldier never 
quits, does not accept defeat, and never leaves a fallen comrade (Shinseki, n.d.). These 
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four ethos are derived from the army values of loyalty, duty, respect, honor, selfless 
service, integrity, and personal courage (Shinseki, n.d.). These attributes represent the 
professional soldier and are not isolated to the American army but are present in every 
successful military across the globe. 
Every army worth its salt strives to be professional, for professionalism drives 
performance. One cannot forget, the origins and structure of the Nigerian Army lay 
within the culture, expectations, and “values” of the British Army. Army values drive the 
soldier to perform as the organization expects. 
To understand Boko Haram and ISWA through this lens. The Salafist soldier 
shares a common religion in a specific form, and Political Islam and not public policy 
guide them. They consider themselves brothers and soldiers under Allah. They have a 
common god, a common belief system, and a common objective. The Salafist answers to 
the one, Allah, and would gladly die in his name. The Salafi-Islamists in Nigeria would 
give the country to Allah. 
The data analysis for RQ1 overwhelmingly concluded that the army of a 
democratic nation reflects the parent society. Previous military and academic studies have 
indicated that superior material, technology, tactics, and institutions were responsible for 
increasing success on the battlefield (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Sun Tzu (2004) wrote that 
“Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and 
your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. 
Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue” 
(p.34).
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When a society is corrupt, and that corruption extends to the military, the military 
is poorly sourced and denied material, the military suffers a lack of technology, poor 
maintenance, and vehicle availability, poor leadership, monolithic strategy, tactics, and 
compromised institutions deny the army success on the Nigerian battlefield. The data 
drove the theoretical applications as I assigned meaning to the state of Nigerian society. 
The ills of society transfer to the military, and in that light, I assigned the realities 
of the Nigerian Army to the neorealist combat balance theory. In 1995, Rosen offered 
that society contributes to military power, which is then dependent on military 
performance. This specific paradigm falls in line with Nigerian society and its effect on 
military performance. 
The neorealist combat balance theory indicated that an army that denies soldiers 
superior material support hampers success on the battlefield (Fitzsimmons, 2013). 
Nigerian social dysfunction induces corruption, which leads to the absence of oversight 
caused by civilian/political apathy, tribalism induces political patronage, leading to 
corruption in the military. This paradigm induces failure in material support due to the 
diversion of monies and resources and validates the military combat balance theory. 
The normative theory of military performance has more credence in this study 
related to the combat norms of the military based on a performance aspect of the Nigerian 
army. Highly trained, motivated, and disciplined troops can adapt, overcome, and 
persevere through adversity, including being hampered by the failure to provide material 
support. These troops know how to fight and remain motivated when material supplies 
are limited or non-existent. This was a component of Fitzsimons’s study. It is the 
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normative theory that explains how well a soldier can perform, no matter the size of the 
unit. 
This starts with the injunctive and descriptive norms of military behavior. Hoare 
(2008) provided a structure to explain how small military units can perform successfully 
in response to these theories. A singular soldier is taken in the context of their military 
culture, which in turn drives military effectiveness. Add an additional soldier who shares 
the same culture and the same military effectiveness, and so on. Combining the soldiers 
into units who share the same culture and effectiveness produces an interaction or force 
multiplier that accounts for success. 
This same formula can account for an unsuccessful army based on their military 
culture, the military effectiveness of the soldier whose interaction does not lead to a 
force-multiplying paradigm, and here is where the Nigerian Army resides. The norms of 
military behavior are found in the normative theory of military performance. The six 
parameters of Hoare’s (2008) foundation for military effectiveness were explained in the 
theoretical framework. The interpretation of data for RQ2 was focused on Hoare’s 
parameters of military performance. I viewed these attributes in conjunction with the 
normative theory of military performance. 
While I did suggest that the neorealist combat balance theory applied to this study 
related to the quantity of force and equipment, the normative theory of military 
performance demonstrated to be the overriding theory as it dealt with the human quotient 
considering the norms of military behavior and how humans perform in combat.
Both research questions were answered by the data collected from the 
interviewees. For RQ1: Society affects military performance. In a severely dysfunctional 
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society grounded in tribalism, societal issues dominate the military to the point of 
performance failure. RQ2; Because of the dysfunction and tribalism found in the 
Nigerian army, civilians are abused, killed, and are fodder for both Boko Haram, ISWA, 
and the Nigerian army. In addition, civilian support and intelligence gathering are 
hampered by army actions. 
Theoretical Framework and Findings
The theoretical frameworks tie into the norms of military behavior as society 
struggles to maintain homeostasis in functioning. Military behavior and performance are 
negatively affected by the abnorms found in society as these abnorms flow into every 
institution in the country. Therefore, military performance is causally related to societal 
constructs. Fitzsimons’s theory and findings focused on small unit strategies and tactics, 
specifically a private military company, or the mercenary.
I utilized Hoare’s (2008) ideas and philosophy on combat performance. I also 
used Fitzsimmons's study of mercenary units and their ability to perform in battle. While 
the Nigerian army is a far larger monolithic force, the theories and ideas of both Hoare 
(2008) and Fitzsimmons (2013) apply to this study. The neorealist combat balance theory 
states that an army that fields material superiority with a never-ending supply stream 
should win the day. The normative theory applies to the cultural performance of the 
soldier. 
Counterinsurgency, known as asymmetric warfare, is small unit warfare. No 
matter the size of the Nigerian Army, it is the army’s small units that are involved in 
battle. It is their interactional competence that requires scrutiny. As noted in Chapter 2, 
the Nigerian Army has conducted large-scale operations, but even in those situations, the
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army does not achieve success. Fitzsimmons (2013) identified the Neorealist Combat 
Balance Theory in which material superiority determines combat balance or supremacy. 
Figure 12 
Neorealist Combat Balance Theory.
Note: Fitzsimmons, (2013), p. 45.
The Hoare and Fitzsimmons theories can be assigned to a larger organization for 
it is the sum of its parts; the team, the squad, the platoon, and finally, the company, a unit 
sized from a few dozen to 200 men (US Army, 2021). In the context of operations, it is 
the military system that assigns relativity to what is significant and small and how large 
and small interact and mesh on the battlefield. The Nigerian military is a large force but 
fails in small unit conflicts. They also fail in large unit conflicts of company strength and 
higher.
Fitzsimmons (2013) concluded that to ensure combatant military performance, the 
military must field both quantity and quality and that every combatant would make full 
and optimal use of the material capabilities. Fitzsimmons also noted that the combatants 
would have to perform optimally in combat to guarantee a successful outcome, validating 
the theory. Fitzsimmons studied mercenary forces, but this, in turn, could be applied to 
standing armies. Military operations are based in small unit operations which, affects the 
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more expansive combat theater. Combat and army operations depend on small unit 
movements and competency in battle. 
Nigeria cannot provide proper materials to the forces combating Boko Haram. 
Even if Nigeria were to supply the troops with the best materials available and sufficient 
quantities, Nigerian soldiers fail to utilize Hoare’s (2008) six positive constructs for 
military effectiveness, do not perform optimally, and negate the combat balance theory. 
Chapter 2 indicates the insurgent forces may, in many cases, be better equipped than 
army units. It is here that adverse societal effects become evident in affecting military 
performance. Figure 14 demonstrates society’s negative contribution to the neorealist 
combat balance theory. Society’s negative impact on the Nigerian military is apparent.
Figure 14
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Dysfunction breeds dysfunction in both material superiority and military culture. 
Dysfunction, abnormal social and military behaviors, and structures affect the neorealist 
balance theory. The normative theory of military performance explains the failure in 
culture, combat actions, and soldier competence. Fitzsimmons (2013) demonstrated that 
the normative theory explained military performance in his study, while the neorealist 
theory did not explain military performance. However, the lack of material support to the 
army in the field does deny efficient and substantial performance; this has been 
demonstrated in this study with a more significant national force. 
A soldier without a weapon, ammunition, food, air support, mechanized ground 
units, and armor simply cannot perform on the battlefield. Quality of manpower 
determines military performance based on the six norms of military culture. Fitzsimmons 
cited Hoare’s (2008) norms of military effectiveness to explain what is required for 
optimal functioning. 
Hoare (2008) suggested that positive experiences in military effectiveness would 
appear like this; an army would exhibit the following positive constructs in performance. 
They would exercise creative thinking. Conduct decentralized decision-making. 
Encourage personal initiative. Practice the free transmission of accurate military 
information—practice and train in technical proficiency. Encourage and promote group 
loyalty. Fitzsimmons agreed with Hoare that these positive constructs create a positive 
and successful military culture (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Therefore, the normative theory of 
military performance suggests: 
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Figure 13
Normative Theory of Military Performance. 
Note: Fitzsimmons, (2013, p. 25). 
Social dysfunction adversely affects military culture and, therefore, military 
effectiveness. As discovered through data analysis, a military cannot overcome the 
abnorms found in society as those abnorms become ingrained in the military culture. This 
is the foundation for the normative theory of military performance. Based on societal 
dysfunction and the cultural traits transferred to the military, a military must impart 
mechanisms to address drift or failure in the norms of military effectiveness. Continuous 
training, discipline, and practical applications in discipline and competence are mandated 
by a successful army to maintain a high functioning level.
Figure 14. 
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Note: Hoare, M. (2008). Congo Mercenaries. 
Figure 17 
Nigerian social and military dysfunction denying success through the Normative Theory 
of Military Performance.
Theoretically, social dysfunction and its supportive theories affect the norms of 
military performance and deny both the neorealist theory of combat balance and the 
normative theory of military performance. Social dysfunction also bastardizes the 
injunctive and descriptive norms of the military environment and skews the moral, 
ethical, and expected norms of military behavior. This study presents solid evidence that 
society affects military culture and performance and is one feature that denies army 
success in Nigeria.
Fitzsimons’s (2013) predicted that if a military unit exercised creative thinking, 
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free transmission of accurate military information, trained in technical proficiency, and 
encouraged and promoted group loyalty would carry out significant tactical innovation, 
would have little difficulty in meeting unexpected threats and developments on the 
battlefield, would have little trouble adapting to unexpected weapons or tactics by their 
adversary, they would learn quickly form their mistakes and take action, and would 
utilize very simple but effective tactics (p. 34). 
A military unit that did not exercise creative thinking, decentralized decision 
making, personal initiative, practiced the free transmission of accurate military 
information, trained in technical proficiency, and encouraged and promoted group loyalty 
would act in the obverse of a successful professional unit and would have great difficulty 
on the battlefield (p. 34). 
Limitations of the Study
This study had clear limitations, as noted in Chapter 1. I used senior military 
officers and those of high academic standing. This was a limitation in the sample 
population. The sample was limited to seven participants due to the sample group's 
hyper-homogenous standing, which led to theoretical and knowledge saturation at 
interview four. An additional three interviews were done to ensure no new information 
was introduced. Data collection was limited to seven participants. This study was limited 
to the social effects on military performance; strategic and tactical operations and 
operations in the field were not part of data collection or this study other than 
demonstrating poor military performance and failure related to societal influence. 
The Amnesty International video and the New York Times article documenting 
Nigerian Army abuses and killings were limited to Nigeria and this study only. The video 
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represented one piece of evidence, and the interviewees were limited to viewing the one 
video. Both were standalone documents but offered a representation of Nigeria on nearly 
a regular basis (Amnesty International, 2021). 
I limited the study to explore only the interaction and effects on military culture 
and performance based on a single national democratic society. The impact on military 
performance by society is directly applicable to the fight with Boko Haram and ISWA, 
therefore limited to the Nigerian theater of operations. This study would not necessarily 
correspond to Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Somalian Army. 
Recommendations
It is recommended that research be conducted on low performance or third-world 
armies to identify performance issues. The vast amount of literature addresses the 
militaries of high-power high functioning militaries. Therefore, future research should 
focus on militaries of low power, low functionality, and illiterate systemic structures that 
may affect military performance. 
The modern battlefield, even a conventional battlefield, is far more nuanced than 
the older Soviet-era model tank versus tank at the Fulda Gap. Countering insurgencies 
adds an entirely new and complex methodology, and little is known how the armies of 
low function--low power or post-colonial armies perform. Continuing research is called 
for in post-colonial nations fighting insurgencies. The Congo has been unstable for 
decades; Nigeria is currently unstable, with Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia 
fighting terrorism and insurgents. Africa is tribal, and that dynamic plays into political 
and military functioning. 
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There is little research on tribalism as applied to military functioning and 
operations. The Nigerian Army contingent includes the Fulani, the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, 
and various smaller tribal representations. It was not suggested in the literature which 
tribe, if any, dominated the Army. It could be assumed that since the Hausa-Fulani 
represent about 30% of the Nigerian population and are in the Sahel and North, the 
Hausa-Fulani might make up most army personnel (CIA, 2020). The Fulani are a 
nomadic warrior tribe, one of the fiercest in Africa (Hadithi Africa, 2019). The Hausa-
Fulani identity came from the migration of the Fula indigenous peoples into Hausaland in 
about the fifteenth century (Bosch, Calafell, & Pérez-Lezaun, et al., 2000).
A path for research lay in understanding the Nigerian Army in far more detail. 
Little is known about the dynamics that tribalism brings to the army. Little is also 
understood about the religious makeup of the army and whether it is predominantly 
Muslim or if friction exists between Muslims and Christian negating proper function. 
Research in this area would assist in understanding how the army functions based on a 
religious context. 
Multiple respondents suggested during data collection that the Nigerian army 
operated as a tribe unto itself. This would be a fascinating thread to follow and an 
excellent subject for future research. However, this study demonstrated the beginnings of 
understanding the role tribalism plays and offers a highly likely causation for army 
action. The Nigerian Army operates as a tribe in a land where tribalism dominates; it may 
further explain army actions in the field. Nigerian soldiers may trade one tribe for 
another, the “other” being the army. 
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Tribalism could exist in a multi-threaded explanation as to the incapability found 
within the army. This study explains military performance and effectiveness and why 
Boko Haram is often viewed as a better fighting force over a national army. This study 
also answers why the army abuses the population to the point of killing and the scorched 
earth destruction of Nigerian villages and towns. In these cases, tribalism may be a 
motivating factor. 
In addition, the army is protective of its structure and reputation. Army 
spokespeople continuously deflect criticism and causation of adverse events onto other 
aspects of society. Army personnel explains abuses and killings by blaming everyone 
from cultists to entire villages for army behavior instead of army units and personnel, 
indicating army tribalism in action. No army conducts operations without fault or 
sterility. However, propaganda from army personnel would leave one to believe they are 
perfect in every aspect of operations. This includes continued army rhetoric on defeating 
Boko Haram, and protectionism is a key component of tribal existence.
Finally, I came across a paradigm in the research of Nigeria. Although I did not 
use conflict theory, disorganization theory, the structural-functional theory, or any other 
social function theory in this study, I studied these theories in detail to assist in 
understanding Nigerian society. No matter the social implication of a theoretical concept, 
there appeared to be a reality predominating every aspect of Nigerian society. 
In Nigeria, and I suspect additional African post-colonial tribal nations, a 
theoretical structure can be described as disassociation. In Nigeria, every social construct, 
entity, condition, and organization operated as a singular entity seeking political, societal, 
and economic hegemony over religious groups, societal groups, and tribes. The tribe 
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remained the guiding force in everything Nigeria. It would be conducive to studying the 
idea of “divergence” or “dissociation” in a society dominated by tribalism or moved 
towards a tribalistic environment. 
Societal, religious, political, and economic entities sought to gain power for 
hegemony. No singular agency in Nigeria worked together to provide a unified front, a 
national consciousness, and any attempt to assist in the homeostasis of Nigerian society.
Implications 
Positive Social Change
It is difficult to identify and implement positive social change. This study exposed 
the societal effects on military performance of a significant post-colonial African nation. 
This study offered insight into why the Nigerian Army cannot defeat a far smaller 
insurgent force. If the military could somehow separate itself from societal dysfunction, 
which is deeply ingrained, if the army recognized its subservience to a democratic 
people, and if the army were to institute reforms designed to protect the people and 
ensure success on the battlefield, then positive change could occur. 
Identifying the actual problem of failure is a step forward. It is incumbent upon 
military leadership to understand the profoundly ingrained issues within the organization 
and admit issues exist. It is doubtful this fundamental leadership responsibility will 
happen so that the status quo will continue. In addition, this study brought insight into 
military performance and explains why the Nigerian military cannot defeat Boko Haram, 
ISWA, and why they treat the population as the enemy. 
It was not within the scope of this study to discuss the steps required to effect 
change to army culture or operations. The army is mired in self-preservation, self-
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aggrandizement, and maintaining political and societal hegemony in the state. The army 
cannot change operations or tactics without first changing the theoretical and operational 
culture. After researching the Nigerian army over the past three years, it is reasonable to 
believe army leadership does not have the intellectual ability to establish new thinking, 
new doctrine and readily address the existing structural problems. 
However, I will add that starting small, as with a platoon-sized change in culture, 
training, discipline, trust, tactical understanding, confidence building, treating soldiers 
with respect, which means on-time pay, food rations, plentiful weaponry, and working 
equipment, could eventually turn around a company, a brigade, or a division (Shamir, 
2000; Henderson, 1985). 
However, this must be met with a change to the entirety of the organizational 
culture. Ricks (2006) noted that this was the course chosen by the US military in Iraq. 
Initially, change came from retraining small units that were actively involved in daily 
combat. Units deployed from the U.S.were trained prior to theater deployment, and 
change came as a requirement to a changing battlefield. This was not a focused change 
limited to frontline units, every component of army operation changed with the emphasis 
placed on combat operations. 
However, Nigerian army command must first admit they have an issue and a 
problem in culture, organizational function, and tactical ability. To admit to problems and 
incompetence is not a sign of failure, but to ignore those problems and incompetence is a 
failure. Leadership must think creatively. If leadership cannot find their way forward, 
then bring military experts into train leadership. 
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Leadership involves strategy, and every military has its innate organizational 
abilities to fight a war. The Nigerian army could practice the methodology of “relentless 
pursuit,” an African bush tactic introduced by Eaben Barlow and Executive Outcomes in 
1995. When contact occurs, army units go on the offensive and hunt the insurgents to 
ground until destroyed. There are no static lines of combat in an insurgency; the army 
should operate “where the enemy is not,” putting the insurgents on defense, unable to 
carry out offensive operations, and constantly looking over their collective shoulders. 
These ideas require a fighting force of high caliber, imaginative motivation, 
doctrine, and training. The needed additional caveat is the unconditional support of the 
populace to provide intelligence and support. The Nigerian army has limited intelligence 
gathering capabilities as they are not a technology-driven fighting force. To abuse and 
kill civilians negates the best and usually only source of intelligence available.
According to O’Brien (2016), “doctrine provides the lingua franca for military 
planners and thinkers to discuss the military problems they face effectively” (para. 2). 
The Nigerian army should study the doctrinal and cultural changes made by the US, 
Britain, France, and a host of international armies fighting insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Prior to the drawdown, the US and NATO had great success in the country. 
It existed in the paradigm of Western-centric ideology and warfighting doctrine tempered 
with tribal and cultural understanding, but Nigerian military leaders understand African-
centric methodology. The Nigerian army should then tailor those learned experiences to 
their specific organizational intellect, capabilities, and competencies; to then change 
operational and tactical proficiencies for use in Nigeria. 
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Military education is crucial and should be housed in an ongoing framework in 
culture doctrine, creative thinking, and tactics. The Nigerian people deserve to be treated 
with respect and dignity; this is the foundation of counterinsurgency tactics. Win the 
people, then use population support to assist in defeating the insurgency. 
It simply takes one commander to practice the ideas taken from 
counterinsurgency doctrine to make positive social change. The question would remain if 
the army could overcome societal influence and strong anthropological narratives 
pertaining to tribalism and religion to make the necessary changes. In the end, this study 
dealt with a nation’s society and how societal dysfunction might influence military 
performance. To discuss operations or tactics is ultimately a non sequitur as the army's 
performance is heavily influenced by societal dysfunction. 
Conclusion
I initiated this study to understand why the Nigerian army cannot adequately meet 
Boko Haram and ISWAP on the battlefield and realize success. In addition, to understand 
why Nigerian citizens are abused and killed. One can understand the motivations of the 
insurgent groups; however, the army’s mandate through the constitution lay in protecting 
every national citizen. 
Since 2011, Boko Haram was identified as an emerging threat when the 
Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence released their Boko Haram 
Emerging Threat report to the U.S. Homeland (King, 2011). According to Kulungu 
(2019), the threat posed by Boko Haram (ISWAP) is more crucial today. I interviewed 
senior military personnel with leadership, combat experience, and scholarly expertise to 
identify failure causation and answer the research questions.
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This study identified the immense societal dysfunction found in Nigeria, with 
tribalism the main animating issue. Societal function affects military performance. The 
data and analysis revealed that the military operates as a dysfunctional organization with 
little hope of defeating the insurgencies. In addition, the Nigerian army is not immune 
from international law or the Geneva Conventions in how the army deals with the 
Nigerian people, the enemy, and non-combatants. 
The international community will not act against these insurgent and terror groups 
until they become a threat to the West or if they were found to be responsible for a terror 
attack. This is an unfortunate situation as Nigerian civilians, many of whom are in 
poverty and destitute, must wait in perpetuity for help. Humanitarian organizations are on 
the ground in Nigeria; perhaps the only avenue for the world to know of abuses and 
killings at the army's hands. But these groups and their members are in harm’s way, 
targets for Boko Haram. Boko Haram and ISWA are local and regional concerns, but an 
intervention will eventually have to be made as an emerging threat to the world. 
Before 9/11, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida were ignored by the West and were 
viewed as a local and regional threat and not considered a threat to the homeland. This 
failure cannot be allowed to reimagine with Boko Haram or ISWA providing a haven for 
the training of transnational terror groups. 
In addressing the dysfunction found in Nigerian society, societal structures must 
be dismantled, and the societal system remade or at least enhanced. This is a problematic 
situation as money and hegemony among the Nigerian tribes drives the social will. 
Overcoming entrenched tribalism will not occur, so the various tribes must come together 
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to fight the insurgency. However, this would take a transformational leader and a 
willingness to confront the issues throughout Nigeria. 
I would expect to have another 11-years of conflict with corresponding deaths and 
destruction. However, the conflict may never end. Throw in a potential coup d'état by the 
military, and the status quo is continued. In the meantime, this study has provided some 
understanding of why the Nigerian army is a failure and why the army will not change. I 
noted that throughout history, democracies had shown a prevalence in winning wars. This 
success was due to “democracies' superior human capital, civil-military relations, and 
cultural background” (Biddle & Long, 2004, p. 541). This is not the case in Nigeria, 
which fails in those societal requirements. It is society that must offer the first signs of 
change to affect the norms of military behavior. 
To add a note of optimism, the experts interviewed for this study to a person 
indicated that strong leadership is required in both the civilian political sector and in the 
military. However, an army requires a high level of stewardship and direction, not in the 
western tradition, but for what would work for the Nigerian army. However, increased 
guidance and sharing past experiences from insurgent wars may help Nigeria turn the 
corner. Army leadership must be open to assistance. There are few successful 
counterinsurgent wars. The British in Malay, NATO and the Americans in Iraq, and the 
Pershing initiative in the Philippines. To present a positive experience, I wrote on the 
Moro insurgency of 1896, and it can be found in Appendix D. 
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1A. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you agree 
or disagree that a democratic nation’s (regular) army be used to enforce domestic 
policy? Please explain your answer.
1B. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you 
believe that a nation’s military is a reflection/mirror of the society from which it 
sprang from both socially and culturally? 
1C. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education. Does the 
military of a democratic nation adopt its culture based on the culture and societal 
influence of the nation? Please explain. 
1D. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, could you 
explain how a nation’s military culture is developed? As a young officer and 
throughout your career, how were you instructed in morals, values, and ethics in 
carrying out military orders? 
I will show you a video obtained by Amnesty International (2014, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64) and referenced by the US State 
Department, which shows actions by the Nigerian Civilian Joint Task Force and the 
Nigerian Army. I would like your thoughts after the video, and I will ask you questions. 




1E. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, what do you 
believe are the causes (lapses) for incidents like this in which military personnel 
participate in torture or extrajudicial killing? 
1F. In 2006, US troops in Iraq were killing and abusing Iraqi citizens. Understanding the 
moral and ethical drift encountered in Iraq by US troops using conventional 
warfare (the reason Petraeus installed population-centric warfare doctrine). Could 
you extrapolate (based on the video) using your military training, experience, and 
or advanced education that in using conventional war practices, the same 
population abuse could be occurring in Nigeria by the Nigerian Army against 
civilians? 
 1G. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using 
your command experience, education, and training, can you assess the culture, 
training, leadership, and military norms of behavior demonstrated in this video? 
I would like you to read the following New York Times Report on Nigerian Army abuses 
titled “They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.’ Then Came Slaughter.”
. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/world/africa/nigeria-civilianmassacre.html
1H. I would like to get your opinion after reading this article and based on your 
military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command 
experience, education, and training; on the professionalism, internal culture, and 
actions demonstrated by the Nigerian Army as shown in this article? 
1I. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, use your 
command experience, education, and training. Can you explain the social and 
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cultural norms and expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and 
successful military?
1J. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using 
your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that a 90-day 
basic training boot camp is enough to instruct recruits on appropriate discipline, 
military culture, expectations, and moral and ethical responsibilities in combat? 
Please explain. 
1K. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using 
your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that if a 
nation’s army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption 
is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian 
violence is pervasive, political and civil accountability is non-existent and is on 
the verge of social and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful 
army? Please explain. 
1L. In a democratic nation, who is it (group, individual, institution, or population) that 
bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in how a military conducts’
itself in both peacetime operations and wartime operations? Please identify and 
explain why?
1M. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of corruption, tribalism, 
ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism” (political patronage), media 
manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female 
subjugation, illiteracy, and economic disparity. Based on your military training, 
experience, and advanced education, use your command experience, education, 
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and training. Is it possible for a nation’s army to isolate itself from society’s ills, 
exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain. 
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Appendix C 
Mapping Research Questions with Interview Questions
RQ1--How and 
to what extent 
does a nation’s 
military reflect 





1A. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced 
education, do you agree or disagree that a democratic 
nation’s (regular) army be used to enforce domestic policy? 
Please explain your answer.
1B. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced 
education, do you believe that a nation’s military is a 
reflection/mirror of the society from which it sprang from 
both socially and culturally? 
1C. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced 
education. Does the military of a democratic nation adopt its 
culture based on the culture and societal influence of the 
nation? Please explain. 
1D. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced 
education, could you explain how a nation’s military culture 
is developed? As a young officer and throughout your career, 
how were you instructed in morals, values, and ethics in 
carrying out military orders? 
1K. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced 
education, and using your command experience, education, 
and training. Do you believe that if a nation’s army sprang 
from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption 
is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the 
culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil 
accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social 
and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful 
army? Please explain. 
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RQ2--How and to what extent 
can marked societal 
dysfunction affect or inhibit 
military performance in 
Nigeria? 
1E. Based on your military training, experience, 
and advanced education, what do you believe are 
the causes (lapses) for incidents like this in which 
military personnel participate in torture or 
extrajudicial killing? 
1F. In 2006, US troops in Iraq were killing and 
abusing Iraqi citizens. Understanding the 
moral and ethical drift encountered in Iraq by 
US troops using conventional warfare (the 
reason Petraeus installed population-centric 
warfare doctrine). Could you extrapolate 
(based on the video) using your military 
training, experience, and or advanced 
education that in using conventional war 
practices, the same population abuse could be 
occurring in Nigeria by the Nigerian Army 
against civilians? 
 1G. Based on your military training, experience, and 
or advanced education and using your 
command experience, education, and 
training, can you assess the culture, training, 
leadership, and military norms of behavior 
demonstrated in this video?
1H. I would like to get your opinion after reading 
this article and based on your military 
training, experience, and or advanced 
education and using your command 
experience, education, and training; on the 
professionalism, internal culture, and actions 
demonstrated by the Nigerian Army, as 
shown in this article? 
1I. Based on your military training, experience, and 
or advanced education and using your 
command experience, education, and 
training. Can you explain the social and 
cultural norms and expectations found in a 
well-functioning, professional, and 
successful military?
1J. Based on your military training, experience, and 
or advanced education and using your 
command experience, education, and 
training. Do you believe that a 90-day basic 
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training boot camp is enough to instruct 
recruits on inappropriate discipline, military 
culture, expectations, and moral and ethical 
responsibilities in combat? Please explain. 
1L. In a democratic nation, who is it (group, 
individual, institution, or population) that 
bears the ultimate responsibility and 
accountability in how a military conducts’ 
itself in peacetime operations and wartime 
operations? Please identify and explain 
why?
1M. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, 
and present, of corruption, tribalism, ethnic 
conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism” 
(political patronage), media manipulation, 
citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power 
hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, 
and economic disparity. Based on your 
military training, experience, and or 
advanced education and using your 
command experience, education, and 
training. Is it possible for a nation’s army to 
isolate itself from society’s ills, exclusively 
acting as an independent institution of 




The Philippine Moro Insurgency
I have included this description of the Philippine Moro insurgency as an example 
of only one of two tremendously successful counterinsurgent campaigns in history. The 
other being the British-Malaya counterinsurgent campaign against the Malayan National 
Liberation Army, the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party.
The Philippine Moro campaign was not referenced much in contributing to 
modern counterinsurgency doctrine; however, there was a common thread to successful 
counterinsurgent operations. Army counterinsurgent doctrine is built on historical study, 
so the inclusion of the Moro campaign is relevant to the discussion. 
The US government claimed the territories of the Philippines after the Spanish-
American War. The military governance in the Philippines and specifically the Moro 
province, which had remained neutral in the Spanish-American war, led to an insurgent 
revolt against American “occupation.” The Moro campaign, which lasted from 1899 to 
1913, represented the first time the US conducted a counterinsurgency campaign outside 
the US and within an Islamic society. 
The Bates Agreement, signed in August 1899, allowed for indirect rule over Moro 
Mindanao and its neighboring islands (Sulu Archipelago) in the southern Philippines by 
the Moro sultans, provided that the Moro’s acknowledge American sovereignty. The 
initial plan for the Moro area allowed for each military governor to establish a system of 
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governance associated with economic development and educational initiatives to pacify 
the Moro population. Initial military operations were meant to support these activities. 
However, security threats and violent opposition made this strategy unworkable, 
and pacification by nation-building failed. It was left to General John J. Pershing to 
implement a disarmament policy to disarm the population and end Moro resistance. 
Subsequent military campaigns ended the Moro insurgency so that the civilian 
enhancement policy could finally be put into place, and the Moro areas were returned to 
civilian control in 1913. Each military governor of the Moro Province and three began 
their commands with different strategies for pacifying the Moros. The military 
government eventually adopted a strategy that relied on military force, but only after 
eight years of military governance focused on civil affairs and economics had failed to 
achieve results.
 General Leonard Wood (1903-1906) established the initial strategy of the 
American military government. Wood’s strategy focused on establishing a system of 
governance for the province. Wood believed that one firm military defeat would be 
enough to end all resistance, so he approached every act of resistance as if it were the 
last. Unfortunately, General Wood had it wrong as there was always one more battle 
around the corner until he was confronted with the Battle of Bud Dajo in the spring of 
1906. 
General Tasker H. Bliss (1906-1909) focused his strategy on the economic and 
educational development in the province. Bliss believed that Bud Dajo was the decisive 
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battle to end the Moro’s ability to offer martial resistance. He implemented security 
operations around the protection of and promotion of economic development. Bliss 
withdrew his forces out of contact with much of the population to be less confrontational. 
The tactics used by Wood and Bliss failed because neither felt that military intervention 
was needed to overcome the resistance. When Bliss returned his forces to the garrison 
environment, the Moro leaders were encouraged to ignore and disregard American 
military power. 
General John J. Pershing (1909-1913) was himself a Moro Datu, given this honor 
on his first deployment during the 1899 Philippine insurrection, and was the last military 
governor of the Moro province. Pershing was able to end the Moro resistance utilizing 
both indirect and direct-action campaigns. The Moros, located in isolated areas, exploited 
two weaknesses within the American governing structure. Only those Moros adjacent to 
and within proximity to American forces became loyal to the Manila government and 
enjoyed the economic benefits. 
The second weakness came out of the first; the US failed to address the Moro 
leadership in those areas and win them. A third issue concerned the Sultans, or Datu as 
they were known. The Datu’s main power behind the resistance, but the Moros could not 
sustain a long-drawn-out military campaign; they had neither the men nor arms to do so. 
No single Datu held sway over the others to influence policy, and defeating one 
Datu did not affect the other tribal members. Each Moro leader had to be conquered 
individually, and that never occurred until Pershing initiated his disarmament campaign. 
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Pershing arrived in the Moro province seeking to further the region's economic 
development and continue the work of improving conditions for the Moros. Pershing 
believed that good governance focused on economic and educational development. 
However, shortly after his arrival, reality set in when he learned firsthand that security 
was nonexistent. 
Pershing implemented a host of civil affairs actions along with security changes to 
pacify the province. Pershing met regularly with the local leaders to discuss issues, and 
he ordered his subordinates to do the same. Pershing ordered the garrisoned troops into 
the field to interact with the indigenous peoples and, in some cases cohabitating with 
them to build trust. Pershing passed acts that continued to remove exemptions and bring 
the Moro province further in line with the administrative system for all the Philippines. 
Pershing continued to enhance the educational system. 
Pershing also updated the Moro Exchange system and began industrial trading 
stations in the interior area. Pershing personally insisted on steps to improve labor 
practices by plantation owners, and Pershing was aware of the level of animosity between 
the Moros and the Filipinos, admitting that the Moros resented the Filipinos far more than 
the Americans. 
Pershing integrated more Moro leaders into the provincial government, and Moro 
leaders acted as deputy district governors and reinforced American authority even when 
acting within their traditional role. During Pershing's tenure, the most significant legal 
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and governmental change was the passage of a provincial disarmament law that went into 
effect in September 1911. 
However, only in 1913 did the violence become so pronounced that it was 
reported in the official reports. Violence to that point had been sporadic and low 
intensity. 1910 had brought about a redistribution of military forces within the Moro 
Province. Two additional battalions of Philippine scouts were added to the Moro 
province (Miller, 2009, p. 130).
Pershing utilized the increase to disseminate the troops into the province to man 
company-sized stations. In the rest of the Philippines, the scout and military troops were 
consolidated into battalion-sized or larger garrisons to cut costs. The extra troop strength 
allowed Pershing to establish four additional outposts in the troublesome Lanao district, 
assign a battalion to secure Davao, and establish eight new stations along the Cotabato 
River Valley ((Miller, 2009). Pershing’s approach can be seen from an excerpt of 
instructions given to the Philippine scout companies for their operations: “At regular 
intervals of not less than three months, if practicable, detachments will be sent to the 
principal localities, including rancherias and villages of influential wild men, to remain 
for short periods. During their stay at such places, and, in fact, always, both officers and 
enlisted men should use every endeavor to create and maintain friendly relations with the 
inhabitants, especially the Moros and wild people, to the end that the latter may be 
brought under governmental influence and control” (Miller, 2009, p. 131).
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Pershing recommended a permanent regimental headquarters in Jolo, a brigade 
headquarters in the Lake Lanao region, and another regimental headquarters in 
Zamboanga. He established several smaller camps at Keithley and Overton. Pershing 
increased the number of combat available troops within units that gave him more forces 
to interact with the population (Miller, 2009). Pershing’s increased Philippine troop 
readiness to a perpetual war footing status. Troop strength was increased from sixty 
soldiers in a company to 150. Pershing cut regimental headquarters staff by half, so the 
ratio of field troops to support staff was increased. Pershing designed military operations 
to augment civil authorities in maintaining order and control and eliminating pirate or 
outlaw bands. In 1909 the Subano ethnic group occupied and fortified a position in the 
hills not far from Zamboanga. 
A constabulary force was sent to investigate and attacked, taking casualties. 
Major J. P. Finley, the district governor of Zamboanga, took charge of military troops and 
put down the uprising. Finley did not use brute force to put down the revolt, and he 
moved slowly to avoid any hostile action (Miller, 2009, p. 135). 
Finley believed that if the troops acted in a nonaggressive manner and were 
friendly to the Subano people, he could establish trust and confidence between the 
indigenous people and the US government. Finley wanted to end the conflict without 
bloodshed by convincing the Subano that the US and Philippine governments were 
genuinely interested in their welfare. 
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 Finley’s strategy worked, and the Subano returned to their homes and aided the 
American forces in capturing and testifying against the Moro instigators of the rebellion 
(Miller, 2009, p. 136). The Subano operation demonstrates Pershing’s overall strategy in 
using troop presence to provide security without relying on actual military force to 
eliminate resistance.
Throughout 1912, vigorous patrolling by army, scout and constabulary units 
carried out disarmament. When patrolling units came across a Moro carrying a weapon, 
any weapon, the units attempted to talk the Moro into giving it up. Much of the time, 
however, the Moro chose to flee or fight. Pershing made sure that his field soldiers 
understood the meaning of a weapon to the Moro. Disarming a Moro meant damage to 
his honor, and he would feel the emasculation of having his weapon taken away (Miller, 
2009, pp. 142-143). 
Aggressive patrolling deterred organized resistance for most of that year. A minor 
engagement near Jolo in January of 1912 resulted in no U.S. fatalities, but twenty 
attacking Moros were killed when radical Moros engaged a column of four U.S. 
companies. The first violent resistance occurred in Jolo in November and December 1911 
when 1300 Moros opposed to disarmament occupied the crater of Bud Dajo, scene of the 
earlier 1906 battle. Pershing personally led a force of 1,000 Regular Army, Scouts, and 
Constabulary troops to deal with the situation (Miller, 2009, pp. 143). 
Negotiations by Pershing resulted in all but 300 of the resisters giving up and 
returning to their homes. After Pershing received guidance from the Philippine Governor-
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General, Newton W. Gilbert, it was decided that Pershing could neither directly assault 
the crater nor use artillery to shell the crater’s defenders to prevent a repeat of the 
political fallout accompanied the earlier 1906 Battle of Bud Dajo.
Pershing sealed off the crater and played a waiting game to compel the surrender 
of the remaining resisters when their supplies were exhausted. The Moro defenders were 
forced to attempt a breakout from the crater, and after several unsuccessful attempts, the 
majority surrendered (Miller, 2009, pp. 143-144).
General Pershing practiced indirect action missions in civil affairs actions before 
civil affairs had a name. Military force was tempered and judiciously applied, and all-out 
battles were few and far between. Heavy troop presence in trouble areas with the troops 
eschewing all-out violence and practicing peaceful interaction won the day. 
Finally, the Moro leadership and hardcore insurgents took the hilltop at Bud 
Bagsak, kidnapping 6,000 to 10,000 local villagers. The unarmed population was 
persuaded it was safe to return to their homes, but the core insurgent group refused any 
effort at a peaceful resolution. As a result, Pershing ordered a heavy assault against the 
insurgents. The Moro leadership was killed with 300 to 500 Moro insurgents (Miller, 
2009, pp. 145). 
While Pershing worked hard at peaceful cooperation and a means to quell the 
insurgent population, he was not hesitant to use overwhelming force when called for. It 
may have taken thirteen years, but peace was established by winning the hearts and 
minds of the population, proving that providing a reason to trust the political process was 
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far better than trusting the insurgents. Pershing engaged the population and built a society 
but was not afraid to use force when required. Pershing knew the Moro from a previous 
assignment to the province, and he did not want lifelong insurgents and tempered his 
policies to prevent future insurrections. 
